UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-31-2012

Steuerer v. Richards Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 39274

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Steuerer v. Richards Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 39274" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1150.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1150

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO

vs.

5

.e:.t'\

Appealed from the District Court of the
Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and

for\)J\G,QIJI,,,.
Hon.

~i)hf'

County

\I\.Y>\L.+\t_y

~ok>trl:

District Judge

e.~, \\, o.JttS

cbns+ope.~ x ~,MtAs

Attorney_ for Appellant_

Attorney_ for Respondent_
Filed this _ _..,_ day of - - - - - - , 2 0 _
-----------Clerk
By _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Deputy
CAXTON Pf'llf\J";Ef1S CALDWFI_L IDAHO 17S68S

Vol Ll.r'I\L d--- J'/J'fi.J

-

, ~ -

·

,,

,..., , .,. ,

l

lit\

(..V 0 Q,"1'1J

J,.j~

FILED

MAY 3 1 2011
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT_LI NCOLN lDAHO ,J

ROBERT E, WILLIAMS
IDAI{OSTATEBARNO. 1693

WILLIAMS~ MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168

Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone; (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: {208) 324-3135
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIITH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
Case No. CV-2010-212

DONALD E. STEUERER;

Plaintiff,

PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM
OF PLAINTIFF

vs

N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS ,
and JOHN DOES I-V,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, DONALD E. STEUERER, by and through hjs attorney of
record, Robert E. Williams of Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and submits this Pretrial

Memorandum pursuant to IRCP Rule 16(b),
A.

THE NATURE OF THE ACTION, This case is primarily an action to quiet title in

certain residential real property located in the city of Shoshonei Lincoln County, Idaho . In
addition to seeking an order quieting title to the real property in himself, the Plaintiff has
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requested that the Court determine two (2) Deeds to the real property conveying interests to the
Defendant be construed as mortgages securing loans on the real property and that the Court
determine the amount owed on the loans.
B.

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS,

The record ownership of the real property that is the

su.bject matter of the action is presently in the Defendant as accomplished by a Warranty Deed

from the Plaintiff recorded in 1997 and a Quitclaim Deed from the Plaintiff and the Defendant
to the Defendant recorded in the year 2000 ("Deeds"). Defendant claims these Deeds were not
intended to be conveyances of the fee simple ownership to the real property, but rather they

were mortgages securing the repayment of loans from Defendant to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims
that the Defendant loaned him $2,000.00 in the year 1997 and then made additional loans in the
years 2000 through 2010 in the form of the payment ofreal property taxes on the real property
subject in the total additional amount of $6,785.00. Defendant contends that she made
additional loans to Plaintiff in the amount of$5,000,00 over and above the amounts that

Plaintiff claims were loaned.
C.

ADMISSIONS OR STIPULATIONS. Although not formally admitted at this point,

Defendant appears to agree that the two (2) Deeds were intended to be mortgages and not
conveyances of the fee simple title to the real property. The Defendant also appears to agree

that the $2,000.00 paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendant in the year 1997 and the subsequent
payment of real property taxes by the Defendant in the years 2000 through 2010 were all loans
secured by mortgages on the real property in the fonn of the two (2) Deeds. Defendant also
appears to agree with Plaintiff's contention that the proper interest rate to accrue on each of the

PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM OP PLAINTl.FF
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loans is 12% per annum under Idaho Code§ 28-22-104(3).

D.

AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS.

To fully try the relevant issues before the Court)

Plaintiff requests that the complaint be amended to specifically provide, in addition to quieting
title to the real property, that the Court declare that the two (2) Deeds are mortgages

encumbering the real property and determine the amount owed on the loans secured by the
mortgages as of the date of trial.

E.

REMAINING FACTS TO BE LITIGATED.

A motion for summary judgment on all

issues has been filed by Plaintiff and will be heard on June 21, 2011. Remaining facts to be

litigated, if any, will be identified in the Court's ruling on the motion.
F.

ISSUES OF LAW TO :BE LITIGATED,

Plaintiff does not believe that there are any

remaining issues oflaw to be litigated.
G.

ORDERS TO EXPEDITE TRIAL

Plaintiff does not believe there are any orders

necessary to expedite the trial at this time.

H.
trial

EXHIBITS. Plaintiff intends to offer the following exhibits into evidence in the

of this matter:
1.

Warranty Deed from Defendant dated February 24, 1997

2.

Quitclaim Deed from Plaintiff and Defendant to Defendant dated May 8,

2000
3.

Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1812

4.

Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1807

5,

Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1809

PRETR1ALMBM0RANDUM Ol"PLAINTfFF

•3-

\\SERV.ER\SHAR.E\DATA\STEUBRER DONALD\RICHA.RDS\PRETR!ALMEMORANDUM 11 MAY 3JST.D0C

Page

I 231

14] 004/008

loans is 12% per annum under Idaho Code§ 28-22-104(3).

D.

AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS.

To fully try the relevant issues before the Court,

Plaintiff requests that the complaint be amended to specifically provide, in addition to quieting
title to the real property, that the Court declare that the two (2) Deeds are mortgages
encumbering the reai property and determine the amount owed on the loans secured by the

mortgages as of the date of trial.
E.

REMAINING FACTS TO BE LITIGATED.

A motion for summary judgment on all

issues has been filed by Plaintiff and will be heard on June 21, 2011. Remaining facts to be
litigated, if any, will be identified in the Court's ruling on the motion.
F.

ISSUES OF LAW TO BE LITIGATED,

Plaintiff does not believe that there are any

remaining issues oflaw to be litigated.
G.

ORDERS TO EXPEDITE TRIAL,

Plaintiff does not believe there are any orders

necessary to expedite the trial at this time,
H.

EXHIBITS. Plaintiff intends to offer the following exhibits into evidence in the

trial of this matter:
1.
2.

Warranty Deed from Defendant dated February 24, 1997
Quitclaim Deed from Plaintiff and Defendant to Defendant dated May 8,

2000
3.

Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1812

4.

Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1807

5,

Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1809
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6.

Defendant's handwritten note, dates February 25, 1997, March 3, 1997,
April 1, 1997, May 1, 1997 and June 1, 1997 in the left hand cohmm

7.

Lincoln County Tax Collector Delinquency Document 1983/1984

8,

1997 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated
December 20, 2000

9.

1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated

May8, 2000

10.

1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated

December 20, 2000
11.

1999 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated

December 20, 2000
12,

2000 'tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated
December 20, 2000 and June 20, 2001

13.

2001 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector dated
December 21, 2001 a.TJ.d Jur1e 19, 2002

14.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the
year 2002

15.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the
year 2003

16.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the

year 2004
17.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the
year2005

18.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the
year 2006

19.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Co1lectot for the
year2007
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-4·

\\SBR'v'.ER \SHAR.E\DATA\S7'BUERER, OON ALD\RICHARDS\PRITTRIAL MEMORANDUM l l lVIA Y 31 ST. DOC

Page

I 233

20.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax. Collector for the
year 2008

21.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the
year 2009

22.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the
year 2010

23.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1997

24.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1998

25.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1999

26.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2000

27.

History Report from the office oft.lie Lincoln Cou..11ty .Assessor for Lots 4 .
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the yeat 2001

28.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2002

29.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2003

30.

Histozy Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone; Idahoi for the year 2004

31.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshonei Idaho, for the year 2005

32.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2006

33.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2007

PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM OP PLAINTIFF
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34.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5i Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2008

35,

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2009

36.

History Report from the office of the Lincoln County Assessor for Lots 4
and 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2010

37.

Affidavit of Donn W. Borde-wyk

WITNESS LIST AA'D ADDRESSES.

Plaintiff intends to call the following

witnesses at the trial in this matter:
Donald E. Steuerer
POBox9

Shoshone,Idaho 83352

Donn W. Bordewyk

1833 Scutli Lincoln
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Linda Jones
111 West B Street, Suite A
Shoshone,Idaho 83352

Cathy Gilbert
111 Wyst f:lStreet, Suite T
Shoshone,Idaho 83352
N.E.M. Richards, aka Nicky Richards
POBoxK

Shoshone,Idaho 83352
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of May, 2011.
WILL1AMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

9u)lL
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l HEREBY CERTIFY That on this

~';/:y of

114.,; ,

2011, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addresses appear below

by the method indicated;

"

Alison E. Brace
Attorney at Law
Non Confrontational Legal Services, LLC
PO Box 6061
Boise ID 83707

.S. Mail, postage prepaid

D Hand Delivery D Court Folder
D Facsimile Transmission

0 Federal Express

PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PL.ATNTlFP

-7·
\\SERVER\SHAREIDATA\S11WJIB.ER, DONALD\RICI-IA.RDS\PR.E!'Rl.ALM.EM'.ORANDUM 11 MAY 3IST.DOC

Page

I 236

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
CV-2010-0000212
Donald E Steuerer vs. N.E.M. Richards
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 6/7/2011
Time: 9:03 am
Judge: John K Butler
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Candace Childers
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Petruzzelli
Tape Number:
900 Court introduces case. Time and place for pretrial.
Mr. Williams is present for the Plaintiff.
Ms. Richards is present in Court with Counsel Ms. Alison Brace.
Ms. Brace advises that case will go to summary judgment
Issues remaining are rather was in fact a mortgage.
Ms. Richards admits that it was in fact a loan and property was secured as collateral.
Also question of interest to be paid rather compounded or annual and also the way it was
calculated.
905 Mr. Williams is pleased to hear what the Defendant thinks the remaining issues are.
905 Ms. Brace also has a motion to withdraw. Ms. Brace advises that she took this case to
help negotiate and Ms. Richards was aware of this and that she was not intended to be the
trial lawyer and she told Ms. Richards this up front. Ms. Brace thought that they had a
settlement but they didn't. Ms. Brace understands that Ms. Richards has another Attorney
that may take this matter but does not have anything in writing at this time.

906 :Mr'. "\Villiams objects to withdraw of CouriseL Former Cow;isel h~s gp].y qee11 out of
the case for about 60 days. Mr. Williams would agree if new Counsel would abide by the
current scheduling order, summary judgment hearing and the trial his client would be
prejudice.
906 Court advises that because motion to withdraw is not noticed up for today that Ms.
Brace file her motion to withdraw and the Clerk will schedule for the next day that he is
available and it will be taken up at that time.
907 Comments from Ms. Richards.
909 Courts comments to Ms. Richard as far as representation. Court explains that Ms.
Brace will be her lawyer until hearing is held or new Counsel substitutes in as Counsel.
910 All dates remain at this time. Recess

=

COURT MINUTES

ChristopherP.Sirmns
Attorney at LawISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

IN THE DISTRJCT COLTR.T OF TIIB FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE .COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

Plaintiff,
vs.
N.E.M. RICHARDS, ak.a. NICKY
RICHARDS, and JOJW DOES I - V,

Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-2010-212
MOTION TO CONTINuE
AND RESET HEARING ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

SlJM11ARY JUDGMENT AND
TRIAL SETTING

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, through counsel, CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS,
and files this MOTION TO CONTINUE Al\TD RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUM1v1ARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING, and in support

thereof states as follows:
L

This matter is set for court trial on July 13, 2011, with hearing on Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment set for June 21, 2011.
2.

Counsel for

Defendant entered his appearance as attorney of record

simultaneously v.rith the filing oftbis motion.

MOTION TO CONTINlJE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ANu TRIAL SETTING
LOOO/tOOOWl

VVJ
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3.

Defendant has been represented by two prior attorneys, neither of whom filed, or

moved to file a compulsory counterclaim.
4.

Defendant's prior attorney's failed to conduct discovery, and failed to respond to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
5.

Defendant, by information and belief of counsel, is disabled, and appears to have

cognitive impairments which may have contributed to lack of preparation for the defense.
6.

Counsel for Defendant requires time to investigate his client's mental status and

how that issue may impact the case.
7.

Counsel for Defendant requires time to research the· facts and law of the case to

provide Defendant with due process oflaw due to the failures of prior counsel.
8.

Continuing and resetting both the hearing·on Motionfor Summary Judgment and

trial will serve the interests of Court efficiency and justice by avoiding a potential
malpractice action against prior counsel, and/or issues arising on appeal due to former
counsel's omissions.
V/HEREFORE, Defendant prays this honorable court enter its order continuing
and resetting hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and trial setting
herein.

(/,JC, I
STOPHER P. SIMMS

DATED

AITORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARJNG ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING
LOOO/vOOD{[/

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that ~n the

t?day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy

. of the foregoing MOTION TO CONTJNUE AND RESET HEARINU ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Al\1D TRIAL SEITING was delivered to
Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP,
153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135.

MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT M1D TRIAL SETTING

3
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB.#7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

SUZANNE McCONNELL. CLERK
DISTRICT COU~l~~-OL~_IE_AH_O

IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE comrTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

Plaintiff,
vs.
N.E.M. RICHARDS, ak.a. NICKY
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I- V,

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-2010-212
NOTICE OF HEAR1NG MOTION TO CONTINUE
AND RESET HEARING ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY mDGMENT Af.JTI
TRlAL SETTING

)

TO: ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARJNG ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR Sillv1MARY JUDGMENT Af.Jl) TRIAL SETTING on the 21st day of

June, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, before the Honorable John K. Butler,
District Judge, at which time you may be present and heard jf you so desire.
TTORNEY AT LAW

STOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

a .s. //

DATED

NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTJNUE AND RESET HEARING ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING

1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET

HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL
SETTING was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams,
Meservy, & Lothspeich, LU>, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338,
via Facsimile to 208.324.3135

NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON

PLATh.TTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING
LOOO!lDOO Wi

2
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SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT U~_C:_OLN IDAHO

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7 4 73

P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

)

)
Plaintiff,

)

vs.
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

CV-2010-212

NOTICE OF APPEAR.AJ~CE

)
)
)

C01v1ES NOW CHRISTOPHER P. STh1MS, Attorney at Law, and hereby enters
his appearance for the Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, herein.

U7.

/6,;/
DATED

STOPHER P. STh1MS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the/(;" day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE was delivered to Robert E. Williams,
Attorney for Plain.1:iff:

of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street,

PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
LOOO/ZOOOIEJ

P~ge
YV.,Cf
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i-ax - N<.;L:S Io:Steuerer v. Richards; Motion to Withdraw (12088862458)

12:12 06116/11GMT-05 Pg 04-09

NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC
Alison Brace. Atfomey
P 0. Box 6051
Boise. !D 83707

"Ill l
Lui.

208-353-5213
IS8. 6611

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of THE
STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEURER.
Plaintiff.
vs

Case No CV-2010-212
AFF1DAV!T OF ALISON BRACE
IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO
WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL OF
RECORD

N E.fvi RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS,
and JOHN DOES !-V,
Defendants

STATE OF lDAHO
Count11 of Ada
f, Alison E. Brace. being first duly sworn upon oath do state as follows:
I am counsel of record for N E.M Richards. aka Nicky Richards. ihe Defendant in the
above-captioned matter
2

I have represented Defendant since March 29. 2011.

3.

Al the time i was retained. Defendant and! agreed that I would attempt to negotiate a

seWen1ent in the n1atter.

4.

H was agreed at ihe time counsel was hired that. if !he matter continued on to irial.

Defendant would iocate another attorney to pursue the trial
5.

At ihe time Mr. Williams filed his Motion for Summary judgment. it appeared that a

settlement was possible.
6.

However. since !ha( (ime. it has become apparent ihat settle;11ent is not an option in this

Page
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1 o;-:,reuerer

v. Richards; Motion to Withdraw (12088862458)

12:12 06/16/11GMT-05 Pg 05-09

mailer
7

Counsel has informed Defendant that an extension of time for any of the trials is nol an

option. and thai she must eiiher retain counsel or proceed prose al the June 21" Summary
Judgment hearing. as well as the Ju'y 13"' couri tria!.
/-

DATE;,

//,J.,A',.,(_, /

5

. 2011

Attorney

SUBSCRIBE:D AND SWORN before me ihis

IS'

day of June. 2011

/

/",. _J

~///JI~

SAttY V. SYACKU:
No/or;,~
Sta!eof~

v/NQTA.::v( PUBLIC FOR lDAHO
/"i/

,.

;. ,,UUvJ
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NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTlONS. LLC
Alison Brace. At!omey

V

P.O.Box6061
Boise ID 837}7
208-353-5213

I

..
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.
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ISB 6611
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, !N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

Case No. CV-2010-212

DONALD E. STEURER.

MOTION TO WITHDRAW

Piainti:f
vs

N.EM. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS,
and JOHN 00!::S !-V.
Defendanis

COMES NOW Alison E. Brace. from the firm Non Confroniational Legai Solutions.
pursuant io Rule 11 (b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. and moves this Cour: for an Order
allowing her to withdraw as attorney of record for N. E. M. Richards, aka Nicky Richards.
DeTendanL

Seid motion is supported by the Affidavit of Alison Brace. aitacr1ed.
Oral argument is requested

2011

Attorney

MOT!ON TO V·J!THOqf...\/\/. i
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10:;:,teuerer v. Richards; Motion to Withdraw (12088862458)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify I served a copy of this Motion to all the parties named below, by United States Mail:
Robert E. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338

/s/ Alison E. Brace
Aiison E. Brace

NOTICE OF HEARING -2
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v. Richards; Motion to Withdraw (12088862458)

12:12 06/16/11GMT-05 Pg 03-09

CERTiFICATE OF SERVJCE

I hereby certify l served a copy of this Motion to all the parties named below. by United States Mail:

NE.M. Richards
P.O. 8:JX 950
Shoshone, ID 83352
Rober'. E. Williams
Wil!iams, Meservy & Lothspeich LLP
PO Box 168
Jerome ID 83338
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Ida_ho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

JUN 16 2011
SUZANNE Mee
DISTRICT COUR?~~~'ECLL, CLERK
• OLNIDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,

)
)
)
)

)
)
------=Dc...::e=fe=n=dan=ts=,_ _ _ _ _ _)

CV-2010-212
NOTICE OF HEARING MOTION TO CONTINUE
AND RESET HEARING ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
TRIAL SETTING

TO: ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
Notice is hereby given that Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, will call up for hearing
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING on the 21st day of

June, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, before the Honorable John K. Butler,
District Judge, at which time you may be present and heard if you so desire.

C :r.
RISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

11

DATED

NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON 1
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT A.ND TRIAL SETTING
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET
HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMl\1ARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL
SETTING was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams,
Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338,
via Facsimile to 208.324.3135

firistopher P. Simms

NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON 2
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTINGPage I 250

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7 473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

JUN 16 2011
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DlSTRICT COURT LINCOLN lDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
)
)
-------==D=-=e=fe=n=d=an=t=s,_ _ _ _ _ _ )

CV-2010-212

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

COMES NOW CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, Attorney at Law, and hereby enters
his appearance for the Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, herein.

STOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

DATED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

IS day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE was delivered to Robert E. Williams,
Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street,
PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
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JUN 16 2011

Christopher P. Sim.1us
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

SUZANNEM
D/SiRJCT cou';?uNN~LL, CLERK

N,.,OLNIDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I- V,
)
)
Defendants,
-----~
- ~ ~ - - - - - - .)

CV-2010-212
MOTION TO CONTINUE
AND RESET HEARING ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
TRIAL SETTING

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, through counsel, CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS,
and files this MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING, and in support
thereof states as follows:
1.

This matter is set for court trial on July 13, 2011, with hearing on Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment set for June 21, 2011.
2.

Counsel

for

Defendant

entered his

appearance

as

attorney

of record

simultaneously ,vith the filing of this motion.

MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
1
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING
Page I 253

3.

Defendant has been represented by two prior attorneys, neither of whom filed, or

moved to file a compulsory counterclaim.
4.

Defendant's prior attorney's failed to conduct discovery, and failed to respond to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
5.

Defendant, by information and belief of counsel, is disabled, and appears to have

cognitive impairments which may have contributed to lack of preparation for the defense.
6.

Counsel for Defendant requires time to investigate his client's mental status and

how that issue may impact the case.
7.

Counsel for Defendant requires time to research the facts and law of the case to

provide Defendant with due process of law due to the failures of prior counsel.
8.

Continuing and resetting both the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment and

trial will serve the interests of Court efficiency and justice by avoiding a potential
malpractice action against prior counsel, and/or issues arising on appeal due to former
counsel's omissions.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this honorable court enter its order continuing
and resetting hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and trial setting
herein.

RlSTOPHf'.R P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

DATED

MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ;?day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING was delivered to
Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP,
153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135.

MOTION TO CONTINUE AND RESET HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
3
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL SETTING
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JUN 17 2011
Cbristopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473

SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO

P.O. Box 1861

Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

IN TIIB DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

"STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER
Plaintiff,
vs.

N.E.M. RICHARDS, ak.a. NICKY
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV-2010-212
MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SU11MARY nJDGMENT

------""D;....;;e=fe=n=d=an=ts=,------)
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, N.E.M Richards tlrrough counsel, and files tlris

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, and in support thereof states as follows:
1.

This matter is set for hearing on Pfa111tit-'f's Motion for Summary Judgment June

21, 2011.

2.

Counsel for Defendant entered his appearance as attorney of record on June 15,

2011.
3.

Defendant's prior attorney's failed to respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
6000/ZOOOlm
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4.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice of Hearing thereon were

filed Yvith this Court on or about May 13, 2011, yet Defendant's prior attorney failed to
respond in any way, either by opposing affidavit or Memorandum of Law.

5.

Defendant has credible, compelling affidavit testimony, clarifying that produced

at deposition that will create material issues of fact preventing summary judgment from

being entered. ( and that would be the basis for summary judgment for Defendant if prior
counsel had filed such a motion)
6.

The relevant legal issues would be illuminated by allowing Defendant the

opportunity to fully brief the court prior to oral argument on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Defendant has very strong, persuasive legal arguments to be made
against summary judgment

\V1IEREFORE, Defendant prays this honorable court enter its order granting
leave of court to file late response to Plaintiff's Motion for Surn....ma.ry Judgment.

RESPEC~ Y SUBMITTED,

/j
~/ti,.//
C

STOPHERP. SIMMS

DAIBD

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF SER\t1CE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

/-J- day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered to Robert E.
Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East

Main Street, PO Box 168, Jeromeldaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135.

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

MOUON FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLA.INTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGME:t'<'T
6000/tOOO®
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PARCEL: RP S010000E004A A

Hlti'l'U.KI

SHOSHONE
LOTS 4 & S
BLOCK E

BOX 686

CODE AREA

SHOSHONE
RY
1993

41

1993

10000

ID 83352

QUANTITY

TOT~LS

Fl:Help

.J...J.:,,

LEG.AL DESCRIPTION

NAME/ADDRESS
STEUERER, DONALD E

CAT
20

l~.1-1.l'..

F3=Exit

UN

VALUE

HO MRKT

HO ED!P

4176
1000

1000

500

5176

1000

500

F5=N'EXT HISTORY

F7:LEGAL

F8:CAT

CB MRKT

F12=MASTER
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION

NAME/ADDRESS

SHOSHONE

RIC'"tlARDS, N.E.M

LOTS 4 & 5

BLOCK E

PO BOX K

CODE ARE.A

SHOSHONE

rn·

CAT

RY

QUANTITY

20
41

1998
1998

TOTALS
Fl=Relp

F3=Exit

10000

83352
UN

VALUE
4176

HO MRKT

HO EXMP

3 000

3 000

1500

7176

3000

1500

F6=NEXT HISTORY

F7=LEGAL

FB=CAT

CB MRKT

RS MR.KT

Fl2=MASTER
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FILED AM

PM

/°

v, If I rr_J b1

Christopher P. Simms

JUN 17 2011

Attorney at Law ISB #7473

P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idabo 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN" AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
DONALD E. STEUERER
Plaintiff,
vs.
N.E.M. RJCIM..RDS, ak.a l\TICKY

RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
).
)
)

CV-2010-212

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

)
)
)

I.R.C.P 7(b)(3)(A)

CO:MES NOW Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, by and through her attorney of
record, Christopher P. Simms and files this MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME and in

support thereof states the following:
1.

Defendant retained present counsel on or about June 15, 2011 and entered bis

appearance on her behalf that same day.

2.

Defend.ant was represented by prior counsel· who utterly failed to respond to

Plaintiff's Motion for Sum.mazy Judgment, by opposing affidavit ormemorandum oflaw.
3.

Present counsel has judiciously yet expediently apprised himself of the facts

of

the case at hand, as well as the relevant case law and statutory provisions and prepared a
response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in the form of an AFFIDAVIT OF ·

N.E.M. RICHARDS IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR Sillv.Th1ARY
JUDGMENT, and DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
6000/9000 [£]

I
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, which response is late in the context of

I.R.C.P. 56.
4.

Counsel for Defendant filed contemporaneously herewith MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SlJMMARY

5.

In that Counsel for Defendant was retained a full week after the deadline to file a

response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, it was impossible to produce a

timely response.
6.

Defendant would be greatly prejudiced if she is not permitted to formally respond

to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, as will prior counsel.
7.

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1)(3)(A) states, "A written motion, other than

one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereon shall be filed with the
court, and served so that is received by the parties no later than fourteen (14) says before
the time specified for the hearing."
8.

Due to prior counsels' collective failures to adequately represent Defendant, and

the necessity of present counsel to be retained to properly defend against the actions of
Plaintiff, the time limits of the civil rules should be shortened such that Defendant's
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, can be heard at9:00 am., June 21, 2011
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this honorable Court, in the interest of justice,
enters an Order granting Motion to Shorten Time.

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

2
Page
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r;,/ /,
HRISTOPHER P. STh{MS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HERFBY CERllFY that on the/?- day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME was delivered to Robert E. Williams,
Attorney for Plain:tiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street,
PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

3
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FILED A,Vi ..,..,_,.....,...,-

PM n

'

JUN 17 2011

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF IDAHO
IN A.ND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
DONALD E. STElJERER,

)

CV-2010-212

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.ka 1'HCKY
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I- V,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF HEARING MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
· AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE LATE RESPONSE TO
PLA.IN!IFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY WDG1\1ENT

TO: ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
Notice is hereby given that Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, will call up for hearing
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LAIB
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY mDGMENT on the 21st

day of June, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, before the Honorable John K. Butler,
District Judge, at which time you may be present and heard if you so desire.

RNEY AT LAW

STOPHERP. SIMMS
A1TORNEYFORDEFENDANT

DATED

NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME A.ND MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUM:MARY
JUDGtvIBNT

1
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6000/SOOO !EJ

XVd Ov :91 TT07./LT/AO

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

/-7-- day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME M1D

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FlLE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SlJ1iMAR.Y JUUGMEN"T was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of
Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome
Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135

NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO SHORIBN TIME AND MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE LATE RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUM:MARY

2

mDGMENT
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FILEU

\

NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC
Alison Brace, Attorney
P.O . Box 6061
Boise, ID 83707
208-353-5213
ISB: 66 11

~

JUN 17 2011

L

SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEURER,
Plaintiff,
vs

Case No. CV-2010-212
AFFIDAVIT OF ALISON BRACE
IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO
WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL OF
RECORD

N.E.M. RICHARDS , aka NICKY RICHARDS ,
and JOHN DOES 1-V,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada
I, Alison E. Brace, being first duly sworn upon oath do state as follows:
1.

I am counsel of record for N.E.M. Richards, aka Nicky Richards , the Defendant in the

above-captioned matter.
2.

I have represented Defenclant since March 29, 2011 .

3.

At the time I was retained, Defendant and I agreed that I would attempt to negotiate a

settlement in the matter.
4.

ft was agreed at the time counsel was hired that, if the matter continued on to trial ,

Defendant would locate another attorney to pursue the trial.
5.

At the time Mr. Williams filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, it appeared that a

settlement was possible .
6.

However, since that time, it has become apparent that settlement is not an option in this

AFFIDAVIT OF ALISON BRACE IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO WITHDRAW -1

Page
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matter.
7.

Counsel has informed Defendant that an extension of time for any of the trials is not an

option, and that she must either retain counsel or proceed prose at the June 21st Summary
Judgment hearing, as well as the July 13ih court trial.

DAT~

@A(i]£f/lae1, ""

J 5~ 2011

Alison E. Brace
Attorney
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

/ .!(

/

day of June, 2011.

~p~~
,;6014-e , ~

Residing at:
My Commission E x p i r e s : ~ o / /

AFFIDAVIT OF ALISON BRACE IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO WITHDRAW-2
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FILED

AMi.4J..'~-

PM

JUN 17 2011

NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC
Alison Brace, Attorney
P.O. Box 6061
Boise, ID 83707
208-353-5213
/SB: 6611

SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEURER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2010-212
MOTION TO WITHDRAW

VS

N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS,
and JOHN DOES 1-V,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Alison E. Brace, from the firm Non Confrontational Legal Solutions,
pursuant to Rule 11 (b) of the Idaho Rules of Civli Procedure, and moves this Court for an Order
allowing her to withdraw as attorney of record for N.E.M. Richards, aka Nicky Richards,
Defendant.
Said motion is supported by the Affidavit of Alison Brace, attached.
Oral argument is requested .

.....,-,
DATE-<iUbV'-

15 ,2011.

·.
f,..,A )
_. CL4-1C;11..J
[;.
'

~ :

Alison E. Brace
Attorney

o~

!- ~ / / ?

j

.1
!

!

I

MOTION TO WITHDRAW-1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify I served a copy of this Motion to all the parties named below, by United States Mail:
N.E.M. Richards
P.O. Box 950
Shoshone, ID 83352
Robert E. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338

·{~8~
Alison E. Brace

/

MOTION TO WITHDRAW -2

Page

I 269

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7 4 73
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

j JUN 2 0 2011
I

SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN lDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTHJUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
)
)
Defendants,
)
------""-====-'-------

CV-2010-212

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, N.E.M. Richards through counsel, and files this
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
and thereof states as follows:
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Defendant, Ms. Richards, has been represented by two prior attorneys, neither of
whom conducted any discovery.

Plaintiff's deposition has not been taken, and no

interrogatories or requests to produce documents were propounded on behalf of Ms.
Richards. In addition, prior counsel failed to interview Ms. Richards to determine the
true nature of the facts of the case, or advise her as to the legal framework guiding this
litigation.

Therefore, this matter will come on for hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment without adequate factual discovery having occurred, and without
Plaintiff's own testimony, unfiltered by counsel's authorship, before the court.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
WDGMENT

If

1
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permitted by the Court, Defendant will file counterclaims, conduct discovery, and pursue
a Motion for Summary Judgment on those claims, and as to Plaintiffs claim, in due
course and in compliance ·with any litigation schedule ordered by the Court.
Plaintiffs "sworn statements" as contained in his affidavit in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, and "verified statements" drafted by counsel, are unchallenged
by the test of cross-examination.

The Court has only the deposition testimony of

Defenda.11t, lead by opposing counsel, without objection from Defendant's counsel, to
provide background factual narrative. Defendant submits simultaneously herewith the
Affidavit ofN.E.M. Richards in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
(Richard's Affidavit) to provide a more complete, balanced factual background reflecting
the intent of the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACT
Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, is a single, disabled woman, age sixty, (60) residing
in the City of Shoshone, Idaho. (Richards Deposition pg. 9; Richards Affidavit, pg 1,
parag. 1 & 2; hereinafter referred to for citation as "RD" and "RA" respectively) Ms.
Richards met Plaintiff, Donald Steuerer in the late 1980s when she purchased a home,
located at 115 N. Greenwood in the City of Shoshone, across the street from the home in
which Plaintiff resided, 110 N. Greenwood, legally described as Lots 4 and 5, Block E of
the Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County, Idaho, according to the official plat map
thereof. (hereinafter also referred to as "the real property in question" or "at issue") (RA
pg. 2, parag. 2)

In the late 1990s Ms. Richards began providing money to Mr. Steurerer, at his
request, because he said he could not pay the real prope1iy taxes due on the above

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
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described real property which Steuerer represented to be delinquent, and upon which a
tax sale was imminent. (RA pg 2, parag. 5) Ms. Richards believed Steuerer ovmed the
property, and had no knowledge other than provided by Mr. Steuerer regarding taxes, or
of other liens or encumbrances relating to the real property. (RA pg 2 parag. 6) Prior to
February of 1997 Ms. Richards had provid~d Mr. Steuerer two thousand dollars ($2,000).
(RA pg 2, parag. 8)

On or about February 24, 1997, Donald Steuerer, as Grantor, executed a \Va.rra.11ty
Deed and delivered same to Donald E.K. Steuerer and N.E.M. Richards, as Grantees,
whereby the property in question was conveyed from Plaintiff solely to Plaintiff and
Defendant jointly. As a result of this transaction Ms. Richards believed herself to be the
one half (1/2) ovmer of the property in question. In 1997 Ms. Richards believed the value
of the property to be approximately six thousand dollars $6,000, or the value determined
by the Tax Assessor. (RA pg 3, parag. 11)
Between 1997 and 2000 Ms. Richards provided Mr. Steuerer, in addition to the
two thousand dollars ($2,000) referred to above, five thousand dollars ($5,000) more,
again under the same circumstances. (RA pg 3, parag. 14) In May of the year 2000 Ms.
Richards learned that Donald Steuerer had not in fact paid real property taxes past due on
Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, as he had led Ms. Richards to believe. (RA pg. 3
parag. 15)
On or about May 8, 2000, Donald E.K. Steuerer and N.E.M. Richards, as
Grantors, executed a Quitclaim Deed and delivered same to N.E.M. Richards as Grantee,
whereby the property in question was conveyed from joint ovmership of the parties, to
the sole ownership of Ms. Richards. As a result of this transaction Ms. Richards believed
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herself to be the sole owner of the property in question. (RA pg 4, parag. 18) In 2000
Ms. Richards believed the value of the property to be approximately seven thousand
dollars ($7,000), or the value determined by the Tax Assessor. (RA pg. 4parag. 19)
At the time of the Quitclaim deed in the year 2000, Ms. Johnson had given Mr.
Steuerer seven thousand dollars ($7,000) up to this point in time, and he had not repaid
her any money. (RD pg. 27, ln. 1-22, pg. 17, In. 11-15) Ms. Richards believed and
believes; she had an agreement with Mr. Steuerer that he \Vould repay her seven thousand
dollars, ($7,000) consisting of the first two thousand dollars ($2,000) provided to Steurer
prior to 1997, and the five thousand dollars ($5,000) provided to Steuerer between 1997
and 2000, as soon as possible, within the time frame, and that she would not charge him
rent; and if he paid her back, within the time frame, she would reconvey the property in
question. (RA pg. 5 parag. 22) No specific time frame, or date was discussed or agreed
to for repayment and reconveyance, other than, as soon as possible. (RA pg. 5, parag. 22)
Beginning on or about May 8, 2000, Ms. Richards began to pay back due and
owing taxes on the property at issue and has paid all taxes due relating to said real
property from that date forward representing tax years 1996 to present. (RA pg. 4, parag.
21) Ms. Richards made these payments because she believed she was the sole owner of
the real property.

(RA pg. 4 parag. 21) Based on the agreement she had with :tv1r.

Steuerer she would have reconveyed the property in question to him upon repayment of
funds provided, if he had done so as soon as possible within a reasonable time. (RA pg.
5, parag. 21, RD pp. 16, ln.11-21, pg. 17, In. 2-4, pg. 26, ln. 8-12) Mr. Steuerer made no
effort, nor tendered any payment to Ms. Richards for years, and years. (RA pg. 5, parag.
23)
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As time passed Ms. Richards determined that any agreement to reconvey the
property had expired, because Mr. Steuerer had not repaid her as soon as possible within
the time frame of providing him the funds. (RA pg. 5 parag. 24)

Apparently, Mr.

Steuerer learned in 2009 or 2010 that a third party had a commercial interest in the
property at issue, and suddenly became interested in redeeming title. (RD pp.17, ln.1116)

ANALYSIS
FACT ISSUES

Defendant does not dispute Plaintiffs legal recitation of the typical standard of
review regarding summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate when no

genuine issues of material fact are pre:sented based upon the pleadings, depositions and
admissions on file together with any affidavits. The current posture of this case presents
genuine issues of material fact, only resolved by the Court's ability to judge the
credibility of witnesses.
Defendant vigorously disputes Plaintiffs strained and incomplete version of the
facts. Plaintiff cites to pages 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 26, 29, 35, 38, 51 and 52 of Defendant's
deposition for the proposition that "They have always agreed that upon repayment of the
loans, the Real Property would be reconveyed to Steuerer, in that the deeds constituted
security devices for the repayment of the loans." Plaintiffs conclusory assertion is
incomplete and intentionally leaves out crucial factual information testified to by Ms.
Richards.
Ms. Richards has always believed she held ownership, but did in fact use the term
"loans" for the sums provided Mr. Steuerer, conditioned upon repayment as soon as
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possible, within the time frame of the loans. (Richards Deposition transcript "RD" pg.
16, ln. 14-22; pg.;17, ln. 4; pg. 24, ln. 13-25; pg. 25, ln. 4-20; pg. 26, ln. 8-12; pg. 28; pg.
51, 10-17; pg. 52, ln 1-20; pg. 56, ln. 17-20, RA pg. 1, parag. 3, pg. 3, parag. 11, pg. 4,
parag. 18 & 21, pg. 5, parag. 22) Even if Ms. Richards understood exactly what a
"security device" was, she didn't believe that's what she held. (RD pg 51 ln. 20-25, and
see citations above for belief in ownership) She has repeatedly stated she has believed
from tlie time of the W a...1Tanty Deed that she owned, first half, and after the Quitclaim
deed, all the property in question.

It is true she agreed to reconvey the ownership

interest, if she were repaid as soon as possible within the time frame of the payments.
However, timely repayment did not occur.
LEGAL ARGUMENT

The law is abundantly clear that conveyance of real property by deed is
conclusive as to transfer ownership. LC. § 55-606. Here the instruments used to transfer
title were first a warranty deed, and secondly a quitclaim deed, both fully satisfying the
statute of frauds, and providing certain covenants and warranties of title. LC. §§ 9-503,
55- 612. In addition to those warranties and covenants implied by statute for all grants, a
warranty deed expressly provides, among others, covenant to provide defense of title as
to all claims. Amonson v. Idaho Development Co., 25 Idaho 615, 139 P. 352 (Idaho
1914) (Black's Law Dictionary-warranty deed definition)
The law presumes that the holder of title to property is the owner thereof Erb v.
Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328 at 331, 824 P.2d 903 (Idaho App. 1992); Hawe v. Hawe, 89
Idaho 367, 406 P.2d 106 (1965); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 324 P.2d 380 (1958).
Plaintiff would have this court believe he didn't understand that he conveyed first half,
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then the entirety of the property in question to Ms. Richards, when the deeds were
absolutely clear as to that plain fact. Plaintiff implies that somehow it was he, not Ms.
Richards who was taken advantage of; he who took thousands of dollars from an
emotionally challenged disabled women; he who never repaid a cent or showed any
interest in recovering the real property until a third party showed valuable interest.
Plaintiff argues that these deeds, absolute on their face were in fact mortgages.
Idai.11o Cou...rts have repeatedly rejected similar claims. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho
799,241 P.3d 972 (Idaho 2010); Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087 (Idaho
2006); Shaner v. Ratgdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916),

"It is a

well-settled rule of law that where one asserts that a deed shall be given a different
construction from that clearly appearing on its face, claiming that it is a mortgage, he
must show by clear and convincing evidence that a mortgage, and not a sale with the
right to repurchase, was intended." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087, at
1091-92. (Idaho 2006)
A person may purchase lands, and at the same time contract to reconvey them for
a certain sum, without the intention of either party that the transaction should in effect be
a mortgage." Id at 1092, quoting Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho 546, 551, 290 P. 205, 207
(1930). The transaction at issue here is clearly such a case. Ms. Richards plainly viewed
the transaction as one whereby she took ownership, but under certain, somewhat unclear
circumstances, she would have reconveyed the property to Mr. Steuerer. The factual
difficulty with the case is lack of a written agreement to repurchase or re-convey. In this
regard it is Plaintiff's burden by clear and convincing evidence to overcome the legal
presumption. Shaner v. Ratgdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916)

7
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
Page I 276
JUDGMENT

The Hogg Court recited the factors to be considered when deciding whether a
deed absolute on its face is a mortgage; (a) the existence of a debt to be secured, (b) the
satisfaction or survival of the debt, (c) the previous negotiations of the parties, (d) the
inadequacy of the price paid, (e) the financial condition of the grantor, and (f) the
intention of the parties. In Hogg, the Court affirmed the trial court, finding a conveyance
of title rather than a mortgage. The Court emphasized that no evidence was presented of
any pressure to enter into the transaction. The court also referenced the fact that, like in
the case at bar, no effort was made to re-acquire the property.
"Whether a debt was to be secured is less than abundantly clear on the facts before
the court, certainly if a debt it was, it has not been repaid. The parties' recollections are
at odds concerning their negotiations. Plaintiff argues that the price paid was inadequate
and that "The fair market value of the Real Property was substantially in excess of the
loans made by Richards to Steuerer at the time they were made." This contention is in ·
obvious contradiction to the only evidence on this issue, the Tax Assessors Records.
(Attached hereto)
In 1997 the Assessor valued the land at four thousand one hundred seventy six
dollars ($4,176) and improvements at one thousand dollars ($1,000), while Ms. Richards
paid two thousand dollars ($2,000) for her purchase of a one half (1/2) interest thereof.

In the year 2000 the Assessor continued to value the land at four thousand one hundred
seventy six dollars ($4,176), while the improvements had risen to three thousand dollars
($3,000), while Ms. Richards paid five thousand dollars ($5,000) in addition to the two
thousand dollars ($2,000), previously paid, for a grand total of seven thousand dollars
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($7,000) for her outright purchase of the property. In other words, the evidence proves
that Ms. Richards paid to Mr. Steuerer almost the exact amount the Assessor determined
to be the value of the property.
As to the last two factors, Ms. Richards only knows what Mr. Steuerer told her
about his financial condition, and his intentions regarding their transaction. Ms. Richards
did discover that Mr. Steuerer had not used the initial sums provided to Mr. Steuerer to
pay· real property taxes. l\1s. PJ.chards car1 state vlitl1 certain(y v1hat her intentions ,;vere

with regard to the transactions; that she believed she gained an ownership interest by
payments to Mr. Steuerer. Ms. Richards confirmed that belief in her ov.rnership by
consistent payment of real property taxes commencing the very same day she acquired
fee simple title, by Quitclaim Deed on May 8, 2000. Mr. Steuerer on the other hand,
made no actions and took no steps, confirming in any way that he believed the
transactions were mere mortgages.
Idaho Court's have rejected the proposition, put forth by Plaintiff here, that when
at the time of execution of an absolute conveyance a separate agreement to reconvey is
also executed, that trans~ction will constitute a mortgage. Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho
355, at 362,399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965)

The rule above stated is too narrow. See criticism, note 3, p. 234, LR.A.
[N.S.] 1916B. It fails to incorporate other necessary and controlling
elements, and eliminates the question of intention of the parties, and
encroaches upon their right to contract. In effect, literally speaking, this
portion of the opinion holds that a deed, in form an absolute conveyance,
expressing the intention of the parties, coupled with possession, payment
of taxes, assertion of ownership, and with a positive understanding by the
grantee that he had an absolute conveyance and his positive refusal to
accept anything but an absolute conveyance, cannot be upheld as such, if
at the time of the execution of the deed an agreement was entered into to
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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reconvey the property. Such a holding is contrary to the great weight of
authority, and not in harmony with prior and recent decisions of this court.
Whether a deed, absoiute in its face is to be deemed a mortgage depends upon the
intention of the parties in regard to it at the time of its execution. "In order to convert a
deed absolute in its terms into a mortgage, it is necessary that the understanding and
intention of both parties, grantee as well as grantor, to that effect should be
concurrent and the same." Clontz, 88 Idaho 355 at 362, 399 P.2d 949 at 952. (emphasis

added) Therefore, even if this Court believes Plaintiffs current claim that he believed
these transactions were mortgages and not conveyances, it must also find that Ms.
Richards also held the same belief. No evidence has been presented to support such a
finding, quite the contrary. Ms. Richards has uniformly and consistently held out that she
owned the property.
STANDING I EQUITY/ LACHES I ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff comes to this court seeking to have this cou..."'i declare the transaction of
the parties an equitable mortgage. "In attempting to have a deed declared a mortgage,
equity requires the party so asking to tender and offer to pay the amount of the debt and
interest before he is entitled to any standing in a court of equity. Shaner v. Ratgdrum
State BariJz, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916) citing (Hicks v. Hicks (Tex. Civ.), 26
S.W. 227; Dawson v. Overmyer, 141 Ind. 438, 40 N.E. 1065; Rodriguez v. Haynes, 76
Tex. 225, 13 S.W. 296; Jones on Mortgages, 2d ed., par. 1095.) No evidence has been
presented that Plaintiff ever even discussed repayment of the monies provided prior to
2010, and no evidence that money has ever been tendered. Therefore, the question of
whether Plaintiff has standing to request equity from this court is presented.
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\Vhen seeking equity one must approach the court with clean hands deserving
equity. This principal and estoppel by laches was explored by the Court in Clontz v.
Fortner at 363. Here, like in Clontz no evidence exists that plaintiff even spoke to
defendant about the transaction for years and years.

Like in Clontz, the defendant

expressed public displays of ownership of the property, while plaintiff sat silent. The
Clontz court found the Plaintiff to be estopped from claiming the deed, absolute on its
face, to be a mere mortgage. The Cou.,_rt, at page 364 cited a California case, Hmnud v.
HavVihome, 52 Cal.2d 78, 338 P.2d 387 (1959), at some length, quoted below,
It was not until plaintiffs learned of the interest of an oil company in the
subject property that they bestirred themselves to ascertain whether such
property was worth an effort on their part to reclaim it. As commented in
Livermore v. Beal (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 535,549, 64 P.2d 987, 'one is not
permitted to stand by while another develops property in which he claims
an interest, and then if the property proves valuable, assert a claim thereto,
and if it does not prove valuable, be vvilling [399 P.2d 954] that the losses
incurred* * * be borne by the opposite party. This thought was expressed
in one case by the following language: 'If the property proves good, I want
it; if it is valueless, you keep it." (See also Robison v. Hanley (1955), 136
Cal.App.2d 820, 824-825[1-2], 289 P.2d 560.' 338 P.2d at 392.
The following statement from 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 59, p. 105, 1s
applicable here:
'A party who has the right to treat a deed absolute on its face as a mortgage
and to redeem from it must be reasonably prompt in asserting such right;
very Jong delay, run,ou11tin_g to laches on his part, maydefeat his right to
have the deed declared to be a mortgage and his right of redemption,
especially if interests of third persons have intervened, or if the grantee has
been allowed to deal with the property in such manner that a redemption
would seriously prejudice him, and one conclusively chargeable with full
knowledge of his rights will not be permitted to excuse his delay in
seeking relief on the ground of ignorance of his rights.'

And the following from 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 107, pp. 547-548:
'The term 'quasi estoppel' has been applied to certain legal bars which are
in some respects analogous to estoppel in pais and which have the same
practical operation as an estoppel in pais, but which nevertheless differ
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from that form of estoppel in essential particulars. Thus, it has been held
that no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side,
no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient.
'The doctrine classified as quasi estoppel has its basis in election,
ratification, affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of benefits; and the
principle precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a
right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him. The doctrine
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistentwith one in which he__ acquiesced, or of which he
accepted a benefit.'
Here, Steuerer was perfectly content to allow Ms. Richards to believe she ovmed
the property for some thirteen years. Steuerer sat idle while a disabled woman paid real
property taxes on the home she believed she owned. Steuerer was perfectly content to be
pitied as man who couldn't pay rent. Mr. Steuerer 'took not one step to assert ownership,
nor obligation, with regard to the property in question until he learned that it was not a no
rent hovel, but a developable parcel of commercial land. Under these circumstances this
Court, like the Clontz and Hamud Courts, should send away the opportunist.

Mr.

Steuerer's claim is barred by laches and equitable estoppel.

RESPECTULL Y SUBMITTED,

STOPHERP. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / :/- day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of
Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome
Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135.
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

JUN 2 0 2011
SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN A"ND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
\

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
vs.
)
)
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
)
)
Defendants
-----~
~ ~ ~ - - - - - - .)

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Blaine

)ss.
)

CV-2010-212
AFFIDAVIT OF N.E.M.
RICHARDS IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

N.E.M. RICHARDS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows;

1. ·

I am a single woman, residing in the City of Shoshone, Lincoln County, Idaho.

2.

I am a disabled veteran and suffer from a host of physical and mental conditions

that impair my abilities to concentrate, and recall information quickly.

I have been

hospitalized for long periods of time due to my conditions and heavily medicat~d for
same.
3.

I am the sole fee simple title ovmer of the real property located in the City of

Shoshone, Lincoln County, Idaho, legally described as Lots 4 and 5, Block E of the
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Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County, Idaho, according to the official plat map thereof, of
record with the Lincoln County Recorder, by conveyance through a Quitclaim Deed
dated May 8, 2000.

4.

I am acquainted with Donald Steuerer as my neighbor who has resided across the

street from my home for many years.

5.

In the mid 1990s I began to provide money to Donald Steuerer, at his request,

allegedly, because he could not pay the real property taxes due on the above described
real property which Steuerer represented to be delinquent, and upon which a tax sale was
imminent.
6.

I had no knowledge, other than provided by Mr. Steuerer regarding taxes, of other

liens or encumbrances relating to the real property described as Lots 4 &5, Block E, City
of Shoshone, and believed Mr. Steuerer to be the owner of the property.
7.

I felt sorry for Mr. Steuerer and did not want to see him lose his home and

become destitute.
8.

I provided Mr. Steuerer two thousand dollars ($2,000) prior to February of 1997.

9.

On or about February 24, 1997, Donald Steuerer, as Grantor, executed a Warranty

Deed and delivered same to Donald E.K. Steuerer and myself, N.E.M. Richards, as
Grantees, whereby Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, State of
Idaho was conveyed by the grantor to the grantee ..
10.

Said Warranty Deed was recorded on February 26, 1997, as Instrument No,

16173, Lincoln County Idaho Recorder of Deeds. A true and correct copy of said
Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
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11.

I believed, by virtue of the money provided to Donald Steuerer, and the Warranty

Deed referenced above, I was the undivided one half (1/2) owner of Lots 4 & 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, and all improvements thereon.
I believe the value of the real property legally described as Lots 4 & 5, Block E,

12.

City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, and all improvements thereon, had, in the year
1997, a value of approximately six thousand dollars $6,000, or the value determined by

lhe Tax: ltssessor.
I believed a verbal agreement was reached with Mr. Steuerer that he would repay

13.

me the two thousand dollars as soon as possible, within the time frame, and that I would
not charge him rent, and if he paid me back, within the time frame, I would reconvey my
interest in Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone. No specific time frame, or date was
discussed or agreed to for repayment and reconveyance, other than, as soon as possible.
Between the years 1997 and 2000 I provided Mr. Steuerer, in addition to the two

14.

thousand dollars ($2,000) referred to above, five thousand dollars ($5,000) more, again
under the same circumstances.
15.

In May of the year 2000 I learned that Donald Steuerer had not in fact paid real

property taxes past due on Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, as he had led me to
believe.
16.

On or about May 8, 2000, Donald E.K. Steuerer and N.E.M. Richards, as

Grantors, executed a Quitclaim Deed and delivered same to N.E.M. Richards as Grantee,
whereby Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, State of Idaho was
conveyed from grantor to grantee.
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17.

Said Quitclaim Deed was recorded on May 8, 2000, as Instrument No. 168006,

Lincoln County Idaho Recorder of Deeds. A true and correct copy of said Warranty Deed
is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
18.

I believed, by virtue of the momes provided to Donald Steuerer, and the

Quitclaim Deed referenced above, I become the sole fee simple owner of Lots 4 & 5,
Block E, City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, and all improvements thereon.
19.

I beliei/e the ·value of the real property legally described as Lots 4 & 5, Block E,

City of Shoshone, County of Lincoln, and all improvements thereon, had, in the year
2000, a value of approximately seven thousand dollars $7,000, or the value determined
by the Tax Assessor.
20.

I believed a verbal agreement was reached with Mr. Steuerer that he would repay

me seven thousand dollars, ($7,000) consisting o_f the first the two thousand dollars
($2,000) provided to Steurer prior to 1997, and the five thousand dollars ($5,000)
provided to Steuerer between 1997 and 2000, as soon as possible, within the time frame,
and that I would not charge him rent; and if he paid me back, within the time frame, I
would reconvey my interest in Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone. No specific time
frame, or date was discussed or agreed to for repayment and r.econveyance, other than, as
soon as possible.
21.

Beginning on or about May 8, 2000, I began to pay back due and owing taxes on

Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone and have paid all taxes due relating to said real
property from that date forward representing tax years 1996 to present. I made these
payments because I believed !'was the sole owner of the real property.
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22.

I believed the agreement with Mr. Steuerer arising from the monies provided

beginning in the year 1997 through the year 2000 was that Mr. Steuerer sold me half,
then all of the real property constituting Lots 4 & 5, Block E, City of Shoshone, with a
right to repurchase said property, if said repurchase occurred within the time frame of the
monies provided. No specific date was discussed or agreed upon, other than as soon as
possible.
23.

As time passed and !vir. Steuerer made no effort to contact me or offer to

repurchase the property it was my belief that his right to do so expired.

DATED this

/'{,

day of June, 2011.

(

N.E.M. RJCHARDS ·

SIGNED Al\TD SWORN before me on t h e ~ day of June, 2011.
r

N;tjrry Public:

[ SE.AL J

Residing at:

.

th,

z1 h

My Commission Expi es:

A-krV
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/
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NON CONFRONTATIONAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC
Alison Brace, Attorney
P.O. Box 6061
Beisel iD 83707
208-353-5213
!SB: 6611
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

c~sp Nn. t'.\/-2010-212

DONALD E. STEURER,

ORDER ALLOWING COUNSEL
TO WITHDRAW

Plaintiff,
vs
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS,
and JOHN DOES 1-V,
Defendants.

This matter came on for review on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw, and good cause
appearing thereof;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the firm of Non Confrontational Legal Solutions, LLC., is
allowed to withdraw as attorney of record for the above-named Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant appoint another attorney to appear or
Defendant shall appear in person by fiiing a written notice with the court stating how she will
represent herself within twenty (20) days from the date of service or mailing of this Order to
Defendant.
Defendant's attorney shall, with due diligence, serve copies of this Order upon Defendant,
whose last known address is P.O. Box 950, Shoshone, Idaho, 83352, and all other parties to this
action, and shall file proof of service with the Court.
DATED this

iz2-/

MOTION TO WITHDRAW-1

day of June, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify I served a copy of this Order to all the parties named below, by United States Mail:
Alison E. Brace
Non Confrontational Legal Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 6061
Boise, ID 83707
Robert E. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
P.O. Box 168

Alison E. Brace

MOTION TO WITHDRAW -2

Page

I 291

CLS To:Attn: Chris Simms (12087882300)

17:04 06/20/11GMT-05 Pg 02-03

I

Chri,wpher Simms, Esq.
V

Trlt: ~IWdS LAW fJRM

JUN 2 i ZJH

P.O. BDx l 861

Hailey, lD 83333
Ph:

(208! 788-2XOO

Fax:

(20:-?) 7gg_23(i()

l__

)

SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO

-----~·~-~--····-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tf-JE FfFTH JU)!CIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF tDAHO, H'>i AND FOR THE C(H!Yl"Y OF LINCOLN

Case No.: CV .:?OJ0<212
vs.

NY.Vt. RIC! lARDS, ab, NICKY
J-rn't/i\RDS. and .I OJIN DOES l- V.

NOTJC[ OF SUBSTJTUTION
COUNSEL

or

Notice to All Parties
Nn1ice i;; hcrchy given 1lrn1 Chriswpher Simms. faq .. or !he law firm n/' Tl 1;-: s1M\-1S IA w
FIRM,

appc,1rs a;; a11omcys ,li' record for Defcnda111. N.li.iVI. Richards_ nnd /\lison E.

Brace, Esq. wirhdraws as a!\orncy (.)(record !"or Dci'cndanL N.E.M. Richards. l'lease send
all Ji1turt correspondence and pieading,; relating lo 1h.is rnauer to: Till-:

ATTN: CHRISTOPH '

S!1v: S

tl;'"~
Christopher Simms. Esq.
/1.ppe~ring_ Counsel

I

si:v1MS

LAW

Frn,v1,

.0. Box !861, 1-fai!ey, Idaho 83333.

. day or J unc.. 20 l l.

Alison E. Brace_ Esq.
\Vi1hdrawing Counsel

NOTJCE OF .Sl.iBS1Tn.'TION OF COUNSEL Page l
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(

m:MyF

NCLS To:Attn: Chris Simms (12087882300)

17:04 06/20/11 GMT--05 Pg 03-03

Cei·titkare of mailing or hand ddivery
l certil\ th,,1L on June 20. 201 l. I served a true :md rnrrc:c1 copy of rhc NOTJCli 01'
SUBSTJTUTiON 01· COU!\SJ:L upnn ihc
designa1cd:

Robert E. Williams
\Vil:iams. \.kscrvy & Lmhspcid1, L!.P

P.O. Box 168
Jerome. JD 1n:n 8

US J\·1nil

O I land-delivered

:_J Facsimile (208) J24-:l 1J5

,'\JOT/Cl: OF SL13ST/TlirIO,\' OJ' COl.:NSEL Page 2
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
CV-2010-0000212

Donald E Steuerer vs. N.E.M. Richards
Hearing type: Motion to Withdraw
Hearing date: 6/21/2011
Time: 9:02 am
Judge: John K Butler
Court reporter: Candace Childers
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Petruzzelli

902 Court introduces case
Ms. Richards present \Vi.th Counsel Mr. Simms
.Mr. Williamson present in Court for the Plaintiff.
Discussion of Ms. Brace motion to withdraw.
.Mr. Simms has brought signed stipulation for substitution of Counsel.
Court will allow substitution.
903 Mr. Simms argues for continuance of motion for summary judgment and trial
settings.
906 Mr. Williams argument against continuance
912 Mr. Si1Tirns farther cmnn1ents.
913 The Courts comments and decision on motion to continue.
The Courts scheduling order does clearly require that for a motion for summary judgment
to be heard it must be filed and served not later than 60 days before trial.
Scheduling to be heard is less than 30 days before trial
Court trial has been scheduled since January 18, 2011.
The Court notes that some discovery has been performed mostly from the Plaintiff in this
matter. --... -----·--·. ·--·-··---.--··-· -·-· ____ ..
....
__ ---·----- -···----·- -- -·.
--·--··-··· - -- -·-- ·-···--·. ·---·
The Court further recognizes the importance of a quick resolution in this matter to both
sides.
The Court advises that there is one criminal trial set on that day in Lincoln County as
well as one in Jerome County on same date. If criminal trials are to go they would take
priority over this matter. However if those matters do resolve or are c continued
Then this trial will be heard. If this Court trial was to be continued it would be in excess
of 6 months and court does not feel that is fair to either side.
Court recognizes that Mr. Simms would like to do some discovery. Court vacates the
hearing on summary judgment because it does not comply with the Courts scheduling
order. The Court trial will be left on July 13th_ The Court will allow Mr. Simms to depos
Mr.Steurer for purposes of trial before trial while the Court recognizes that is beyond the
..

·-"''

"

...

,.,_, ... ,. ,. ... ~ ....... ,

_.,.,,_,

"'"'

...
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cutoff date in the Courts scheduling order that is the only discovery that he will permitted
prior to July 13th_
Court will know by July 5th if trial date is still available for Cou..11.sel. If the Court has to
vacate the trial because of those proceedings then we will basically be starting over at
that time and Mr. Williams would be able to re notice his motion for summary judgment
917 Recess

Attest
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7 4 73
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300

JUN 2 3 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
)

)
)
vs.
)
)
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
)
)
Defendants,
_____=...;c,;===------)
Plaintiff,

CV-2010-212
NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S
DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM

I.R.C.P. 30 & 34

TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL OF RECORD
. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, will take the
deposition of Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer, upon oral examination on Friday, July 1,
2011, at the hour of 11 :00, at the location of the Lincoln County Courthouse Jury Room,
111 W. B Street, Shoshone, Idaho 83352, before a Notary Public or authorized individual
to administer oaths who may be present at said time and place.
NOTICE IS FURTHER HEREBY GIVEN that the above-named witness will be
required to produce, then and there at ·the taking of the said deposition, for examination,
all documents, papers and items described in Exhibit A ofthis Notice.

NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM

Page
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If said deposition is not complete on the aforementioned date, the taking thereof
will be continued from day to day thereafter at the same place until completed, Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays excluded.

Dated this 21st day of June, 2011

CH STOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTO~"l\TEY FOR DEFENDANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM

was

deljvered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, &
Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile
to 208.324.3135 .

NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM
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EXHIBIT "A" TO NOTICE OF TAKING PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION DUCES
TECUM
I.
DEFINITIONS
The term "document" refers to the originals (or legible copies where originals are
unavailable) of any and all tangible items and writings in your possession, custody or
control, or in the possession, custody or control of your representatives, empioyees,
agents, or attorneys, including but not limited to records, books of accounts, checks,
reports, correspondence, telegrams, electronic communications, facsimiles, records of
telephone conversations or other conversations, meetings or conferences, diaries,
appointment books, notes, tape recordings, studies and agreements of any kind and
description.

II.
DOCUMENTS CALLED FOR BY THIS NOTICE
The following sections specify the documents called for by this Notice. Any
document withheld on the grounds(s) of any alleged privilege or any ot11er basis is to be
specifically listed with a statement of the ground(s) for withholding each document.
1.

Each and every document you intend to offer as an exhibit at the trial of this

action.

EXHIBIT "A" NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM Page I f-98

1 -

-Fl
FILELED
D""iAi>J:t1.f:'
, ::J'.
-J ~:.. . . . .·f

I

:i--I

PM

,--..JU_L_0......:6:..:::.:2.=01=1

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #74 73
P .O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FA.X 208 788 2300

SUZANNE McCONNELL, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
DONALD E. STEUERER,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

CV-2010-2 12

)
vs.

)
)
N .E.M. RlCHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RlCHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
)
)
Defendants, _ _ _ __ )
----~~==c..i._

STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

COMES NOW, the parties hereto, through counsel, and hereby stipulate to admission of
the following Exhibits for purposes of Admission into evidence in the trial ofthis matter;
DOCUMEN TARY EVIDEN CE
1.

Warranty Deed from Defendant dated February 24, 1997

2.

Quitclaim Deed from Plaintiff and Defendant dated May 8, 2000

3.

Check
for Defendant's check number 1812
. . Stub
.

4.

Check Stub for Defendant's check number 1807

5.

Check Stub for Defendant's check number 1809

6.

Defendant's handwritten notes, dates February 25, 1997; March 3, 1997; April 1, 1997;

.,

May 1, 1997 and June 1, 1997 in the left hand column
7.

Lincoln County Tax Collector Delinquency Document 1983 & 1984

1

STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
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8.

1997 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 20, 2000

9.

1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated May 8, 2000

10.

1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 20, 2000

11.

1999 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 20, 2000

12.

2000 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 20, 2000,
and June 20, 2001

13.

2001 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax Collector Dated December 2i, 200i
and June 19, 2002

14.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2002

15.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2003

16.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2004

17.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2005

18.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2006

19.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2007

20.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2008

21.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2009

22.

Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax Collector for the year 2010

23.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 1997

24.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 1998

25.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 1999
STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
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26.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,

27.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2001

28.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2002

29.

Hi<:tnry Report frnm thP. Cif-fir.P. nfthP T.inr.nln Count Ac:<:ec:c:nr for T.nts 4 ;mr'i 5, Rlnck F,

City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2003
30.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2004

31.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln C~mnt Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2005

32.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2006

33.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2007

34.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2008

35.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2009
#

36.

History Report from the Office of the Lincoln Count Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E,
City of Shoshone, Idaho for the year 2010

37.

Affidavit of Donn W. Bordewyk
STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
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3 8.

Litigation Guarantee

39.

Check Register Notations - Shoshone Club

40.

Demonstrative Exhibit/ Interest Rate Calculation Annual Rate 12%

Christopher P. Simms

Dated

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

Robert E. Williams

Dated

STIPULATION FOR ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
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WILLL\MS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
11

Attomey for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2010-212

PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF

vs
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS,
and JOHN DOES I-V,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, DONALD E. STEUERER, by and through his attorney of
record, Robert E. ¥/illiams .of Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, a...11d submits b..is Trial
Brief in this matter addressing selective legal issues likely to arise during the trial. Trial is set
to commence July 13, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff previously submitted a Brief in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment.
A hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was not held because the Court detennined
the Motion for Summary Judgment to have been untimely filed under the Court's Scheduling
Order, dated January 18, 2011. Some of the matters referred to in this Trial Brief are discussed
TRIAL BRIEF - 1
\\SERVER\sHARE\DATA\STEUERER,DONALD\RICHARDS\TRIALBRIEF.DOCX
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!! -in m,-w,::, ,-1f'>hii1

in P1!'.linfrff' .« RriPf in

snppnrt of Motion for S11mmary Judgment previously

filed.
I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action to quiet title to real property located in the city of Shoshone, Idaho,
more particularly described as Lots 4 and 5 of Block E, Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County,

I

II

Idaho in the Plaintiff, subject to a mortgage in favor of Defendant. The record ownership of
the real property is currently in the name of the Defendant. In 1997, a deed to the real property
from Plaintiff to himself and Defendant was recorded. In 2000, the Plaintiff and the Defendant
executed and recorded a quitclaim deed to the same real property, in favor of Defendant.
Plaintiff contends that by verbal agreement of the parties the deeds were given in
response to loans made by Defendant to Plaintiff and that the deeds were intended to serve as
"collateral" for the repayment of loans made to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. The Plaintiff
contends that the Defendant loaned him Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) during the year
1997 when the warranty deed was recorded and an additional Six Thousand Seven Hundred
Eighty-Five Dollars ($6,785.00) was loaned to him over ten (10) years by Defendant paying
real prgperty taxesfor the years 1996 throµgh fae first one'."half(l/2) of 2010, rr1ak.irJ,g total
loans of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Five Dollars ($8,785.00).

Although

Defendant is likely to contend that additional amounts were loaned, Plaintiff believes the
evidence will establish total loans of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Five Dollars
($8,785.00). If the deeds were given as collateral, they are mortgages. Plaintiff owns the fee
simple title to the real property subject to the Defendant's mortgage, and only the amount of
the loans secured by the mortgage needs to be determined.

TRIAL BRIEF - 2
\\SERVER\SHARE\DATA\STEUERER, DONALD\RICHARDS\T'RIAL BRIEF.DOCX
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II

ii

II. PAROLE EVIDENCE

In Idaho, parole evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing that a conveyance of
land, absolute in form, is a mortgage. Credit Bureau ofPreston vs. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 216,
440 P.2d 145, 149 (1968).
II

III. INTENT OF THE PARTIES IS PARA.MOUNT

Unlike the facts in several reported cases in the state ofidaho on the subject of when a
deed absolute constitutes a mortgage, there is no written memorandum between these parties as
to their understandings at the times the deeds were executed and recorded. The rule in Parks vs
Mulledy, 49 Idaho 546, 551, 290 P. 205, 207 (1930), was cited by the Idaho Supreme Court as

recently as 2006 in Hogg vs Wolsky, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087, 1092 and 1093, that
The intention of the parties at the· time an agreement to execute a deed is
consummated is determinative as to whether title is irrevocably transferred or the
conveyance is merely security for the debt for performance of an obligation
is particularly significant

In addition to the intent of the parties in determining whether a deed constitutes a
mortgage, Idaho courts have examined factors including existence of a debt to be secured;
survival of the debt after the mortgage was granted; the prior negotiations of the parties;
adequacy of the consideration given for the mortgage; the comparative value of the real
property at the time the deed was given to the amount loaned and the financial condition of the
Grantor are factors in determining whether a deed was a mortgage. Dickens vs Hesston, 21
P.2d 905, 908-910, 353 Idaho 91 (1933).
TRIAL BRIEF - 3
\\SERVER\SHARE\DATA\STEUERER, DONALD\RJCHARDS\TRIAL BRIEF.DOCX
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II

II

IV. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE

A contention that the Deeds are to be construed as mortgages must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. Shaner vs Rathdrum State Bank, 129 Idaho 576, 583, 161 P.
90, 92 (1916).
ii

V. INTEREST ON LOANS

Plaintiff believes the evidence to be produced at trial will establish that both parties
characterized the transactions at the time of the recording of the two (2) deeds as loans, and
that the understanding of the parties was that the loans would be repaid as soon as Plaintiff was
able to, with no interest.
It is anticipated that Defendant may allege that interest on loans made by her to the

Plaintiff should be compounded annually. Compound interest does not appear to be available
under I. C. § 28-22-104, Doolittle by and through Doolittle vs Meridian Joint School District

No. 2, 128 Idaho 805, 919 P.2d 334 (1996).
Plaintiff believes the evidence at trial will establish that the parties made no agreement
as to the payment of interest on the amounts loaned by the Defendant to him, and that the first
time interest on the loans was mentioned was during 2010 when a conversation took place
between the parties during which Plaintiff offered to pay interest to the Defendant for the
money loaned to him in exchange for her cooperation in placing title to the real property back
into the name of the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff anticipates the evidence will further show that

Defend ant did not respond to Plaintiff's proposal to pay interest as part of the loan transaction.

TRIAL BRIEF - 4
\\SERVER\sHARE\DATA\STEUERER, DONALD\RrCHARDS\TRIAL BRIEF.DOCX
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.II

Idaho Code§ 28-22-104(1)3 pro,.1ides that:

"Vvhen there is no express contact in writing fixing a different rate of interest,
interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (.12) on the hundred by the year
on ... 3. money lent. .. "
Idaho courts have upheld provisions of contracts expressly providing for no interest on
a loan, requiring the payment of interest under I.C. § 28-22-104 only after a "no interest"
ii

obiigation becomes due. Jntemational Business M-achine Corporation vs Lawhorn, 106 Idaho
94, 677 P.2d 507, 511 (Idaho App., 1984). Plaintiff believes that the evidence at trial will
establish that the loans became due when Mr. Steuerer could repay them and that this date
occurred in 2010. Thus interest under I.C. § 28-22-104(3) should be computed only from the
year 2010, the year during which the loans became due because Mr. Steuerer had the ability to
repay them under the rule affirmed in Intemational Business Machines Corporation vs
Lawhorn, supra.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of July, 2011.
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

O~J\LROBERTE. WILLIAMS

TRIAL BRIEF - 5
\\SERVER\SHARE\DATAISTI:UERER, DONALD\RJCHARDS\TRIALBRJEF.DOCX
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II
II

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of July, 2011, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addresses appear below by the
method indicated:

ii

. Christopher P. Simms
I .
Attorney at Law
400 South Main Street
Hailey, ID 83333-8402

TRIAL BRIEF - 6
\\SERVER\SHARE\DATA\STEUERER, DONALD\RJCHARDS\TRIAL BRIEF.DOCX
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

CV-2010-0000212
Donald E Steuerer vs. N.E.M. Richards
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 7/13/2011
Time: 9:00 am
Judge: John K Butler
Court reporter: Candace Childers
l\1inutes Clerk: Ruth Petruzzelli
900 Court introduces case
Time and place set for Court Trial
Mr. Steuerer present in Court with Counsel Mr. Williams
Ms. Richards present in Court with Counsel Mr. Simms
902 Plaintiff will not be making opening statement
Defendant will make opening statement
902 In chambers conference discussion of exhibit that was not provided in discovery. The
Court will allow if foundation is laid for the exhibit.
903 Mr. Williams addresses Exhibit 206 being allowed as to credibility

904 M.,r. Simms has briefed the Court in written brief and will waive opening statement.

904 Court will take case under advisement and briefs will be requested.
905 Mr. Williams calls Donald Steuerer, Clerk administers oath to Mr. Steuerer.
Mr. \Villiams begins direct exam.
912 Objectiont())eading guestion/ sustained by.the Court ..
915 Objection speculating/ sustained by the Court
916 Objection not responsive to the question/ sustained by the Court
918 Exhibit 101 is admitted without objection. Exhibit is handed to Mr. Steuerer.
926 Mr. Simms asked the answer be stricken, Sustained by the Court.
928 Witness turns to exhibit 102.
929 Objection to answer/ sustained calls for yes or no answer.
936 Objection to answer/ sustained
936 Objection/ overruled
941 Objection not responsive to question asked/ sustained by the Court.
946 Objection not responsive to question/ sustained by the Court
COURT MINUTES

947 Objection asked and answered/ overruled
948 Objection personal knowledge yes or no answer/ sustained.
949 .Mr. Simms begins cross exam of.Mr. Steuerer
955 Objection on grounds of relevance .
.Mr. Simms advises of relevance.
956 Sustained how many jobs is not relevant, may ask about annual gross earnings.
1005 Objection/withdrawn
1012 Objection/ sustained by the Court
1014 Court recesses for 20 minutes
103 7 Back on the record
.Mr. Simms continues cross exam of Ms. Steuerer.
1042 Objection, Court notes for the record that there is a conflict in the testimony and
affidavit filed.
1049 Court advises Mr. Simms that question has been asked and answered.
1050 Mr. Simms asks that answer be stricken. Court sustained.
1051 Not responsive .... overruled.
1053 Mr. Williams re direct of.Mr. Steuerer.
1055 Objection to the leading nature of question/ sustained
1059 Mr. Steuerer steps down.
1059 Mr. Williams calls Donn Bordewyk General Manager from Valley Co-op.
Clerk administers oath to Mr. Bordewyk.
.Mr. Williams begins direct exai-n.
1108 Objection outside witness personal knowledge. Question rephrased.
1111 Objection to anything that is settlement negotiations/ overruled
1113 Cross exam by Mr. Simms
1113 Mr. Borde\\yk steps down and the Plaintiff rests.
-

"-·-

-·

'

-· .

1113 Mr. Simms calls Ms. N.E.M Richards
Clerk administers oath to Ms. Richards.
1115 Mr. Simms offers all exhibits 101 through 138
Exhibits 101 through 13 8 are admitted
1116 Mr. Simms begins direct exam.
1127 Objection leading ...... Court requests that Mr. Simms rephrase question.
1132 Objection asked and answered ..... Overruled
1135 Court asks .Mr. Simms to rephrase question
1135 Mr. Williams is allowed to ask question in aide of an objection.
Court advises to clarify time period.
1138 Mr. Simms hands witness exhibit 206
COURT MINUTES

1142 Mr. Simms offers Check carbons as exhibit 212
1144Mr. Williams believes this exhibit has been marked as 103,104 and 105.
1145 Mr. Simms agrees that they are repeated exhibits
Mr. Simms apologies that original was not.produced until now.
1146 Exhibit 212 is admitted.
1146 Court asks clarifying question.
1147 Mr. Simms offers Defendants 213
1148 Mr. Williams comments as to this defendant's exhibit 213. Objects to exhibit
because of repeated requests in discovery
1150 Objection to question/ sustained
1151 Offers defense exl1ibit 214 and 215
1152 Mr. William.s's objections to exhibits
1153 Objections noted and exhibit 214 and 215 are admitted.
1154 Objection leading/ sustained
1156 Objection/ sustained
1157 Objection/overruled
1203 Afternoon recess

1227 Back on the record.
Mr. Simms continues with direct exam of Ms. Richards.
1234 Objection to discussion of attorney's fees/ sustained

1234 l\tir. Vlilliams requests that disposition be published. Court allows.
1235 Mr. Williams begins cross exam of Ms. Richards.
1241 Objection forces legal conclusion/ overruled
1244 Witness is handed deposition.
1247 Objection to deposition being read when it has been published/ sustained
1251 Objection/ overruled
1254 Objection no evidence money was paid in the year 2000/ sustained
102 Objection/ deposition testimony is deposition testimony
_103 Obj~ction asked llll~ answered/ te~imony has alre11-dy tJeen established
111 Answers to interrogatories are handed to Ms. Richards.
114 Court advises that copies are not verified. Mr. Williams advises that they were filed
by Ms. Richards' s attorney.
121 Objection asked and answered and assuming facts.
122 No re direct. Ms. Richards steps down.
123 Mr. Simms offers Defendants exhibit 211.
124 Defendants exhibit 211 admitted.
125 Mr. Steuerer retakes the stand and is reminded he is still under oath.

COURT MINUTES

Mr. Williams will have a redirect question to Mr. Steuerer as to education and also
rebuttal questions.
127 Mr. Simms further re cross.
129 Court has question for Iv.Ir. Steuerer.
130 Both sides rest.
130 Discussion of the parties being allowed time to get records from the parties bank
accounts if available for that time period.
Counsel will go today
133 Court asks that he be advised if records are not available, upon that date that is when
the matter would be deemed concluded. Counsel would then begin putting together th~ir
.
l
.
1
.
..J r,..
s1n::m,tanecus vmtten Closmg argum.ent, proposeu nnarngs, proposea concms10ns ana
filed within 14 days send copies to chambers in Jerome then each side would then have 7
days to submit any supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law and any rebuttal
argument.
1

134 Recess

COURT MINUTES
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Christopher P. Simms

i

Attorney at Law ISB #7473

I

P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333

rI AUG - 3 2011 ,
I

SUZANNE McCONNELL, CL~K
_ DISTRICT COURT LINCOLN IDAHO

PH 208 788 2800
FAX. 208 788 2300

IN THE.DISTRICT COURT OF THE FJFTII JUDICIAL DISTRIC~'
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AN"D FOR TrlE COUNTY OF LIN~OLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

Pl~
vs.
N.E.M RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY

RICHARDS~ and JOHN DOES I- V,

Defendants,

'

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

CV-2010-212
NOTICE RELATING TO
COLLECTION OF EVID..illCE

AND DUE DATES FOR: .>QST-

TRIAL BRIEFING

)
}

COMES NOW THE PARTIES HERETO, each through the respectve coUIJSel

and file this Notice Relating to Collection of Ev.idence and Due Dates fo1 Post-Trial
Briefing, and state as follows;
This matter came on for court trial on Juiy 13, 2011 on 'Whlch date t11e case was
.
.
submitted with the exception of certain bank records 1hat were to be retrieved ·,y counsel.
J,

2.

!,

Counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant each served subpoenas on certain institutions

and each counsel received confirmation from all institutions th.a! the reque!.ted records
were not available because of expu:ation of time.

NOTICE RELATmG TO COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE AND DUE DATitS FOR
POST~TRIAL BRIEFING
f:00016000 le]

xv..:i

1

zs:n

nov101f:lo

JS/

2011 15:42 FAX
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2083243135

141003

The Court reauested counsel to each submit Prooosed FindinJ?S oj Fact and
,:,.

.ii,

--

Conclusions of Law V'lithin fourteen (14) days of the close of evidence~ and to submit

their respective reply 'Witl;tln seven (7) days thereof.

\VHEREFORB. the parties will each submit proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on or before August 16, 2011 and their respective R,;ply on or
before August 23, 2011.

RESPECTULLYSUB:MITTED~

NOTICE RELATING TO COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE AND DUE DATI.S FOR
POST-TRlAL BRIEFING
r. DO 0/£000 lPl
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ROBERT E. WILLIAu'1:S

IDAHO STATE BARNO. 1693

\VILLIAM:S 1 M:ESERVY & LOTHSP'EICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
j
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.

-
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Aflorney;or PLamtiJJ

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTR{CT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
bON_A;LD E. STEUERER,

Case No. CV-2010-::12

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S
CLOSING ARGUMENT

VS

N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RlCHARDS,
and JOHN DOES I-V,
Defendants.
COMES NOW, the Plair1tiff, DONALD E. STEUERER, by and th··ough his attorney of

:record, Robert E. Williams of Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and submits his Closing
.. ,Argument

ttia.! of this matter before the: court co11ducted July 13'11 , 2011 .

Plaintiff seeks to quiet title in him to real property located at 110 North Greenwood
Street in the City of Shoshone, Idaho. He claims that two (2) deeds execu1ed in1997 and 2000 1
respectively, which on their face conveyed interests in real property to the Defendant N,E,M,
Richards, were not intended to transfer title to the real property, but rather were mortgages
intended to provide her collateral securing the: repayment ofloans. Plaintif t' also seeks the
determination of the: amou.i."lt ow{:d by him to Defondant on the Joans.

hA'iNTIFF''S CLOSING AR<iUMENT- J
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I
'fHE TWO (2) DEJEDS WERE INl'.ENDED TO BE MORTCAC;Es

The primary issue in this cas:e is whether the Warranty Deed signe :! by the Plaintiff in
favor the Defendant and himself in 1997, and the subsequent Quitclaim Deed given by Plaintiff
and Defendant to the Defendant in 2000, -both for the real property locatec. at 110 North
11

Greenwood Street, Shcshone1 Idal10, were intended to be ab:solute transfei s of title,, or instead,
mortgages to secure the repayment ofloans.
The primary rule for determining whether deeds to n;al property au e absolute transfers
of titli:\ or instead constitute security for the performance of a debt or other obligation, was
announced in Parks v. A1uledyi 49 Idaho 546> 551,290 P. 205,207 (1930) as follows: ''The
intention of the parties at the time an agreement to execute a deed is constmmated is

determinative as to whether a title is irrevocably transferred, or the conve3 .ance is merely as
security for the debt or perfo:rmaince of an obligation." This basic rule wa;; cited approvingly as

late as 2006 in Hogg v. Wolski, 130 P Jd 1087'1 1092,. 142 Id,aho 549, 545 12006).
The evidence produced at trial e.stablished th.at the parties did not reduce their agreements or
U..'tlderstandings to ~rriting at th.e time: of the recording oftlle two (2) deeds or at any time
before or after, However1 p:!i:!'Ol evidence is admissible to establish that a ( onveyance of land
was intended to be a mongag1e, Idaho Code §45-905; Credfr Bureau ofPreston v. Sleight 92
Idaho 210~ 216 440 P.2d 145, 149 (1968).

Mr. Steuerer testified that th<! two (2) deeds were always intended to c1mstitute "collateral"
for the repayment of loans matde by Ms. Richards to him. In her depositio ''.l, Ms. Richatds also
testified that it was the intent of the parties that the deeds constitute collateral. Throughout her
deposition, and again at triaJ, Ms. Richards referred to her transactions \VJ.th Mr. St~uerer as
loans. In 2010 Donn Bordewyk, General Ma:nager of Valley Co-Ops, Inc. testified that Ms.
Richards referred to the transactions between she and Mr: St1euerer as loan~. In Responses to
Interrogatories promulgated by the Plainti:ff1 Ms. Richards, thxough her c01msel of record at the
time, also characterized the transactions between she and the Plaintiff as lc,ans. In some of her
f'LAJNTIFF'B CLOslNOAROUMENT ~2
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deposition testimony, and also in some of her testimony at trial, Ms. Rich~ rds testified tltrat she
"ovv11ed" an interest in the real property as a result of the recording of the (Leeds. However, she
also recognized in he:i: testimony that she had a duty to recon.vey the real property 10 Mr.
Steuerer if she was paid what she was owed 1 and did not testify that the tr msactions betvveen
she and 1vfr. Steuerer were ones of purchase and sale. Ms. Richards never took possession of
the real property at 110 North Greenwood Street, never requested rent, an< I never demanded

, payment of any kind from ?>-,fr" Steuerer. The intent of the pfu-ties that the (Leeds constitute
mortgages, and that the underlying transactions were loans, is therefore dearly established.
Although the intent of the parties, as discussed earlier, is determinativr of whether the
deeds were mortgages, other factors identified in Dickens v. Heston, 21 P.'.~d 905, 908-910, 53
Idaho 91 (l 933) also support the conclusion that the deeds were mortgage!,. Those relevant
factors applied to the evidence produced at trial are:
1) A debt was in existence and survived the :recording of the deed;

2) The parties negotiations involved the making and repayment of loans, not the sale and
purchase of real property;
3) The amounts advanced by Ms. Richards were less than the fair mruket value oftlhe real

property at the time of'the advances as shown by Plaintiffs Exhibics 123 through 136.

4) .M'.r. Steue:rer had no significant financial resources available to hirr at the times the
loans were made,

Finally; the court in Hogg -v. Wolski, supra, at 1093, observed that the WoJsk.is, the alleged
mortgagors in that case, never attempted to regair1 possessioa of the real property they had
conveyed to the Hoggs, who had taken possessio~ and that:, ... a mortgagc,r ofreal property

typically does not part with possession". Here, Mr. Steuerer,, the mortgagc,r, has always
maintained possession of the Real Property,

The evidence produced at trial establishes that the tw,o deeds were dfectively
mottgages given pursuant to loan transactions, and were inte;rided to consti tutc security for the
Pl-ATNT!FF' S CLOSING ARGUMENT • 3
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repayment of the loans. The totality of the evid~nce also me:ets the requir(1d "clear and
convincing evidence" standard of proof required in such cases. Shaner v. 1cathdrum State Bank,
29 Idaho 576,583, 161 P. 90, 92 (1916).

II
AMOUNT OWED ON LOANS

The second substantial issue before the court is the E!l:nmmt of the money owed to :Ms.
Richards by Mr. Steuerer, The parties are in agreement that $2,000.00 wa~ loaned i;o the year
1997. The parties are also in agreement as to the amount of property taxeE, paid by Ms.
Richards for Mr. Steuerer in the years between 2000 and 2009. Ms. Richards contends that she
loaned an additional $5,000.00 to Mr. Steuerer between 1997 and 2000. Despite repeated
opportunities to do so, Ms. Richards was unable to produce any form of documentary evidence
in support of her contentions of additional amounts loaned, until the date cf the trial when she
produced a copy of a check ledger introduced and admitted as Defendant' i. Exhibit No. 215.
The checks numbered 425 and 495 in Defendant's Exhibit 215 corroborak handwritten notes
constituting Plaintiff's Exhibit 106 as to date, amount, and check number. A separate check,
No. 511 1 under date of "7/1'", made payable to the Shoshone Club, not identified in Plaintiffs
Exhibit 106, is also identified in the ledger, apparently in support of the contention by Ms.
Richards that additional amounts were loaned over and above the original $2,000.00. fo his
testimony at trial and at deposition, Mr. Steue~·er t,estified th~t he received .:i total of $2,000.00

in checks from Ms. Richard:s, and no more. At trial, Ms. Richards did not explain why check
No. 511, da.ted 7/1 in the amount of$500.00, admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 215, was not
entered on Plaintiffs Exhibit l 06. Ms. Richards, both at her deposition and at trial, testified

that her memory was faulty .and that she could not recall facts easily. She ~ould not testify as
to specific amou..nts of money distributed to Mr. Steuerer, or the dates upoH which the
distributions occuued. Mr. Steuerer consistently testified that besides the ;)roperty tax
payments made by Ms. Richards, the only money he received. from her wa3 $2,000.00 in 1997.
The preponderance of the evidence is that the only money loaned or advanced to :rvrr. St~:uerer
by Ms. Richards was $2,000.00 m1997, and a total of $6,784.91 in propercy taxes, in the

amounts and on the dates established b;y Plaintiff's Exhibits 108 through 122.
Pt.i\TNT!l'F'S CWS!NG ARGU/0.ENT • 4
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Idaho Code §28-12-104(3) provides that in cases of money lent, interest accrues at the
rate of 12% per annum if there was ;no express agreement in ~ting other.vise. Here, money
was leant and there was no ex.press agreement in miting establishing inte1 est to be paid,,
although l\1r. Steuerer a..TJ.d Ms. Richards both testified that there was neve- an agreement to pay
interest on the loan. The first time interest on the amounts loaned was dis,;ussed was in a
IJ

conversation be:rwe,en :Mr. Steuerer and Ms. Richards in t.1)e year 2010. .:tvfa. Richards did not
'

'

accept Mr. Steuereri s offer to pay interest at that time. During her testimcny in deposition, Ms.

Richards neverthele:ss testified that she would not convey the real propert) to Mr. Steuerer
unless she was paid unspecified interest and attorney's fees. Interest owed Ms. Richard:s
should be detem.tined under Idaho Code §28~22-104, in the amount set forth in Plaintiffs
Exhibit No. 137. Defenda."li:'s Exhibit No. 211 is not a con:ect calculation of interest for
several reasons. It does not correctly identify the dates upon. which monies were advanced by
to or on behalf of Mr. Steuerer, and it assumes an additional $5,000.00 lo;m to l\1'.r. Steuerer by
Ms. Richards on De:cember 31~\ 1997 that is not supported by the preponderance of the
evidence, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 137 is actually generous to the Defendant in that it assumes
the entire $2,000.00 loaned in the year 1997 was loaned on .February 24t1\ J 997, whereas t.i-ie
evidence at trial establishes that the $2,000.00 was advanced in the form of four (4) $500.00

increments, paid around the first of each of the months of M:'ll'ch, April, May and June of 1997.
The loans: secured by the mortgages total $8)784.91.00 in principal and ac,1rued interest of
$8,651.29 through August 16th, 2011, with per diem interest thereafter ofS,2.89 to the date of
judgment

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

f-6_± day of August, 2011.

PLAINT!Pl'' 6 CLOSlNO AR:IJUMENT • 5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of August, 2011 1 I sened a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addre1,ses appear below by
the method indicated:

Christopher P. Sim.ms
Attorney
at La.w
.
•
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, ID 83333

I
I

j ~J.S. Mail) pos.age prepaid
1 0 Hand Delivery - Court Folder
D Facsimile Transmission
D Federal Expte5Sl

ROBERT E. WILLLAMS
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ROBERT E. WILLIAMS
IDAHO STATE BARNO, 16.93

WILLIAJlv1S, MESERVY &; LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-230j

Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
11

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C01JNTY OF LINCOLN
DONALD E, STEUERER,

Case No. CV-2010-:212

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

vs

N.E.M. FJCHARDS, aka NlCKY RJCHA.RDS,
and JOHN DOES I-V,
Defendants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, DONALD E. STBUERER, by and th.rough his attorney of
record, Robert E. Williams of Williaim.s, Meservy & Lothspi:dch, LLP, and proposes that the

foHovvb:lg Findings of Fa.ct and Conclusions of Law be a.dop1:ed by .the court following the Trial
of this matter conducted JuJ;y

13r\ 2011.
FINDINGS OF FACl'

1.

Donald E. Steuerer, is a 67 year old individual who resides at 110 North Greenwood,

Shoshone; Idaho.

FLA.lNTIFr'S PROPOSIW FJINDD~GS OF FACT ANTI CONCLUSIONS Ol' LAW• l
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"2,

Mr. Steuernr has resided at 110 North Greenwood, Shoshone, Idalto, continuously since

he became a perm.anent tesident of the state of Idaho in 1991. Prior to :m,( •ving to Idaho
permanently, Mir. Steuerer was a resident of the state of New York He was reared and
educated in the state ofNew Yotk and graduated from High School there. Mr. Steuerer

attended one business school class after his high schi::,ol education was completed.

3.

Mr. Steuerer served in the United States Mari..ne Corjp and was hotorabiy dlscha.rged.

4.

The real property loc,ated at 110 North Greenwood, Shoshone, Ida 10, is legally

If

described as Lots 4 and 5, Block E of the Shoshone Town.site, Lincoln County, Idziho, as the
same is platted in the official plat thereof now of record in the office of tt1J,.; recorder of said
county (here111after tht) "Real Property").

5,

Mr. Steuereir purcha:;ed the Real Property from the Odd Fellows oiganization in

Shoshone in 1987 during a visit to Idaho. He: paid Three Thousand a:nd N )/100 Dollars
($3,000.00) for the p1operty in i.Jn.stallments over six months,
6.

When Mr. Steuerer purchased the Real Property from the Odd Fellows no written

agreement was ,entered into, When me purchase price had breen fully paid the Odd Fellc1ws
gave Mr. Steuerer a deed to the Rea1 Property.
7.

Mr. Steuerer did not consult an attorney at t..1,e time he purchased tJ 1e Real Property

from the Odd Fellows. Mr. Steuerer had no prior experienc{;: in owning or acquiring real
property before his ·transaction vrith the Odd Fellows,
8.

Mr. Steue:i:er's only cum::nt source: ofincome is from Social Securi·:y. He last filed

Federal or State Income Tax Returns in 1996, Prior to receiving retireme11 t Social Security
benefits, :Mr. Steuerer received Social Security Disability Benefits for sevciral years. He suffers
from diabetes and other conditions.

PLAlNTil'F'S l'R,OPOSED Fl!ND1J\JGS OF FACT AJ,1P CONCLUSIONS OF LAW· 2
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After 1991, Mi. Steuerer was sporadically employed on a parMim! basis. The longest

Ii 9,

single period of time that M[r. Steuerer v.,-as employed full-time after 1991 was for a few
months when he worked as a dishwasher.
10.

Ms. Richards is a single individual 61, years of age, :residing at Sh, )shone, Idaho. She

holds a degree in veterinary medicine from Washington State University. She owns real
property across Greenwood StreJet from the Real Property, and was a neig 1bor of M..r. Steuerer
II

in 1991.
11.

Ms, Richards claims that she is C'l.m'ently disabled as the result of r 1edical conditions

and that she takes prescriptions for those conditions. She cannot recall tht specific: conditions

causing her disability. She testi:fied that she has troub.le with her memory in recaHing specific
facts.
12.

Ms. Richards has: worked part-time in a veterinarian's office but is not currently

employed.
13.

Ms. Richards was in the milita.ry for several years.

14.

The Real Property is improved by an old, two-story framed dwellillg, After he

purchased the Real Property, Mr, Steuerer' s pla.11 for it was to remodel the structure a.'!ld open a

bar. To that end, he made improvements to the Real Property after 1991, :,ome of which
included the bar itse:lf, and plumbing improvements that would allow him to accomplish his

purposes.
15.

Mr. Steuerer met Ms, Richards, shortly after he returned to Idaho in 199L Ms.

Richards o,1,,11ed real property dfrectly across Greenwood Street from Mr. :,teuerer's residence.

Mr. Steuerer frequently visited Ms. Richards residence, and 1;-onsidered her a friend.
16.

In 1997 Mr. Stew::rer' and Ms. Richards had a convers;atiori concerning Mr. Steuerer's

plans for thie Real Property. 1'v1r. Steuerer explained he had plans to open ,ii bar on the Rc:al
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED' FJNPn.:ic.s OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LIi w-3
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Property, but that he did not have suffic~ent funds; to allow him to do so, -Ie intended to na..rne
1

the enterprise the Shoshone Clu.b.
17.

During the l 997 conversation Mr. Steuerer advised Ms. Richards· hat he thought it

would take $5,000.00 to accomplish the tasks necessary to open the bar, ln 1997 Mr. Steuerer
did not have suffident funds to pay the back property taxes on the Real Property that then
existed, nor did he have sufficient funds to pay t"l-ie costs inc:ident to the opening of the bar. ]'-.1r.
11

Steuerer estimated his income for the year 1997 to have bee:a $ 81000, 00.

18.

During the 1997 conversation, Ms. Rfohards agreed to loan Mr. SL:uerer $5,000.00.

Mr. Steuerertestified that he was paid $2,000.00 in the form of four (4) checks for $500.00
each, written by Ms. Richards in consecutive months in 1997. Mr. Steuer,.:Jr agreed to execute

and deliver a deed for a one-half interest in the Real Property to serve as (>collateral" for the
repayment of the loan.
19.

Plaintiffs Exhibit 106, handwritten notes of Ms. Richards, indicates a total of

$2,000.00 was paid to Wrr. Steue:rer in 1997. Defendant's Exhibit 212 are duplicates of

Plaintiffs Exhibits 103, 104 and 105) and conoborate the pa.yme11t of $2,(iOO.OO to Mr.
Steuerer by Ms. Richards in c:onformance with Plaintiffs fa:hibit 106.
20.

The parties agreed that Ms, Richards would reconvey the Real Pro Jerty to Mr. Steuerer

when he had paid tile amounts loaned back to her. The parties did not agr,.=e upon a spedfic
d~te for the repayment of the loan.
21.

In the 1997 convers2tti.on the parties did not discuss or consider the transaction between

them to be a sale whereby ?vir. Steuerer transferred his one-half (1/2) owm·rship interest in the
Real Property to Ms. Richards in consideration of the payment of money fo

22.

Mr. Steuerer.

On Febru~y 24th, l9971vfr. Stcuerer executed and. deilivered to Ms Richards a

Warranty Deed conveying the: Real Property to Mr. Steuerer and Ms. Ricb3l'ds. Mr. Steuierer

l"LAfNTIFF'S PR.O?OSED F'INDTNGS OP f ACT AND CONCJ..US!ONS OP I..A II'• 4
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did not consult an attorney at the time he made this agreem~:nt with Ms. F ichards 1 or when he

executed and deliYered the Warrau,ty Deed to her. The Warranty Deed was recorded in the
records of Lincoln Courity, Idaho onFebruary26t11~ 1997, as: Instru.rnent:J\o. 161973.

23.

Subsequent to 1997, Ms. Richards advised lVir. Steuerer that she drd not have the funds

to loan the additional $3,000.00 that had been requested by :Mr. Steuerer. Ms. Richards never

did loan the addJ:tional $3,000.00 that would have :made foe total loan $5/100.00.
24.

In the 1997 conversation the parties did not discuss whether the lo,m made by Ms.

Richards to Mr. Steuerer would accrue interest.
25.

After 1997, 1\1r. Steuere1· had difficulty in maintaining communications with Ms.

Richards. Ms. Richards moved from her residence in Shoshone to a resid,:nce in the
countryside outside Shoshone. Mr. Steuerer attempted to rea.chMs. Richerds by telephone and
mail on several occasions to discuss repaying the loan that had been made, but received no

response .from Ms. Richards:,
26.

Ms. Richards testified that she loaned Mr. Steuerer ru1 additional $.3,000.00 in 1997, and

an unspecified amount in 1994, The:se amoW1ts were alleged to have been loaned in addition to
the original $2,000.00 loaned., No corroborating evidence in. the fom1 of viritten oz· printed
. docu..Tltlents was produced by Ms. Richards pdor to trial, despite Requests for Production and a
· Notice of Deposition which requeS'!ied such information, On the day oftri,t.l.,.Ms. Richards forthe first time produced a checkb1:>ok ledger which contained an entry for a check of $500.00
made payable to "Shoshone Club'' on "7/1)'. This was part o,fwhat was ccntained in
Defendant's Exhibit 215.
27.

M:r. Steuerer and Ms. Richards next spoke a.bout the 1997 loan in the year 2000.

PLA!NnFF' s hoPOSEll' Fl!NDD.~GS Of FAC1' AND CoNCLUSJONS OF Lii W • S
\\SERVER\Bi,J.A M\DA TA\STEUER.ER, DoN;,LD\R!C/fAP..DSIPLAlNTil'F'S FR.0l'051lD F'OF & COL.DOCX

Page

I 325

v~, , VI'-"

I I

10, lJJJ

:: 28.

t-1\X

141013/

~Qi:J:3243135

During the 1:onversation of the parties in 2000, Ms. Richards was ooncemed about

delinquent real property taxes on th1;i Real Property. fo 2000 Mr, Ste:uerer did not have the
funds to bring re:al propc:rty tax(:s current on the Real Propeity, or to pay t11ern.

29,

During the cm".lversation of the parties in 2000 Ms. Richards agreed to pay the

delinquent real property taxes on the Real Property as an additional loan t,1 Mr. Steuerer.
30,

During the conversation of the parties in 2000, Ms. Richards reqm sted additional

collateral for the payment of real property taxes in th.e fonn ,of a deed fron I Mr, Steuerer
conveying all of his interest in the Real Property to Ms, Richards. The pa1ies did not
characterize this transaction. as a sale and purchase of the Real Property.
31.

Pursuant to the agreement of the parties on or about May 81\ 2000 Mr. Steuerer and

Ms. Richards executed a Quitclaim Deed for the .Real Property in favor of Ms. Richards. The
Quitclaim Deed was :rec()tded as: Instrument No. 168606 Lin.coln County, [daho records, on
May 8111, 2000. On the same dat,e, Ms. Richards paid $466.02 in back property taxes on the
Real Property.
32.

Ms, Ri~,hards paid real p-toperty taxes for the Real Property on the follov.ing dates in

the corresponding amounts:
5/8/00
12/20/00

$466,02

$299.24

12/20/00
l272Dl{JO .
12/20/00

$309.10

$273.14
$114.49

$114.49

6/20/01
12/21/01

$239.65
$234.95

6/19/02

$217.87

12/19/02

6/2/03
12/20/03

-

$217.87
$275.23

6/20(04

$275.23

12/20/04

$283.19

6/20/05

$283.19

~
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12/20/05
6/20/06
12/20/02
6120107
12/20/07
6/2{)/08

-

·12120108
6/20/09
12/20/09

6/20/10
12/20il 0

ii

,__TOTAL

33.

..

--

I

I $304.30

I$304.30

$303.0D
$303.00
$287.47
$287.47
$292.09
$292.09
$262.81
\ $262.81
$281.91
$6784,91

I

j

I

= "JI
I

l

I
I

~

Ms. Richards h~1 never requested that Mr. Steuerer vacate the Real Property. Neither

has she ever demanded payment of rent from .Mr. Steuierer for his continued occupancy of the

Real Property.
34.

Ms. Richards has never made any demands to Mr. Steuere:r for re~payment of the leans

she made ta him.

35.

Mr. Steuerer did not consult an attorney concerning the transactions entered into

between he and Ms. Richards in 1997 or 2000.

36.

After the year 2000, Mr. Steuerer continued to have difficulty reac.:ting Ms. Richards

for purposes of discussing the loans that had been made .
.1

37,

During the yeair 2007, M:r, Steuerer spoke to Ms. Richards by telephone while she was

confined at a Veterans' Administration.hospital Mr, Steuert~r discovered ·hat Ms. Richards
was suffering from an illness tha,t might have resulted in her death and Mr Steuerer was
concerned about what would happen to the Real Property in that event. In response to 1\,1.r.
Steuerer's question as to how the Real Property would be dei!ded back to l,im Ms. Richards
responded that ht,r friend, Ofer fobar, would sec that the Real Property wo J.ld be deeded back

to Mr. Steuerer if Ms. Richards should die.
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During the year 2010 Valley Co-Ops, Inc, through its General Maitager, Don.--i

BordeV!Jk, contacted :tvfr. Ste:uerer to inquire about the posslibility of purchasing the Real
Property.
3 9.

Valley Co~Ops, Inc. mvris real property immediately adjacent to tr e Real Property. A

few years prior to 2010 Valley Co-Ops, Inc. completed. a m.cJor remodeiin g of its property
which consists of a convenience store and fuel station,
40.

In 2010, Mr. Steuerer was able to contact Ms. Richards to discuss ·.he interest of Valley

Co-Ops, Inc. in purchasing the Real Property, During that conversation Mr_ Steuerer informed
Ms, Richards that he vvished her to deed the Real Property back to him, mid that he would
repay her what he owed her together with interest No specific rate of interest was discussed in
that conversation.

41.

During that same conversation1 :M:s. Richards told :tvfr. Steuerer that he o!lJy needed to

repay her the amount that she ha.cl loaned him, and that payn::1ent of intere-s would not be
necessary. Tht:: parties had Mver discussed or contemplated the payment of interest on the

_loans until the conversation held by them in 2010.
42.

Mr. Steuerer testified the loans were due when he had the ability tt repay them. Ms.

Ricbards testified that th,e loans were to be repaid as soon as possible. Mr. Steuerer would
have the ability to repay the loans if the ~roposed sale transaction with Va ley Co-Ops were

consummated.
43.

Mr. Steuerer is c1l.Il'ently :in possession of a written ·offer from Valfoy Co-Ops, Inc. to

purchase the Real Property for $110:.000.00.

44.

The Real Property consists of two (2) lots in the Shoshone Townsi1e. In 2006 Valley

Co-Ops, Inc. purchased other real property consisting of tbree (3) lots adjacent to its
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convenience sto:re and fueling station for $140,000.00. In 2007 Valley C< -0ps, Inc. purchased
1

other real property consisting of four· (4) lots adjacent to its convenience store and fuei station

for $180,000.00.
45.

The properties purchased by Valley Co-Ops, Inc. in 2006 and 200' r were improved.

Valley Co-Ops, Inc.' s interest in those properties was for the~ lots only anc the existing
II

improvements
were either removed er razed. Valle;'' Co-Ons.
intew in purchasing._. ihe
•
>- ~ Inc.'s
.
Real Property at 110 North Greenwood Street would be to mze the structure now located on it
and expand its business operations.
46.

From 1991 fonvard Mr. Steu.erer believed the Real Property to be ·.vorth more than the

$3,000.00 he paid for it because of improvements that he had made on the Real Property.
47.

Assessment records of Lincoln County, Idaho, estimated the fair rr arket value of the

Real Property for the corresponding years as follows:

1997

$5,176.00

1998

$7,176.00

1999

$7,176.00

2000

$7,176.00

2001

$16,608.00

2002

$16,608.00

2003

$22,470.00

2004

$22,470.00

2005

$25,160.00

2006

$28,430.00

2007

$28,430.00

2008

$29,960.00

2009

$291960.00

2010

$29,960.00
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Donn Bordcwyk is the General Manager of Valley Co-Ops, Inc. During the yeacr- 2010

48.

Donn Bordewyk attempted to contact Ms. Richards several times to discuss his company's
interest in the Real Property vvithout success. Eventually, hie was able to discuss the matter
\Vi.th her by telephone sometime during 2010. During that conversation Ms, Richards

characterized the transactions behve-.en she and Mr. Steuerer regarding the Real Property as

loans.
49.

In her deposition taken the 14tli day of March, 2011; Ms. Richards on multiple

occasions referred to the transactions between she and :Mt. Steuerer as loans, and the two (2)
deeds she received as constituting collateral for the loans.
50.

Ms. Richards refonre:d to the transaction between Mr, Steuerer and herself as loans in

response to written discove1y requests promulgated by Mr. Steuerer, whictJ. responses were
executed by her attorney of record at the time they were made.
51.

Ms. Rfob.a.rds referred to her tra.11saction with :Mr. Ste:uerer as loam in her testimony a1

trial and in cross-examination.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

L

The two (2) deeds dated February 24''\ 1997, and May 8tl1, 2000, and recorded,

respectively, on February 26 1\ 1997, as Instrument No. 161973, ar,d May f·h, 2000; Instrument
No. 168606, Lincoln Coun°t'J, Idaho records, were mortgages intended to s~.cure loans made by
Ms, Richards to Mr. Steuere:r, ar1d to, constitute collateral for those loans. l\.s such, these:i two
(2) deeds are mortg,":Lges and did not convey absolute title in 'lhe Real Prop1!rty to Ms. Richards.
2.

Mi, Steuerez· is the fee simple o\Vlle1· of the Real Property located at 110 North

I

Greenwood Street1 Shoshoni:, Idaho, legally described as Lo'ts 4 and 5, Bl<•ck E of foe

Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County, Idaho, as the same is platted in the ocficial plat thereof
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now of record in the office of the recorder of said county! and title tc, the Real Property be
quieted in him subject to the two (2) mortgages in favor of Ms. Richards, embodied by the
deeds.
I

.

3.

/

Ms, Richards loaned Mr. Steuerer $2,000.00
'
.. in 1997. She made alditional loans to him I
"

totaling $6,784.91 between 2000 and 2010, by paying taxes on the Real Ptoperty in that

amount. The total amount of the loan obligations secured by the mortgag,:.s is $8,784.91.00 fa
principal, together with accrued inte:rest of $8,651.29 through the 1601 day of August, 2011, and
per diem intere.st thereafter of $2.89 to the date of judgment

4.

Upon Mr. Steuerer paying the amount owed on the loans to Ms. R chards as detennined

above, Ms. Richards should be required to execute and caus,;:: to be record,!d in the records of
Lincoln County, Idaho, a suitab]e satisfaction of the tv,,o (2) mortgages.

,~V-

RESPECTFULLY SUBi.\1JTTED th.is ~ y of August, 2011.
\

MS,

& LOTHSPEICH, LLP

PI.AINTlF'F's PR.OJ'O.SED FINDINGS OF FACi' ANO CONCLUSIONS Of' LAW·] l

\\SERVER\sHAR.!l\D,l(TAISTEUBR.Elt, DONAW\R.JCNAR:05\PLAJNT!Pl''E f'll.Ol>O!l£l) FOP & COL.oocx

Page

I 331

vo11or.::v11

10:u1 rAX

Ii) 018/0

'20B3243135

.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1~

I HEREBY CERTffY that on.this
of August~ 2011, I sen ed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and ad.dre:;ses appear below by
the method indicated:

Christopher P. Simms

Attorney at Law
1
P.O. Box i 861
Hailey, ID 83333

J

~J.S. Ma.ii, postage prepaid
D Hand Delivery ~ Court Folder
D Facsimile Trru1smission

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Haiiey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
VS.
)
)
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RJCHARDS, and JOHN DOES I- V,
)
)
_ _ _ _ _D_e:fi_e_n_d_an_t_s._ _ _ _ _ _)

CV-2010-212

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, N.E.M. Richards through counsel, and files this,
her PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and therefore
states as follows:
INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 2010, Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer, filed a Complaint to Quiet
Title to Real Property against Defendant, N.E.M. Richards. Mr. Steuerer alleges and
concludes in his complaint that deeds executed and delivered by him to N.E.M. Richards,
relating to certain real property located within the City of Shoshone, were intended not to
be absolute transfers, but rather to be mortgages.

Mr. Steuerer requests judgment

quieting title in himself; declaring the deeds to be mortgages, and for the Court to
determine the indebtedness owed by himself to Defendant Richards. Defendant filed an
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Answer admitting Plaintiff executed and delivered deeds absolute on their face, denying
the deeds were intended as mortgages and propounding a host of affirmative defenses.
The issues were tried to the Comi on July 13, 2001. The only witnesses to testify
were Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer, Defendant N.E.M. Richards and Donn Bordewyk, the
General Manager of the Valley Co-Ops, Incorporated. Documentary Evidence offered
was admitted by stipulation of the parties. In addition to those exhibits included on the
parties' Ex...bibit Lists, Defendant offered original check reg1sters, original check stubs,
and a copy of check written by Defendant Richards to Plaintiff.
This document is filed in compliance with the Court's Order for submission of
post-trial proposed findings by each party.
FINDINGS OFFACT
Plaintiff filed a verified Complaint swearing that on May 8, 2000 he executed and
delivered to Defendant a Quitclaim Deed, to secure a two thousand ($2,000) loan, for
Real Property legally described as;
Lots 4 and 5 of Block E. Shoshone Townsite, Lincoln County, Idaho
according to the official plat thereof of record with the Lincoln County,
Idaho recorder.
Plaintiff, in his verified complaint, makes no mention of the fact that on February 24,
1997, he, as Grantor, executed a Warranty Deed and delivered same to himself, Donald

E.K. Steuerer, and N.E.M. Richards, as Grantees.

Steuerer swears in his verified

complaint that the May 2000 Quitclaim Deed was intended "not be an absolute transfer
of title but rather stand as a mortgage to secure a loan of $2,000 made by Defendant
Richards to Plaintiff on or about May 8, 2000." Plaintiff goes on in his verified
complaint, paragraph numbered 12, to state, "On or about May gth, 2000 Plaintiff was
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without any funds necessary to pay debts which were then due and oVving ... " Steuerer
makes no reference in his complaint to the nature of the debts due and owing in May of
2000. In addition to his verified Complaint, Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment, which is before this Court.
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, for the first
time acknowledged that not only had he executed and delivered a Quit Claim Deed to
Richards in 2000, he also executed a.11d delivered a \X/arranty Deed in Febrnary 1997.
Plaintiff, in his affidavit swears the 1997 Warranty Deed, not the 2000 Quit Claim Deed,
was given in exchange for a $2,000 loan made, not in 2000, but in 1997. In his affidavit
Steuerer swears the purpose of this $2000 loan made in 1997 was "I was significantly
delinquent in the payment of real property taxes to Lincoln County, Idaho and needed
money to pay real property taxes ... " (paragraph# 5 Steuerer Affidavit)
At trial Plaintiff testified he resides at 110 N. Greenwood Street in the City of
Shoshone. Plaintiff's testimony regarding his background and work history was vague.
Plaintiff was unable to provide the court with an accurate employment history. Plaintiff
did testify that he worked for many years as a trader on Wall Street, and thereafter in the
roofing business, prior to his residence in Idaho.

Plaintiff testified he first came to

Shoshone in 1987 with an unidentified friend, at which time he entered into an un\vritten
agreement to purchase the real property and improvements commonly knovm as 110 N.
Greenwood, more fully described above. (hereinafter referred to as "the real property at
issue" or "in question")

Steuerer testified he agreed to pay Five Thousand Dollars

($5,000) in exchange for title to the property in question, with a Five Hundred Dollar
($500) down payment and the remaining balance to be paid off over time.
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Plaintiff testified that he returned to New York and the roofing business, during
which time he fully paid the balance owed and acquired title to the property in question.
Mr. Steuerer testified he returned to Shoshone in 1988 or 1989, and has resided there
ever since. Mr. Steuerer stated he became acquainted with Defendant, Ms. Richards in
approximately 1990, as his neighbor across the street. Steuerer testified he approached
Ms. Richards in the summer of 1997 in an effort to borrow money to open a bar at the
propert)i in question. Steuerer testified he a..11d 1vfs. Fichards agreed she ,,.1;ould loan him

five thousand dollars ($5,000) in order for him to open the bar, and in exchange he would
"put her on Y:z the property." Mr. Steuerer testified there was no agreement when the
money would be paid back. Mr. Steuerer described the purpose of the deed as to provide
Ms. Richards with collateral. Steuerer testified there was no discussion of payment of
delinquent taxes.
Mr. Steuerer testified he received four (4) checks from Ms. Richards in 1997 over

four (4) consecutive months, each in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500), for a
total of two thousand dollars ($2,000). Mr. Steuerer testified Ms. Richards never gave
him more than the two thousand dollars ($2,000) as described. Steuerer testified he used
some of the money from Ms. Richards to pay taxes that were due and the rest to fix up
'

the building. Steuerer testified that thereafter, he rarely saw Ms. Richards. Mr. Steuerer
testified that in the year 2000 Ms. Richards appeared at his home and informed him that
taxes were delinquent on the property in question, but offered to pay the taxes in return
for a deed "turning it all over to her." Steuerer testified that this second deed was to
serve as further collateral for Ms. Richards. Again, Steuerer testified that no agreement
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was reached as to when the money was to be paid back, or the exact amount of money
owed.
Mr. Steuerer testified he ran into Ms. Richards in 2004, and informed her he was
receiving social security and may be able to pay her back. Steuerer testified his next
conversation with Ms. Richards was after he was contacted by Valley Co-Op regarding
purchase of the property in question.

Steuerer testified he presented himself to Ms.

Richards a..11d told her he may be able to sell the property ai--id pay her back. Steuerer
testified he offered to pay her back five thousand dollars ($5,000) plus interest, and that
Richards told him to just pay her what he owed her. Steuerer testified he spoke with
Richards only once more about the subject, while she was in the hospital, when he
alleges Richards said if anything happens to me my friend will deed property back over
to him.

Steuerer testified he made several other attempts to communicate with Ms.

Richards prior to filing suit; once by mail, returned as undeliverable, and a few phone
calls, where he "couldn't get through."
On cross-examination Mr. Steuerer was asked about the basis of his opinion that
the actual fair market value of the property in question was significantly larger than the
amount of loans. Mr. Steuerer testified that he had made continuing upgrades to the
building, including installation of a bar. However, Steuerer admitted the building had no
heating system other than a wood stove. Steuerer also admitted the building was open to
the weather, in that the roof was failing, and that he had never painted the exterior of the
building. Mr. Steuerer admitted he had rarely worked during his residence in Idaho and
that he hadn't filed an income tax return in more than a decade. Mr. Steuerer also
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admitted he had never actually tendered up any money to repay money given to him by
Ms. Richards.
During his cross-examination Mr. Steuerer was confronted with his Affidavit in
support of Motion for Summary Judgment, sworn on May 13, 2011, wherein he swore
the purpose of the monies provided to him by Ms. Richards was to repay delinquent
taxes, in contract to his trial testimony.

The affidavit, in contrast to the verified

complaint, s,xlore that not onl~,r did Defenda.i."tJ.t execute ai.rid deliver a Quitclaim Deed in

May of 2000 he also executed and delivered a General Warranty Deed to Richards in
February of 1997. Steuerer's verified complaint, paragraph numbered six (6) swore that
a two thousand dollar ($2,000) loan was made by Richards to Steuerer on or about May
8, 2000.

Whereas, in Steuerer's affidavit and at trial he swears that a loan of two

thousand dollars ($2,000) was made to him by Richard's in the year 1997. Steuerer goes
on to swear in paragraph numbered five (5) of his affidavit that Ms. Richards offered to
loan him two thousand dollars ($2,000) in 1997 because he was financially destitute,
significantly delinquent in payment of real property taxes to Lincoln County and needed
money to pay real property taxes. Mr. Steuerer, in contrast with his testimony at trial,
made no reference in his affidavit to a need for money to open a bar.
Thus, Mr. Steuerer has, under oath, told the Court three distinctly different stories
regarding the nature and purpose for the deeds in question.

This Court finds the

credibility of Mr. Steuerer to be questionable. At best Mr. Steuerer' s memory is less
thru1 clear on the pertinent facts of his claim.

In addition to his own testimony, Plaintiff called Donn Bordewyk, general
manager of Valley Co-Ops, Incorporated. Valley Co-Ops is the owner of Valley Country
I
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Store, a gas station and convenience store situated adjacent to the property in question.
Mr. Bordewyk testified that the gas station and convenience store were rebuilt in 1998.
He further testified Valley Co-Ops had an interest in acquiring the property at issue in
order to expand corporate operations on the site. Mr. Bordevvyk testified the corporation
had already purchased other parcels in the immediate area in 2006 and 2008.

Mr.

Borde-wyk testified the corporation had paid one hundred thirty thousand dollars
($130,000) for a three (3) lot parcel and one hundred eighty thousa.TJ.d dollars ($180,000)
for a four (4) lot parcel. Bordewyk testified the property in question is two (2) city lots.
Bordewyk learned in 2010 the property in question was not titled in Steuerer, but later
stated he began attempting to contact Ms. Richards in 2008.
Bordewyk testified the Valley Co-Ops has offered to purchase the property in
question for one hundred sixty thousand dollars, ($160,000) which offer remains open.

Ivfr. Bordewyk testified that counsel for Plaintiff, is actually working for Valley Co-Ops
and confirmed Valley Co-Ops has paid Mr. Williams fees relating to his representation
of Mr.. Steuerer in this litigation. Plaintiff rested.
Defendant, prior to calling N.E.M. Richards to the witness stand, offered into
evidence Plaintiff's exhibits 101 through 13 8. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties each
exhibit was admitted into evidence.

The documentary evidence included: both the

warranty and quitclaim deeds; copies of check stubs and handwritten notes of Richards
evidencing some of the monies paid to Steuerer; tax records relevant to the property in
question for years 1993-2010; Assessor's records relevant to the property in question for
years 1997-2010; the affidavit of Donn Bordewyk and a Litigation Guarantee.
Defendant also offered into evidence exhibits 201-211, which were admitted pursuant to

7
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stipulation of the parties.

Each of these documents were duplicative of Plaintiff's

exhibits, with the exception of Exhibit 211; a demonstrative exhibit displaying all monies
paid from Richards to or on behalf of Mr. Steuerer and exhibiting a cumulative interest
calculation.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 123 and Defendant's Exhibit 209 are the same, a 1997 Lincoln
County Assessor's Report relating to the property in question. For tax year 1997 the
.. Assessor valued t.11e property in question at four thousa..11d one hundred seventy
Cou11ty
six dollars ($4,176) and improvements at one thousand dollars ($1,000), for a total value
of five thousand one hundred seventy six dollars. ($5,176). Plaintiffs Exhibit 126 and
Defendant's Exhibit 210 are the same, a 2000 Lincoln County Assessor's Report relating
to the property in question. For tax year 2000 the County Assessor valued the property
in question at four thousand one hundred seventy six dollars ($4,176) and improvements
at three thousand dollars ($3,000), for a total value of seven thousand one hundred
seventy six dollars. ($7,176)
Plaintiff's Exhibits 103-105, and Defendant's Exhibits 203-205, are duplicates of
check stubs 1807, 1809, and 1812, written by Defendant to Plaintiff on February 25,
1997, March 3, 1997 and May 1, 1997, in the amounts of four hundred dollars ($400), ·
one hundred dollars ($100) and five hundred dollars ($500), respectively. The check
stubs each contain a notation, which in order of the check numbers read: $5,000 Balance
$4,600; Bal. March 1, $500; and May Bal. $3,500. Also admitted into evidence were
certain of Ms. Richards handwritten check register entries and notes relating thereto.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 106, and Defendant's Exhibits 206, 207 and 208 reflect these notes.
Exhibits 208 and 209 are copies of actual check register entries, whereas, Exhibit
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206/106 reflects Ms. Richards summary, not made contemporaneously with the writing
of the checks. These records indicate that in addition to checks numbered 1807, 1809
and 1812, in the total amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000); check number 435, 425
and 511, each in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) were written to Mr. Steuerer
on April 1, 1997, June 1, 1997 and July 1, 1997.
Richards testified that she was disabled and currently receiving United States
Vetera...11.'s Ad..Tinistration Disability benefits. Ms. Richards had difficulty stating the
exact nature of her disability. She .did testify that she was taking a host of medications
and that she has difficulty with her memory and quickness of her thinking. Richards told
the court she had served in the military during the Vietnam era, and had pursued a degree
in veterinary medicine following her active service. Ms. Richards testified she moved to
Shoshone to work in the veterinary clinic, which she did for many years. Ms. Richards
testified she resides at 115 N. Greenwood, in Shoshone, across the street from the
property in question.
Ms. Richards testified she became acquainted with Plaintiff in the early 1990s, as
her neighbor across the street. Richards testified that she used to allow him to use her
water and periodically fed him. Ms. Richards testified that Mr. Steuerer approached her
in the mid 1990s and asked for money because he was delinquent in payment of real
property taxes. Richards testified she felt sorry for Steuerer and didn't want to see him
lose his home.

She testified she gave him two thousand dollars ($2,000) prior to

February of 1997 when she decided she needed to get something to assure repayment.
Richards testified the purpose of the Warranty Deed executed by Steuerer to Steuerer and
herself in February 1997, was to assure repayment or compensation for monies
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previously given to Steuerer. Richards testified that she believed she had acquired a one
half (1/2) interest in the property as a result of the warranty deed, but that she would have
deeded the property back to Steuerer if he had paid her back.
Ms. Richards testified that in 1997 she and Steuerer agreed she would give him
five thousand dollars ($5,000) more, in order for him to get caught up on his delinquent
taxes, and to establish a bar business on the prope1iy in question. Richards testified that

($500) per month, and paid over, in addition to the two thousand dollars ($2,000) given

to Steuerer prior to 1997, an additional five thousand dollars ($5,000) beginning in
February of 1997. Ms. Richards acknowledged that she could not find documentary
records to verify all payments, but insisted she had given Steuerer a total of seven
thousand dollars ($7,000).
Richards did offer exhibits 212 through 215 as additional documentary support
for her testimony. Exhibit 212 was an original packet of check stubs, while Exhibits 213
and 215 were original check registers. These exhibits, in fact, confirmed Ms. Richards'
hand ·written notes by providing authentic originals of entries made contemporaneously
with the writing of the checks. Exhibit 214 is a copy of check number 425, in the
amount of five hundred dollars ($500), ,vritten to Donald Steuerer on June 1, 1997.
These exhibits together provide conclusive documentary evidence confirming payment
by Richards to Steuerer of at least two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) between
February 25, and July 1, 1997.
Ms. Richards testified that in May of 2000 she learned that Steuerer had not in
fact used the money she had given him to pay real property taxes that had become
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DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LA w
Page I 342

delinquent on the property. She testified that she agreed to pay the back taxes, and, in
that no monies had been repaid to her, to, accept a quitclaim deed to the property in
question, in order secure the indebtedness.

Ms. Richards testified that she felt the

instrument conveyed an actual OvV11ership interest in the property, but that she would
have agreed to deed the property back to Steuerer if he were to repay her all money due
to her, as soon as possible. Thereafter, Ms. Richards testified she paid all property taxes,
past due, and current, V"-\rhen such taxes became due.. Ms. PJ.chards testified that Steuerer

never offered to pay her a cent back, nor· even raised the issue, until the time Valley CoOps became interested in the property.
In summary Ms. Richards testified that she loaned Steuerer two thousand dollars

($2,000) prior to 1997, and accepted a warranty deed for a one half (1/2) interest in the
property instead of payment; that she gave Steuerer another five thousand dollars
($5,000) in 1997, and in 2000, not having been paid back, accepted the quitclaim deed
for that debt. She testified that she would have deeded the property back to Steuerer had
he made repayment, but that repayment never came. Richards believed any agreement to
re-convey the property had expired. The Court finds Ms. Richards to be a credible
witness, whose testimony has been consistent throughout the case. The documentary
evidence, in the form of check registers, check stubs, and a check copy, are all consistent
with Ms. Richard's testimony.

Furthermore, the documents disprove Mr. Steuerer's

testimony that he received only two thousand dollars ($2,000) from Ms. Richards. Bank
records from the 1990s are no longer available to conclusively prove or disprove the
amount of monies given by Defendant to Plaintiff.

11
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW
Page I 343

Lincoln County Tax Collector Records, submitted into evidence as Plaintiff's
Exhibits 107-122 collectively prove that real property taxes on the property in question
became delinquent for tax years 1993-1999. The Tax Collector records indicate that on
April 2, 1997 Steuerer paid two hundred fifty eight dollars and fifty eight cents ($258.58)
in delinquent taxes. \Vhile Mr. Steuerer testified at trial that he used the money he says
he received from Ms. Richards in 1997 to pay off delinquent taxes, the records clearly
indicate he did not in fact do so. The records verify no payment was made for delinquent
taxes until December May 8, 2000, when Ms. Richards began making payments clearing
the delinquency. Ms. Richards paid all real property taxes due from 1995 through the
first half of 2010. Mr. Steuerer made a real property tax payment in June of 2011, with
money provided by the Valley Co-Ops Incorporated. Richards paid a total amount of six
thousand eight hundred ninety four dollars and seventy cents ($6,894.70) in taxes for the
property in question.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The law is abundantly clear that conveyance of real property by deed is
conclusive as to transfer ownership. LC. § 55-606. Here the instruments used to transfer
title were first a warranty deed, and secondly a quitclaim deed, both fully satisfying the
statute of frauds, and providing certain covenants and warranties of title. LC. §§ 9-503,
55- 612.
The law presumes that the holder of title to property is the OVv'Iler thereof. Erb v.
Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328 at 331, 824 P.2d 903 (Idaho App. 1992); Hawe v. Hawe, 89
Idaho 367,406 P.2d- 106 (1965); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 324 P.2d 380 (1958).
Plaintiff would have this court believe he didn't understand that he conveyed first half,
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then the entirety of the property in question to Ms. Richards, when the deeds were
absolutely clear as to that plain fact. Plaintiff implies that somehow it was he, not Ms.
Richards who was taken advantage of.

The Court does not accept this proposition.

Plaintiff argues that these deeds, absolute on their face were in fact mortgages.
Idaho Courts have repeatedly rejected similar claims. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho
799,241 P.3d 972 (Idaho 2010); Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087 (Idaho

well-settled rule of law that where one asserts that a deed shall be given a different
construction from that clearly appearing on its face, claiming that it is a mortgage, he
must show by clear and convincing evidence that a mortgage, and not a sale with the
right to repurchase, was intended." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087, at
1091-92. (Idaho 2006)
A person may purchase lands, and at the same time contract to re-convey them for
a certain sum, without the intention of either party that the transaction should in effect be
a mortgage." Id at 1092, quoting Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho 546, 551, 290 P. 205, 207
(1930). The transaction at issue here is clearly such a case. Ms. Richards plainly viewed
the transaction as one whereby she took ownership, but under certain, somew]1at unclear
circumstances, she would have re-conveyed the property to Mr. Steuerer. In this regard it
is Plaintiff's burden by clear and convincing evidence to overcome the legal presumption.
Shaner v. Ratgdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916). Plaintiff has
failed to meet his burden and has not overcome the legal presumption.
The Hogg Court recited the factors to be considered when deciding whether a
deed absolute on its face is a mortgage; (a) the existence of a debt to be secured, (b) the
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satisfaction or survival of the debt, (c) the previous negotiations of the parties, (d) the
inadequacy of the price paid, (e) the financial condition of the grantor, and (f) the
intention of the parties. In Hogg, the Court affirmed the trial court, finding a conveyance
of title rather than a mortgage. The Court emphasized that no evidence was presented of
any pressure to enter into the transaction. The court also referenced the fact that, like in
the case at bar, no effort was niade to re-acquire the property.
Whether a debt was to be secured is less tha..11 abundantly clear on foe facts before
the court, certainly if a debt it was, it has not been repaid. No exact an1ount, nor date of
repayment, was established by clear agreement of the parties. According to Ms. Richards
she agreed to give Steuerer, first two thousand dollars ($2,000) and later five thousand
dollars ($5,000), if she were paid back as soon as possible. Ms. Richards testified that
Steuerer failed to make any effort at repayment and therefore excepted first a one half
(1/2) interest in the property by Warranty Deed, and when the second sum of money had
not been repaid, she accepted a Quitclaim Deed transferring full ownership to her. While
she did testify she would have re-conveyed the property upon repayment, repayment
never came.
The parties' recollections·· are at odds concerning their negotiations. Both parties
have described a transfer of an ownership interest in the property. Steuerer claims to
have made efforts to contact Richards to discuss repayment, but has brought forward no·
evidence to support tender, at least prior to Valley Co-Ops interest in the property.
Plaintiff argues that the price paid was inadequate. This contention is in obvious
contradiction to the only evidence on this issue, the Tax Assessors Records.
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In 1997 the Assessor valued the land at four thousand one hundred seventy six
dollars ($4,176) and improvements at one thousand dollars ($1,000), while Ms. Richards
paid two thousand dollars ($2,000) for her purchase of a one half (1/2) interest thereof.
In the year 2000 the Assessor continued to value the land at four thousand one hundred
seventy six dollars ($4,176), while the improvements had risen to three thousand dollars
($3,000), while Ms. Richards paid five thousand dollars ($5,000) in addition to the two
thousand dollars ($2,000), previously paid, for a grand total of seven thousa.rid dollars
($7,000) for her outright purchase of the property. In other words, the evidence proves
that Ms. Richards paid to Mr. Steuerer almost the exact amount the Assessor determined
to be the value of the property.
As to the financial condition of the grantor, the Court can accept that Mr. Steuerer
was not in a cash flush position in 1997. or in 2000. However, Mr. Steuerer' s financial
condition at that time seems to have been of his own making. This criterion and others,
are designed to consider the equity of the bargaining power of the parties. Here, the court
finds no inequity in this respect. In considering the last of the Hogg criteria, the court
finds the intention of the parties was to transfer an interest in real property in exchange
for pre-existing debts, with an agreement to re-convey upon re-repayment as soon as
possible within a reasonable time.
Mr. Steuerer has testified inconsistently. Clearly, Mr. Steuerer did not use the
initial sums provided by Ms. Richards to pay real property taxes. Ms. Richards stated
·with certainty what her intentions were with regard to the transactions; that she believed
she gained an ownership interest by payments to Mr. Steuerer. Ms. Richards con:firmed
that belief in her ownership by consistent payment of real property taxes commencing the
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very same day she acquired fee simple title, by Quitclaim Deed on May 8, 2000. Mr.
Steuerer on the other hand, made no actions and took no steps, confirming in any way
that he believed the transactions were mere mortgages.
Idaho Court's have rejected the proposition, put forth by Plaintiff here, that when
at the time of execution of an absolute conveyance a separate agreement to re-convey is
also executed, that transaction will constitute a mortgage. Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho
355, at 362, 399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965)

The rule above stated is too narrow. See criticism, note 3, p. 234, L.R.A.

[N.S.] 1916B. It fails to incorporate other necessary and controlling
elements, and eliminates the question of intention of the parties, and
encroaches upon their right to contract. In effect, literally speaking, this
portion of the opinion holds that a deed, in form an absolute conveyance,
expressing the intention of the parties, coupled with possession, payment
of taxes, assertion of ownership, and with a positive understanding by the
grantee that he had an absolute conveyance and his positive refusal to
accept anything but an absolute conveyance, cannot be upheld as such, if
at the time of the execution of the deed an agreement was entered into to
reconvey the property. Such a holding is contrary to the great weight of
authority, and not in harmony with prior and recent decisions of this court.
Whether a deed, absolute on its face is to be deemed a mortgage depends upon the
intention of the parties in regard to it at the time of its execution. "In order to convert a
deed absolute in its terms into a mortgage, it is necessary that the understanding and
intention of both parties, grantee as well as grantor, to that effect should be concurrent
and the same." Clontz, 88 Idaho 355 at 362, 399 P.2d 949 at 952. (emphasis added)
Therefore, even if this Court believes Plaintiffs current claim that he believed these
transactions were mortgages and not conveyances, it must also find that Ms. Richards
also held the same belief. No evidence has been presented to support such a finding.

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 16
LAW
Page I 348

Quite the contrary, Ms. Richards has uniformly and consistently held out that she owned
the property.
NOW THEREFORE the Court HEREBY ORDERS, Plaintiffs claims are held for
naught, and title to the property in question; Lots 4 and 5 of Block E. Shoshone Townsite,
Lincoln County, Idaho according to the official plat thereof of record with the Lincoln
County, Idaho recorder, is quieted to Defendant, N.E.M. Richards.
ALTERNATIVE BASIS OF LEG,Li~L CONCLUSION
STANDING I EQUITY/ LACHES / ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff comes to this court seeking to have this court declare the transaction of
the parties an equitable mortgage. "In attempting to have a deed declared a mortgage,
equity requires the party so asking to tender and offer to pay the amount of the debt and
interest before he is entitled to any standing in a court of equity. Shaner v. Ratgdrum
State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916) citing (Hicks v. Hicks (Tex. Civ.), 26
S.W. 227; Dawson v. Overmyer, 141 Ind. 438, 40 N.E. 1065; Rodriguez v. Haynes, 76
Tex. 225, 13 S.W. 296; Jones on Mortgages, 2d ed., par. 1095.) No evidence has been
presented that Plaintiff ever even discussed repayment of the monies provided prior to
2010, and no evidence that money has ever been tendered.

\Vhen seeking equity one must approach the court with clean hands deserving
equity. This principal and estoppel by laches was explored by the Court in Clontz v.
Fortner at 363.

Here, like in Clontz, no evidence exists that plaintiff even spoke to

defendant about the transaction for years and years.

Like in Clontz, the defendant

expressed public displays of ownership of the property, (payment of taxes) while plaintiff
sat silent. The Clontz court found the Plaintiff to be estopped from claiming the deed,
absolute on its face, to be a mere mortgage. The Court, at page 364 cited a California
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case, Hamud v. Hawthorne, 52 Cal.2d 78, 338 P.2d 387 (1959), at some length, quoted
below,

It was not until plaintiffs learned of the interest of an oil company in the
subject property that they bestirred themselves to ascertain whether such
property was worth an effort on their part to reclaim it. As commented in
Livermore v. Beal (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 535,549, 64 P.2d 987, 'one is not
permitted to stand by while another develops property in which he claims
an interest, and then if the property proves valuable, assert a claim thereto,
and if it does not prove valuable, be willing [399 P.2d 954] that the losses
incurred * * * be borne by the opposite party. This thought was expressed
in one case by the following language: 'If the property proves good, I wai1t
it; if it is valueless, you keep it." (See also Robison v. Hanley (1955), 136
Cal.App.2d 820, 824-825[1-2], 289 P.2d 560.' 338 P.2d at 392.
The following statement from 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 59, p. 105, 1s
applicable here:

'A party who has the right to treat a deed absolute on its face as a mortgage
and to redeem from it must be reasonably prompt in asserting such right;
very long delay, amounting to laches on his part, may defeat his right to
have the deed declared to be a mortgage and his right of redemption,
especially if interests of third persons have intervened, or if the grantee has
been allowed to deal with the property in such manner that a redemption
would seriously prejudice him, and one conclusively chargeable with full
knowledge of his rights will not be permitted to excuse his delay in
seeking relief on the ground of ignorance of his rights.'
And the following from 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 107, pp. 547-548:
'The term 'quasi estoppel' has been applied to certain legal bars which are
in some respects analogous to estoppel in pais and which have the same
practical operation as an estoppel in pais, but which nevertheless differ
from that form of estoppel in essential particulars. Thus, it has been held
that no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side,
no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient.
'The doctrine classified as quasi estoppel has its basis in election,
ratification, affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of benefits; and the
principle precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a
right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him. The doctrine
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistentwith one in which he acquiesced, or of which he
accepted a benefit.'

18
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LA w
Page I 350

Here, Steuerer was perfectly content to allow Ms. Richards to believe she O'Wlled
the property for some thirteen years. Steuerer sat idle while a disabled wom&'1 paid real
property taxes on the home she believed she o~ned, while not charging rent, due to pity.
Steuerer was perfectly content to be pitied as man who couldn't pay rent, while allowing
the property to deteriorate.

Mr. Steuerer took not one step to assert o~ership, nor

obligation, with regard to the property in question until he learned that it was not a no rent

.
1&'1d.
hovel, but a deve1opable parcel of corr. .'Tiercial

Under these circwustances this

Court, like the Clontz and Harnud Courts, must send away the opportunist.

Mr.

Steuerer' s claim is barred by laches and equitable estoppel.
NOW THEREFORE the Court HEREBY ORDERS, Plaintiff's claims are held for
naught, and title to the property in question; Lots 4 and 5 of Block E. Shoshone To'Wllsite,
Lincoln County, Idaho according to the official plat thereof of record with the Lincoln
County, Idaho recorder, is quieted to Defendant, N.E.M. Richards.

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

DATED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

/0

day of August 2011, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff,
of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome
Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135.
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n ROBERT E. WILLIAMS

IDAHO STATE BARN0.1693
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

Attorneys at Law
153 Easr Main Street

P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303

Facsimile: (208) 324-3135

,, Attorney for PlaintiJJ-

IN THE DIS1R1CT COURT OF. TBB FlFTH JUDICJAL DISTR(CT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

t----------·---------~--------Case No. CV-2010~:'.12

bONALD E. STET)ERER,

Plaintift~
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL 10
DEFENDANT'; PROFOSEU
FINDINGS OF FA CT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs
N.E.M. PJCP.iARDS, a.lea NICKY R1CHARDS,
and JOHN DOES I-V,
Defendants,

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, DONALD E, STEUERER ("Steuere1 "), by and through

his attorney of record, Robert E. Williams of Williams~ Meservy & Lothsr,eich, LLP, and

rebuts the Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact

Conclusions of La:v, filed in this matter

by attorney Christopher P. Simms on behalf of Defendant N.E.M. Richards a.k.a. 1\TJCKY
RlCHARDS ("Richards") on the 161h day of August, 2011 as follows:

I
INACCURACIES

A.

Contrary to the contentions of Richards, the evidence does ;how that some of

the $2 1000.00 lent by :llichatds to Steue:i:er in 1997 was used to pay delinqp1ent property taxes
on the real property located at 110 North Greenwood Street1 Shoshone, Idaho (the "Real
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Property"). Plaintiffs Exhibit 107 contains a reference that Steuerer paid delinquent property

taxes m1997.
B.

Steuerer did not testify that he worked as a tr;ader on Wall 1~treet as a11eged by

the Richards, Steuerer testified1that he worked on Wall Street in several different capacities

but did not work as a trader.
C.

Steuerer testified that he paid $3,000.00 for the Real Property from the Odd

Fellows, not $5,000.00 as conte:n.ded by FJchards,
D.

Richards states that Steuerer testified that after a conversat on with Valley Co-

Ops, Inc., he offered to pay Richards back the total amount of $5,000.00 plus i.J1terest. Steu.erer
I

!

actually testified that he would pay
Richards what he owed her together~ ith interest
.
E.

I

Steuerer testified that Valley Co-Ops, Inc. had offered to pirchase the Reial

Property from Steuerer for $110,000.00, not $160,000.00 as stated by Ric 1.a.rds.

F.

)

I

Defenda.rit's Exhibits No. 212,214 and 215 corroborate Plaintiff's Exhib:it no

106 that a total $2,000.00 was paid to Mr. Steuerer in 1997. Plaintiff's E,. hibit No. 106 ~oes
I

not contain a reference to a check in the amount of $500.00 dated July 1~', 1997. Plaintiffs
I

Exhibit No. 215 contains a reference to check No. 511 dated "7/1" to the ;{hoshone Clul:l for
'

$500,00, That is the sole iti:m o,f documentary evidence produced by Richards to suppo:r her

testimony that more than $2;000.00 was given by her to Stouerer in 1997.
G.

Steu.erer testified that he use,d some of the money he received from Richards in
I

1997 to pay back property taxes and that he also paid personal expenses a 1d costs related to his
I

planned bar opening.

'

II
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

'

Richards argues that her transactions with Steuerer in 1997 a."l.d 2000 amounted

t6 the

sale and pmchase of interests in the Real Property. She makes this argummt even thou~ in

some of her testimony at trial, arnd in her testimony throughout her deposi .ion, Richards I
referred to the transactions with Steu.erer as "loans'·'. She also referred to· he tr.ansactiorib as
I
"loans" in a conversation with Donn Bordewyk in 2010. She has also ide.·1tified the intent of
!

the parties in issuing and receiving the deeds to be that of providing collaieral for the

repayment ofloans in her deposition testimony.
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Richards consistently testified that she had a duty to reconvey the :teal Property to
Steuerer when he p:aid her back. She also testified that she felt this obliga·.ion disappear<~d
because of the lapse of time at some point) but that she never communicat )d that to Stenerer.
During the fourteen (14) year pe:riod between. 1997 and 201 l Richards neYer did contact
Steuerer i:o an effort to obtain piiyment for what she believed she was owd, nor did she make

any demand for such payment. On the other hand, Steuerer made several Jttten:.pts to contact
Richards to discuss the repayment of the loans beginr.i:ng in 2004, Richards either failed to
respond to hls at'u:mpts at communication altogether, or remained silent a: to w:hat amount of
payment she expected. In a tele-phone conversation between the .parties when Richards was
seriously ill and confined in a V.A Hospital, she infonned Steuerer that if she should di1~, her
friend Ofer Inbar would see that the property was conveyed to Steuerer.
Ricihards argument ignores the basic rule cited in Hoggv. Wolski, 42 Idaho 549,, 130
P.3d 210 87, (2006), that the intent'ofthe parties at the time the 'transactions were entered into
determines whether the deeds, othe!'WlSe absolute on their face, were intended to be mortgages.
Stcmerer' s testimony was consistent that the transactions were always loans, and that the deeds
were intended to provide collatera!l for the rep.a)'D:IJent of the loans. Most of Richards'
testimony was consistent with Steuerer' s in that regard. Unlike the factuai circc.nnstances of

the cases cited by Richards in support of her arguments, in this case there . .s no express
agreem.er1t, in writing or otherwise, between the parties, to sell o:r buy, and the:i:e wa.s no change

of possession of real property from the person receiving the money to the person paying it.
Contrary to Richards cor1tention.s, Steuere:r never characterized the transac:ion as a sale of an

interest in real property, followed by the recording

d~ 1

PY z.. separate

agreement to reconvey that real property at a subsequent point in time. Cl 'mtz v. Fortner, 80
Idaho 355,399 P.2d 949 Idaiho (1965) and many other Idaho cases, acknowledge that such an

arrangement is possible, but, ff it exists, it does not necessarily mean that the separate
agreement to reconvey constitutes a mortgage. Steuerel s position has alv. ·ays been that there
never was an agreement of sale between the parties followed by an agree:n,ent to reconv~:y the
Real Property, verbal or othenvise. As be has consistently maintained frorn the

commencement of the case, the transactions between the parties were loan:;, and the deeds were
to constitute collateral for the repayment of the loans. Richards testified a,;cordingly multiple
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times. Further, Richards responses to Steuerer 1 s ,;i,1ritten disc,overy requesi s, signed by her
counsel of record at the tirne, aclmowledge that the transactions w:ith Steiu~rer were loans.

The term "mortgage'1 is defined in Idaho Code §45-901 as follows

"Mortgage is a

contract, excepting a trust deed or transfer in trust, .by which specific property is bypothecated for the

performance of an act withoutthe necessity of a change of possession." Further, Idaho Code §4 5-904
provides that: "Every transfer of an interest in property other than in trust to se,;u re the performance of

wy obligation of the trustor or other person named in tbe trust instrument, made only as a security for
11

the performance of another act, is to be deemed a morlgage."
Here, both parties have always agreed that Steiuerer had an obligation to repay Richards what
had been loaned to him. There wru, never any change of possessicm in the Real f toperty to Richards on
account of the transfor of mon,ey to or for the benefit of Steuerer. Steuerer has heen in continuous

possession of the Real Property. Tes;timony of both parties established that the deeds from
Steuerer to Richards were given as co!lateral for the repayment of what was owe j her. This was not a

case wherein the sale of the Real Property was contemplated by either party, and neither of them has
ever chMacterjzed their transactions in such terms. To the extent that Richards b·alieve.d that she
"owned" an interest in the Real Propie.rty as a result of the two (2) deeds being gi·1en tc, her, the
evidence, without contradiction, estabJ lshed that she did so with the recognition 1hat she had a duty to
1

transfor it back to Steuerer whi:m he: repaid tn.i:i loa.'ls, Thus, the deeds in th is case are mortgages in
accordance with ldaho Code §45,901 and Idaho Code, §45-904, and the cas.e law that has been cited.

To the extent that Richards sometimes testified that she "0Yv11ed" the Real Prop,e1 ty, she also
acknowledged she had a duty to reconvey the Real Property whe:n she was repaic loans. Her
description of the transactions in this manner perfectly squares with the mortgag,, definitions at Idaho
Code §45-901 and §45-904, because there was no change of possession of the Rt,al Property and the

deeds were given as ·security for the repayment of loans. There is no support int 1e record for bc,otstrapping Richards' occasional use of the term ''ownership" into turning the tranrn.crions between
herself and Steuerer into the sale and purchase of interesrs in real property, when both parties have
testified that they were Joans.
Because the testimony of both parties has characterized the transactions hy which the deods
were given and received as Joans, and that the deeds themselves were given as cc llateral, the ana.lysis of

the factors in Dick.ens v, Heston~ 21 P.2d 905, 908-910, 53 Idaho 91 (1933) is more supportive of
the deeds being mortgages than. they a.re determinative. The values of the Real P-operty as established

by the Lincoln County Assessor's ()ffice, at the times monies were paid to or for :he be:nefit of Steuerer.
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A debt was in existence at the time of the giving of the deeds and survived their recording. The parties'

negotiations were for making 1:,f Joans, not the purchase and sale of an interest in real property. Steuerer
had no financial reso1ilroes at the tirne the loans were made.

Clontz v. Fortner, 88 ldaho 355, 399 P.2d 949 Idaho (1965), relied upon by Richards in .support
of her argmnents is in apposite to the present case. This is not a c.ase, lilce Clonrz, supra, where there
was a wdtten contract of sale between two (2) parties, followed by a contemporaneous writte11
agreement for the original seller to purc:hase the property bMk. Clontz, the orighal purchaser, assigned
" his pi:m:hase;' s inter~st in tt',f,i proper::-/ to one Brimm. When Ciontz could not m i.ke payments to his
seller, he obtained the money from Brimm and gave him an ass{gnment of his pl trchar.er' s interest in

the contract. Clontz sued Brimm and obtained a declaratory judgment that his a ,signment of his
purchaser's interest was a mortgage. The court gave Clontz a specific amount oi time to repay Brimm
what he was owed. The day b,efore: that time period expired, Clontz, pursuant to a new attomey
prepared agreement, .sold his interest in the real property to one Fortner, who gave an option to Clontz
to repurchase the real property. Clontz then paid Brimm what he was owed and ,·emained in possession

of the real property through a tenant for sixty (60) dµys after the payme11~ at whi )h time Fortner
removed the tenant and took possession of the real property, Fortner remained h pos3ession for more
than five (5) years, until the action which found its way to the Supreme Court was initfated by Ciontz
seeking once again to have a transfer of his interest in the reaJ property to be dee an;;d a mortgag,e.

Summary Judgment in favor of Fortner was a..ffmned by the Supreme Court. Tht· contrast between the
present state of facts and those in Clontz, supra, is stark. Here, there are no wrltt ~n agreements for the
transactions between the parties. Both parties have characterized the transactloni: as loans, and that the
deeds were not absolute conveyances of title. Richards, who paid money to or on behalf of Steuerer has
never been in posSie.ssion of the Real Property, 11or has she ever requested possesdon.
St:euerertestified

as early ~s 2004 be

contacts

Richard,. to discuss paytng her

back and receiving the reconveyance of his Real Property. Mostly, Richards faik:d to respond to those
attempts at communication. Difficulty in communicating wirh Richards was alsc confomed by Donn
Bordev.yk. When Richards did speak about these subjects she was unable to arti.;ulat~, the. amount of
money that .she thought she WR.Sowed. Through fomteen (14) year.s, Richards m.1de no deman~: for

payment or for possession of the Real :Property from Stieuerer.

Hamudv. Hawthorne, 52 Cal.2cJ 78,338 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1959) is relied u ,on by Richards in
support of her claim that equitable defenses of Iatehes, quasi~estoppel, and the me shou l(i prevent

Steuerer from recovering on the cfaims he has asserted. There, Harnud sued Ha"'thome to recover
possession of real property. Originally, Ha"'rthome had loaned money to Hamud on real property that
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was already encumbered by two (2) prior deeds of trust. Hawthorne, at the time Jfth,e, loan, received a
promissory note, a third de,ed of trust on the real property, and a quitclaim deed from Hamud to
Hawthorne to be recorded iI1 the eventthatHamud defaulted on the note and thir:l deed of trust.
Written escrow instructions were entered into between the parties as well. The e,cmw instructions
provided that the quitclaim deed was to be recorded in favor of HaMhorne in the event that Harr1ud
defaulted on the note secured by the third deed of trust. Ha.mud defaulted. The ,1uitcla.im deed from
Hamud to Hirwthorne was recorded. Hawthorne, pursuant to the qultclaim dC1ed, then took possc)ssion

of the real p:mpe:rt-y, rented it, and c:ommenced to make substantial improvement: and ?ay expenses on

11

the property for a period of five (5) years. All this occurred without any objection from Hamud. Flve

(5) years after Hav.rthome took possession of the real property, Hamod discovere:l the interest of an oil
company in the property; found what they believed to be a technicality in the c.::,r veyance langua,ge of
the quitclaim deed, illl.d brought an action to recover possession of the real prope1fy on the basis that the
quitclaim deed was a mortgage. The California Supreme Collrt; in bank, reverse,i the trial court which

had determined that the quitclaim deed was a mortgage, and giving Hamud an OJ: portunity to redeem
the mortgage by paying Hav.-thorn :a sum certain by a specified date. The facts ir the present case are in
total contrast. Richards has ne,ver had possession of the Real Property, nor has she made demands for
possession, rent ot any other compensation from Steuerer. Richards has never made improvements to
the Real Property, and the 011iy money she has paid was in the form of loans to S :euewr which Steuerer
remains willing to repay. Richards has been evasive and non-committal when St;:uere.r attempted to
contact her in an effort to pay lthe loans back. Steuerer first attempted to contact Richads to disc:-uss
repayment of the loan many years prior to the time Valley Co-Ops, Inc, came int,, the picture, Steuerer

is hardly an opportunist, arid the inequitable conduct in this matter, if any there ii, is that of Richards.
conclusions of lttllf and judgment

accordingly that:

1.

The two (2) deeds dated February 24th, 1997; and M?iy Srh, 2000, and recorded,

respectively, on February 26r1\ 1997, as fustrument No. 161973, and M~iy 8'\ 2000,
Instrument No. 168606, Linc,0ln County, Idaho records, were mortgages intended to
secure loans made by Ms. Richards to Mr. Steuerer, and to constitl te collateral for
those loans. As such, these two (2) deeds are mortgages and did not convey absolute
title in the Real Property to Ms. Richards.
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Mr. Steuerer is the fee simple ov.11.er of the Real Property loca.tedl ~ t 110 North
Greenwood Street, Shoshone~ Idaho, legally described as Lots 4 ar d 5, Block E cif the
Shoshone Tov.m:ite, Lincoln County, Idaho, as the same is platted in the official plat

thereof now of ~:cord in the office of fue recorder of said county, rnd title to the Real
Property be quieted in him subject to the two (2) mortgages in favor of Ms. Richards,
embodied by the deeds.
Ii

3.

Ms. Richards loaned Mr.. Steuerer $2,000.00 in 1997. She made additional loans to him
totaling; $6,784.91 between 2000 and 2010, by paying taxes on the Real Property in that

amount. The total amount of the loan obligations seemed by the mortgages is
$8, 784,91 .00 in principal, together ·with accrued interest of $8,651 29 through the 161h
day of August, 2011, and per diem interest thereaft~r of $2.89 to tl.e date of judgment

4.

Upon I\1r. Steuerer paying the amount owed on the loans to Ms. R.Jcb.ards as determined

above~ Ms. Richards should be required to execute and cause to be recorded in the
records of Lincoln County, Idaho, a su.itable satisfaction of the twc (2) mortgages.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

'JS 4day of August, 2011.

{4' E:;

Y & ~OTHSPEICH, LLP

_____..,____~--=·-----

ROBERT E, WILLIAMS
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CERTIFICATE OF· SERVICE
f

d---

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2'b day of August, 2011, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addre! ses appear below by
the method indicated:

I

Christopher P. Simms
&U.S. Mail, pos :age prepaid
Attorney at Law
O Hand Delivery - Court Folder
I
P.O. Box 1861
0 Facsimile Trarsm.is~s·on
Hailey,
ID_83333
D Federal Exprern
.,.__
___
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-'::;,-=-----
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
DONALD E. STEUERER,

)

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)

N.E.M. RICHARDS , a.k.a. NICKY
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)

CV-2010-212
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING
ARGUMENT AND PROPOSED
FINDINGS OFFACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, N.E.M. Richards through counsel, and files this,
her Reply to Plaintiff's Closing Argument and Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and therefore states as follows:

INTRODUCTION
The testimony and evidence adduced at trial, and submitted in post-trial argument
present mixed issues of fact and law. Both the factual and legal issues to be determined
--

..

hinge on the credibility of the parties. Which party is to be believed?
Plaintiffs testimony has been inconsistent; changing as more information became .
available; is contradicted by opposing testimony, and is not supported by the existing
documentary evidence. Defendant has been consistently vague in regard to the minutia
and legal labels, but consistently emphatic on the ultimate facts .
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Fact issues for determination by the Court include: \Vhat was the intention of the
parties at the time the monies were exchanged? \Vhat was the intention of the parties at
the time the deeds were executed and delivered? How much money did Defendant give
Plaintiff, and when?
The initial legal issue to be detem1ined is whether Plaintiff has overcome the legal
presumption and met his burden by clear and convincing evidence, that two separate
rlePrlc:_ J:ihc:0l11te 0n thPir face, <:honlrl he cn11c:trrn>:rl ac: rnnrtgagec:, not ac: a tranc:fer with

right of re-conveyance. Hogg

v.

Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d1087 (Idaho 2006);

Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965) In determining the intention
of the parties the Court is required to examine certain factors, including the existence of a
debt to be secured and the satisfaction or survival of the debt. Hogg, at 1093. If the court
finds for Plaintiff on the initial issue, it must then determine whether equity permits
Plaintiff to recover, or whether laches and estoppel prevent recovery by Plaintiff under
the circumstances. Clontz, at 953. Finally, if the Court finds Plaintiff should recover
despite the lapse of thirteen to fifteen (13-15) years between the transaction and his
claim, then the court must determine the amount of money due Defendant from Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT

INTENTION OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff simply ignores the legal presumption, the plain language of the deeds in
question, the inconsistency in his statements to this Court, as well as the lapse of time
between the transactions and his claims to title. Plaintiff merely concludes that "the
intent of the parties that the deeds constitute mortgages, and the underlying transactions
loans, is therefore clearly established," despite Defendant's consistent testimony that she
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believed she gained an ownership interest in the real property as a result of recording the
executed deeds. Apparently, Plaintiff is asserting that because Defendant recognized an
obligation to re-convey title if she were paid what she was owed, the transactions must be
classified as mortgages.
Plaintiff does not dispute executing and delivering to Defendant a Warranty Deed
on February 24, 1997, nor a Quitclaim Deed on May 8, 2000. However, Plaintiff, in his
verified complaint omitted any reference to the 1997 warra...TJ.ty deed. The only '\vritings"
in any way referencing a transaction between the parties are the deeds themselves. No
note or any other integration in writing was created to memorialize any agreement the
parties may have reached.
Both parties testified they understood the deeds to transfer an interest in the real
property, but that the interest would be deeded back if Plaintiff repaid the monies given
him by Defendant.

Defendant testified the money was to be paid back as soon as

possible, within a reasonable time, while Plaintiff testified no time was set when the
money must be repaid.

Both parties testified no specific agreement was :reached

regarding the exact amount of money required to be paid from Plaintiff to Defendant to
trigger :re-conveyance of title.
When Plaintiff executed his Complaint, before he had any documentary evidence,
he swore he executed a quitclaim deed in exchange for a loan received from Defendant in
May, 2000. When Plaintiff executed his affidavit, after he had documents from
Defendant's checking account :records and a title history, he swore ·Defendant agreed to
loan him $2,000 in 199i and he agreed she could have a mortgage on his real property.
At trial Plaintiff testified he and Defendant agreed in 1997 that Defendant would loan

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT AND PROPOSED FINDINGS 3
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Page I 363

him $5,000 in exchange for the Warranty Deed. Obviously, these stories are not clear
and consistent. In addition to the time frame issues, Plaintiff has not been clear and
consistent with regard to the purpose of the exchange of money for deeds. He has told
the court the money was for back taxes in one version, and in another version, that the
money was to fix the building up for a bar business.
Defendant testified she had difficulty with her memory due to her disabilities, and
associated medication. Defendant t~stified she kept her records in bags throughout her
home. Defendant testified she could only locate a few documents associated with her
having given money to Plaintiff.

Defendant testified she was certain she had given

Plaintiff two thousand dollars ($2,000) prior to February 1997. Defendant was equally
certain she had given Plaintiff five thousand dollars ($5,000) in five hundred dollar
($500) consecutive monthly payments beginning ID February of 1997.
Defendant stated she received the warranty deed from Plaintiff for a one half (1/2)
interest in the real property in exchange for, or in repayment of the initial two thousand
dollar ($2,000) loan. Defendant testified she received the quitclaim deed transferring the
entire title to the property in the year 2000, because the five thousand dollar ($5,000) had
not been paid back. Defendant testified she paid all delinquent taxes and all current taxes
due on the property, after she acquired full ownership thereof in 2000.

Defendant

testified at some point when no monies had been re-paid to her by Plaintiff, any
obligation she may have had to re-convey the properties had expired.
Counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendant, cooperatively attempted to retrieve
bank statements and cancelled checks, and verified that the banks simply do not have
records from the mid-to-late 1990s. Therefore, it is impossible to verify exactly how
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much money changed hands and when.

Certainly, if all the documents relative to

payments made, were available, the intent of the parties may be easier to discern.
However, lack of supporting documents for a transaction that occurred more than a
decade ago, cannot be dispositive of the intent of the parties. In fact, the key documents
are available, filed with the recorder of deeds and admitted into evidence as exhibits 201
and 202; the warranty and quitclaim deeds.
Also submitted into evidence were the baJ1.k records Defendant v;as able to dig
from her old storage. The last of those records, dug from Defendant's bags of belongings
the night before trial, absolutely verify payment of not $2,000, but at least $2,500.
Plaintiff, at trial, testified emphatically he received from Defendant only four checks of
$500 over four consecutive months.in 1997. The actual documents prove Defendant paid
Plaintiff $400 on February 25, 1997; $100 on March 3, 1997; $500 on April 1, 1997;
$500 on May 1, 1997; $500 on June 1, 1997; and $500 on July 1, 1997. (Exhibits 203,
204,205,206,207,208,212,213,214 & 215) ..
Thus, Defendant's recollection of events is in fact confirmed, at least in part,
while Plaintiff's certain memory of events is disproved by the existing records. For this
Court to find for Plaintiff in his request to deem the deeds mere mortgages, it would have
to forgive the inconsistency in his statements. The court would have to believe a man
would execute and deliver a warranty deed, giving away a one half (1/2) interest in his
home, without having received a cent from the grantee. Defendant's recollection of
events plainly makes more sense and is more consistent with the documentary evidence.
If, as recalled by Defendant, she had previously loaned Plaintiff two thousand
dollars ($2,000), which had not been paid back, then it makes sense Plaintiff would have

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT AND PROPOSED FINDINGS 5
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Page I 365

deeded an interest in the property as a form of repayment. Likewise, in the year 2000,
three years after the second loan of five thousand dollars ($5,000), it makes sense he
would have deeded the property in repayment of the loan.
Plaintiff knew Defendant would neither demand rent nor evict him, because he
knew she was compassionate and of generous · demeanor.

This result, borne of

Defendant's charitable spirit, was the perfect set up for a work shy hustler; no rent, no
maintena...11ce, no taxes, not e·ven

fil1)7

utility bills. Plaintiff sho\ved nc interest in title to

the neglected property until he discovered it had redevelopment value to the Valley CoOp.
In addition to the testimony of the parties, coupled with the scant documentary

evidence, the Court is required to analyze certain criteria to determine the intention of the
parties. Among those criteria is the existence of a debt to be secured and the satisfaction
or survival of the debt. Plaintiff fails to provide any argument or analysis as to whether
an enforceable debt exists. In fact if a debt existed, it certainly does not survive. Before a
deed can be declared to be an equitable mortgage there must exist a debt which must be
personal in its nature and enforceable against the person independent of the security.
Shaner v. Ratgdrurn State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916) Idaho Code
Section 5-217 requires an action on an oral contract to be brought within four (4) years.
If such an action is not brought within the required period of time, it is forever barred.

Therefore, a complete defense exists as to any action brought for the debt, and Plaintiff
cannot satisfy this criteria.
The law requires a Plaintiff to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the
concurrent understanding of both parties, grantor and grantee, the transaction in question

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT AND PROPOSED FINDINGS 6
OFFACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF.LAW
Page I 366

was intended as a mortgage, rather than a transfer. Plaintiff has not made a showing
sufficient even to find he believed he entered into mortgages, rather than having
transferred interest in real property.

Certainly, Plaintiff has not shown by clear and

convincing evidence a concurrent understanding of both grantor and grantee that
mortgage transactions were being agreed to. The intention of the parties at the time
money changed hands may have been a loan. However, when Plaintiff executed and
delivered, first

2000 deeds to the pro:pe1iy
5

than clear that the transactions were intended to be mortgages. Therefore, the Court must
find Plaintiff failed to overcome the legal presumption that the deeds transferred titled
ownership of the real property.
LACHES & ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of laches is based upon the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and
not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim
which taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causes prejudice to the
adverse party, and operates as s bar in a court of equity. (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th
Edition) Here, Plaintiff alleges he believed a mortgage was created first in 1997 and
again in 2000.

Yet, during those years between the creation of the mortgages and

bringing his action in equity against Defendant, he did nothing to assert ownership of the
property. Plaintiff claims to have resided in the building, yet the building was without
heat, bathing facilities or even a roof. Defendant, not Plaintiff, paid all taxes due on the
property for all years in question.
The law imposes Emitations .of time as to most claims, for good reasons; fading
memories, availability of witnesses and documentary evidence.

Idaho has long
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recognized laches and estoppel as relevant equitable doctrines in this realm of law.
Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965); Shaner v. Ratgdrum State
Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916).

AMOUNT OF MONEY/LOANED & OWED
In the event the Court finds for Plaintiff on his claim that the transactions of the
parties were mortgages, rather than transfers of a fee interest in the real property, and not
barred by laches a...11d estoppel, then it must determine the a.'Tlount of money owed by
Plaintiff to Defendant.

Defendant's testimony was unambiguous; she directly gave

Plaintiff seven thousand dollars ($7,000), all prior to the end of 1997.

Thereafter,

beginning in the year 2000, she paid all delinquent and then current taxes.
Admitted into evidence was Defendant's Exhibit 211, a demonstration of interest
calculation on monies lent. If the court has determined the deeds are mere mortgages, the
debt secured, with interest must be paid prior to release of the lien.

Under these

circumstances the amount due would be thirty five thousan·d two hundred fifty dollars
and ninety seven cents, ($35,250.97) plus per diem interest accrued since July 1, 2011.
CONCLUSION

In summary, the law is clear that conveyance of real property by deed is
conclusive as to transfer of ownership. Even in equity a presumption exists against the
arcane fiction that a deed, absolute on its face be construed as a mortgage. A century of
sparse Idaho case law on this topic all hold against the party seeking to have a court find
a security interest contrary to the presumption of validity of a deed. The Plaintiff has
failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that anything other than a transfer with
an agreement to re-convey title was intended by the parties.
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STOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

'Z-?

day of August 2011, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to Robert E.
Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East
Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A.ND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DON.ALD E. STEUERER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
N.E.M. RJCHARDS, aka NICKY
RICHARDS,

- - - - - - - -Defendants.
------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-212

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

On July 13, 2011, the court trial was conducted in the above-entitled matter. The plaintiff
was present and represented by Counsel, Robert E. Williams. The defendant was present and
represented by Counsel, Christopher P. Simms.
Testin1011y of

w1tnes:ses was received and exhibits were admitted into evidence. At

the conclusion of the trial the parties were each given additional time to secure bank records of
the defendant and, thereafter, the parties were given fourteen (14) days to submit written closing
argrnnents and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; and, thereafter, seven (7) days
to submit any rebuttal argument or supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law; after
which the matter would be deemed submitted for decision.
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The final briefs were filed with the court on August 24, 2011. This matter was deemed
submitted to the Court for decision on August 25, 2011. The Court, having considered the
evidence and the arguments of counsel as contained in their post-trial memorandums and
counsel's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, makes the following findings of fact
and conclusions oflaw.

I.

SUMM.A l{Y OF TESTIMONY ~4~"J\l"D EY......1IIBITS
DONALD E. STEUERER is the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and is a 67-year-old
resident of the City of Shoshone, Idaho and has been a permanent resident since 1990. He resides
at 110 North Green wood, the subject property. The plaintiff purchased the subject property from
the Odd Fellas on a "hand shake" in December 1987 for the sum of$3,000.00, which was paid in
installments over a period of approximately 7 months. At the time of the purchase the plaintiff
was a resident of the State of New York. The plaintiff, for a period of time, worked on Wall
Street as a trader. He has not worked since 1996 and last filed tax returns in 1996. In 2003 he
began receiving SSI disability benefits. He received those benefits until the year 2007 when he
began receiving Social Security Benefits of approximately $800.00 per month. He had no other
source of income.
The plaintiff became acquainted with the defendant, N.E.M. Richards, in 1990. She was
residing at 115 North Greenwood in the City of Shoshone. Her residence is across the street from
the subject property. Between 1990 and 1997 they would visit a few times per week. He
considered her a friend. In the summer of 1997 he had a conversation with Ms. Richards at her
residence as to what he intended to do with the subject property and he indicated that he intended
to develop the property into a bar/restaurant. She inquired as to how much he would need to
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accomplish his plan and he indicated he would need $2,000.00 to $5,000.00. He denies that at
the time of this discussion there was any mention of delinquent property taxes. He testified that
Ms. Richards offered to loan him $5,000.00 for the development of a bar/restaurant. He offered
to put her name on his deed if she loaned him the money and he intended the deed as collateral
for her loan. He did testify that he had offered to make her a partner in the bar/restaurant but she
declined. There was no discussion between the parties as to the date or time for repayment,

ever received the sum of $5,000.00 and testified that he only received the sum of $2,000.00, in
the form of four (4) consecutive checks of $500.00. He executed a Warranty Deed [Exhibit 101]
as the collateral for the loan and placed Ms. Richards' name on the deed. The deed was executed
on February 25, 1997. He testified that Ms. Richards told him that she did not have any other
money to loan to him.
After he received the $2,000.00 from Ms. Richards he did not have much contact vvith her
between 1997 and 2000 because she was in and out of the hospital. He testified that he only saw
her a "few times a month." Sometime in the year 2000, Ms. Richards came to his residence and
they discussed his delinquent property taxes. She offered to catch him up on the property taxes
for three years if he would deed all of the subject property to her as collateral. Concerning this
loan, regarding the property taxes, she said "pay me back when you can." Regarding these loans
there was never any discussion about interest to be paid on the loans. He executed a Quitclaim
Deed [Exhibit 102] to Ms. Richards on May 8, 2000.
After the year 2000, he did not see Ms. Richards again until either 2003 or 2004 when he
was at the VA hospital in Boise for medical treatment. Ms. Richards was also at the hospital for
medical care. He testified that he told Ms. Richards that he was now receiving SSI benefits and
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could start repaying the loan. She said that he should call her to discuss the repayment. He
testified that he attempted to call her and write to her but his mail was returned undeliverable and
his calls were not returned. When he would call the phone was either busy, she did not answer,
or the voice mail was full. It was not until March 2007 that he was able to speak with Ms.
Richards concerning the repayment of the loan. This was after Valley-Coop expressed an interest
to him in purchasing the subject property. He drove out to a ranch where she was staying and

property and wanted to know what he owed her on the loan. He offered to pay her interest on
what he owed but she said, 'just pay me what you owe me." He admits that after the year 2000
Ms. Richards paid all of the property taxes, except for the June 2011 taxes, which he paid.
Sometime in May 2007 he and Ms. Richards had dinner in Twin Falls and he wanted to talk
about repayment of the loan. He testified that Ms. Richards was "in too much of a hurry" to talk
about it. About three weeks later he tried to call her and discovered she was in the hospital. He
followed up with letters but they were again returned undeliverable.
He did not have any opinion as to the value of his property in 1997, other than that he
assumed it was worth more than what he had paid for it. He testified that Valley-Coop has
offered him $110,000.00 for the subject property.
On cross-examination, he was confronted with his prior affidavit, wherein he testified
that in 1997 he was destitute. He admits he does not know what that term means. Today the roof
of the building on the subject property is not sound and the interior of the building is open to the
elements. The exterior of the building has not been painted since he has owned it. He did not pay
the property taxes on the subject property for the period of 1995 to 1997. He does not recall the
months in 1997 that he received the four (4) consecutive checks of $500.00. He only had a
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checking account at First Security Bank, at that time. He no longer has any bank records for the
relevant period of the time in question. He denies he ever told Ms. Richards that he was
delinquent on his property taxes in 1997. However, in his affidavit on file with the court, he
asserted under oath that he was destitute and "that he needed money to pay real property taxes
and other personal expenses." He did not state that the loan was for a bar/restaurant. His affidavit
also states that Ms. Richards agreed to loan him "$2,000.00" not the $5,000.00 referred to on his

although he claims to have used the money to "fix up" the building. He admits that at no time
has he ever attempted to pay back the loan by sending payments to Ms. Richards. His
explanation is that he did not know where to send a payment, since her mail was undeliverable.
The Shoshone Club was the name of his intended bar/restaurant. The plaintiff is also known as
"Brooklyn Don."

DO~"N BORDE\VYK is the General Manager of Valley Coop, which is a farm supply
cooperative. He reports to the Board of Directors of the Coop and oversees the day-to-day
operations, as well as the long-term objectives of the Coop. He has been the general manager
since 1996. He is familiar with the subject property. The subject property consists of two city
lots. The Coop owns a C-Store and a gas station that are adjacent to the subject property. The
Coop's property was refurbished in 1998 at a cost of $1.9 million. Since the remodel, the Coop
has acquired other property adjacent to its property. One piece of property consisting of three
city lots was purchased in 2006 for $140,000.00 and the other piece of property consisting of
four city lots was purchased in 2007 for $180,000.00. The Coop is also interested in purchasing
the subject property and approached Mr. Steuerer about purchasing the property in 2007. At that
time, the Coop thought that he was the titled owner of the subject property. He first met with Mr.
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Steuerer in his office in Jerome. At some point in early 2010, after this meeting and after he
became aware of the quitclaim deed to Ms. Richards [Exhibit 102], he contacted plaintiff's
counsel to begin the process of purchasing the subject property. He had a conversation with Mr.
Steuerer as to why his name was not on the title to the subject property. Mr. Steuerer told him
that he had borrowed money form Ms. Richards for expenses related to opening a business. He
testified that he had attempted to contact Ms. Richards sometime in 2008 or 2009 by telephone,
but he was not able to reach her; on each occasion her "(-loice mail "</las ft1.ll and he could not leav. e
a message. He does recall talking to her on the telephone in April 2010. Ms. Richards told him
that she would get back to him about the transaction. V/hen he did not hear back from her he
tried to call her several more times. It was not until December 2010 that he had any substantial
conversation with her. Ms. Richards stated that the amounts owed were a loan for a business and
they talked about the amount owed. This was the first that he had heard there was an additional
$5,000.00 owed. They also discussed a fair interest rate.

N.E.M. RICHARDS is a resident of the City of Shoshone, Idaho and had resided at 115 North
Greenwood for over 20 years. Her residence is across the street from the subject property, which
is the residence of Mr. Steuerer. She currently suffers from various physical and mental
disabilities and has been treated for such disabilities at the VA Hospital since approximately
1998. These disabilities have an impact on her ability to recall and organize her thoughts. She
grew up in Hansford, Washington and went to school in the State of Washington. She went to
nursing school at the University of Washington, but her education was interrupted by service in
the military during the Vietnam War. After the war she returned to school at Washington State
University and obtained a doctorate degree in veterinary medicine. She has never been licensed
in any state to practice veterinary medicine, but has worked in a number of veterinary clinics,
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including the Shoshone Veterinary Clinic. She moved to Shoshone in 1987. She purchased her
current residence in 1990 and it was at this time she first met Mr. Steuerer. They would visit
from time to time and she, on occasion, would feed him; allow him to borrow water; and allow
him to shower at her residence.
In approximately 1995 or 1996, Mr. Steuerer approached her and told her that he was
behind on his property taxes. She thinks that his house was close to foreclosure based on his
delinquent taxes. She gave lii111 $2,000.00, v.rhich she thought he was going to use to pay his back
taxes. She did not want to see him living on the streets. She does not recall if she gave him the
money in cash or by way of a check. She testified that there was a verbal agreement that he
would pay her back "as soon as possible." "I didn't think it would be right away. I thought that it
would take him sometime, because I thought he should do the taxes. I told him don't worry about
it." By February 1997, Mr. Steuerer had not paid back the money. She had not made any demand
for payment, because "I don't believe in pressing people for money." In February 1997, she
talked to someone else who had lent money to Mr. Steuerer and Mr. Steuerer had given this
person some guns as "collateral." At this time she thought that Mr. Steuerer's property was
worth about $6,000.00, so she asked him for half of his property as an "incentive to pay me
back." She asked him for a document saying that half of his property was hers and he gave her
the Warranty Deed [Exhibit 101]. She believed she was a half owner of the subject property after
receipt of the Warranty Deed.
She does not recall if, between 1997 and 2000, she and Mr. Steuerer had any
conversations about repayment of the $2,000.00 loan. She does recall going to dinner with Mr.
Steuerer in Twin Falls. She testified she was hoping to talk about repayment but it was Mr.
Steuerer who did not want to discuss the subject. She admits that this dinner was sometime after
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the year 2000. She did testify that sometime in 1997 Mr. Steuerer approached her and indicated
he was in need of more money because he was still behind on his property taxes. She agreed to
give him $5,000.00, over time, in increments. She told him that "if he signed over the whole
thing [referring to the subject property] .. .I would catch up on everything and pay taxes

[referring to the property taxes]." She claims to have given him a series of checks totaling
$5,000.00 over a ten month period. At the time of trial she, belatedly, provided Exhibits 212
[original check stubs including check #1807 dated 2/25/1997 payable to Donald E.K.
Steuerer/Shoshone Club for $400.00; check #1809 dated 3/3/1997 payable to Steuerer for
$100.00; check #1812 dated 5/1/1997 payable to Steuerer for $500.00], 213[original Washington
Mutual check register listing check #425 dated 6/1/1997 payable to Steuerer in the amount of
$500.00], 214 [Washington Mutual cancelled check to Don Steuerer #425 for $500.00 dated
6/1/1997 and check #511 dated 7/1/1997 payable to Shoshone Club in the amount of $500.00],
215 [original partial check register].
N.E.M. RICHARDS DEPOSITION TESTIMO:NY

The deposition of Ms. Richards was taken on March 14, 2011. As to the money she paid
to Mr. Steuerer, she testified, in relevant part, as follows:
[Pg. 13, L. 5-12]
Q:

.... When was the first time you agreed to loan money to Mr. Steuerer?

A:

In the late 1990's

Q:

And what was the reason that you agreed to loan him money?

A:

I didn't want him to be on the streets. And he was delinquent in his taxes, so that I could

keep the house - - he could keep the house from foreclosure.
[Pg., L. 5-12]
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Q:

So did you make a loan to him in the late 1990's?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And how much was it for?

A:

2,000.

Q:

How did you pay him the money that was loaned to him?

A:

I don't remember.

[Pg. 16, L. 15-21]

Q:

And what do you say the agreement was that you made together, you and Mr. Steuerer, as

to how you would be repaid the loan?
A:

He - - I - - he indicated he would pay me back as soon as possible. And I told him not to

worry; I would not charge him rent, just to imagine it was his. So there was no definite time

period to pay back.
[Pg. 17, Line 2-8]
Q:

Did you agree on a time by which the loan had to be repaid?

A:

As soon as possible.

Q:

After you made Mr. Steuerer this $2,000 loan, did you ever ask him for the money to be

paid back to you?

A:

No.

[Pg. 25, L. 1-9]
Q:

So he deeded you a half interest in the property for the $2,000?

A:

Correct.

Q:

And did you consider yourself the owner of the property at that time?

A:

No.
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Q:

So what was the arrangement, why didn't you - -

A:

Part Ov;,711er.

[Pg. 25, L. 17 to Pg. 26, L.12]
Q:

V/hy didn't you take possession of it if you had a half-ownership interest in it?

A:

Because I made an agreement \\1th Brooklyn Don that he could just live there and pay me

back.

Q:

So without trvi..r1Q to nut words in '.J'OUT mouth. Ms. Richards, this is more like a mortQ:aQe
_,.

..._,

.l.

...

._.;

"-"

then, you had basically an interest in the property, and when he paid you back, you would deed
your interest in the property back to him, was that the intent?

A:

The intent was to have some kind of collateral.

Q:

So you viewed your half interest in the property that was acquired by this deed as

collateral? Was there some other kind of collateral, other than this deed?

A:

No.

Q:

So let's just say, what would you have done then, let's say in the year 1998, had he paid

you back the $2,000?

A:

I would have signed it back over to him, as I told him I would.

[Pg. 26, L. 23 to Pg. 29, L.8]
Q:

Between 1997 and the date of Deposition Exhibit No. 2, at least the last page of

Deposition Exhibit No. 2, which the document says is May 3rd, 2000, - - maybe May 8th, 2000, it
appears. Did you make any more loans to Mr. Steuerer over and above the $2,000 you've already
told me about?

A:

Yes.

Q:

How much did you loan to him and when did you loan it to him?
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A:

5,000. And I'm not sure when. It was not all at one time.

Q:

Do you remember when any part of the $5,000 was loaned to Mr. Steuerer?

A:

Not atthis time. Late 1990's.

Q:

Was it before the date that's on that deed that we're looking at, the last page of Exhibit 3?

A:

Yes.

Q:

It would have been before May st\ 2000?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Any why did you loan the additional money to him?

A:

I don't remember what reason he gave me.

Q:

But, in any event, your testimony is that you did advance him an extra $5,000 sometime

between February of 1997 and May of2008?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Was there any new agreement reached between the two of you at that time as to how the

new loan amount, which appears to now be up to about $7,000, would be paid?

A:

No.

Q:

Was it- -

A:

Not except for as soon as possible.

Q:

Still as soon as possible?

A:

Correct.

Q:

And there still was no specific date mentioned?

A:

No.

Q:

After May 8, 2000, if Mr. Steuerer would have paid you back the $7,000, what would

you have done?
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A:

Signed it back over to him.

Q:

Now, could you tell me, looking at the last page of Deposition Exhibit No. 3, again,

which is the Quitclaim Deed dated May 8, 2000, why was this second deed signed and given to
you at the time?
A:

Because of the loan. The extra loan.

Q:

The new--

A:

That's why - - I'm sure he - -

Q:

The new $5,000 loan?

A:

Correct.

Q:

Was it supposed to be again, collateral, like the warranty deed was to be collateral from

the initial $2,000 loan?
A:

It was something to assure me that he was going to pay me back.

Q:

After May 8, 2000, did you ever take possession of the real property that's described in

the quitclaim deed and the warranty deed?

A:

No. It was the same agreement, live there free.

Q:

Has that agreement - -

A:

Consider it your own.

The following exhibits were admitted at trial:

Plaintif:f s:
#101-Warranty Deed, dated February 24, 1997
#102-Quitclaim Deed, dated May 8, 2000
#103-Defendant's check stub no. 1812
# 104- Defendant's check stub no. 1807
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#105- Defendant's check stub no. 1809
# 106-Defendant' s handwritten note
#107-Lincoln County Tax Collector Delinquency Notice, 1983/1984
# 108-1997 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 12/20/2000
#109-1998 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 5/8/2000
# 110-1998 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 12/20/2000
# 111-1999 Lincoln Countv
., Tax Collector Bill/ReceiDt,
" dated 12/20/2000
#112-2000 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 12/20/2000 & 6/20/2001
#113-2001 Lincoln County Tax Collector Bill/Receipt, dated 12/21/2001 & 6/19/2002
#114-#122-Lincoln County Tax Collector Tax transaction details, 2002 to 2010
#123-#136-Lincoln County Assessor History Reports, 1997 to 2010
#137-Affidavit Donn W. Bordevvyk
#138-Litigation Guarantee
Defendant's:
#211-Interest Rate Calculation
#212-Richards original check stubs for check #1801 to 1825 for the period of 11/24/96 to
5/25/97
#213-Richards original check register for the period of 4/09/96 to 10/28/98
#214-Richards cancelled check#425 dated 6/01/97
#215-Richards partial original check register
The exhibits above do shed some light on the testimony of the parties in this action. In
tem1s of the payment of property taxes on the subject property it is apparent from the records of
the Lincoln County Tax Collector that Mr. Steuerer paid the property taxes, interest, and
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penalties due for 12/20/95 and 6/20/96 on April 2, 1997, in the total sum of $201.58. According
to the testimony of Ms. Richards, he also paid the property taxes due on 6/20/2011, in the sum of
$281.91. Ms. Richards appears to have paid all of the current and delinquent property taxes on
the subject property for the tax years of 1997 to 2010, in the total sum of $6,784.91; with her first
payment being on May 8, 2000 and her last payment being December 20, 2010.
The exhibits above also shed light on the testimony of the parties as to the monies paid by

J'v1s. Richards to 1'Ar. Steuerer. According to t.cli.e. original check stubs, the original check registers
and the one cancelled check, Ms. Richards, during the year 1997, paid to Mr. Steuerer or the
Shoshone Club the total sum of $2,500 as follows:
Check#

Date Paid

Amount Paid

1807

2/25/1997

$400.00

1809

3/03/1997

$100.00

495

4/01/1997

$500.00

1812

5/01/1997

$500.00

425

6/01/1997

$500.00

511

7/0111997

$500.00

II.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This action relates to the ownership of certain real property located in the County of

Lincoln, State ofidaho, legally described as Lots 4 and 5 of Block E of the Shoshone Town site,
110 North Greenwood, Shoshone, Idaho (subject property) and the amount due and owing to

N.E.M. Richards (Richards).
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2.

Steuerer purchased the subject property in December of 1987 for the sum of $3,000.00.

The subject property has a two story structure on it and the property consists of two city lots.
Richards lives at 115 North Greenwood which is across the street from the subject property.
Steuerer became a fulltime resident of the City of Shoshone in 1990. Richards purchased her
current residence in 1990. In 1990 Richards and Steuerer became acquainted as friends.
3.

Steuerer was capable of paying his property taxes on the subject property from the time

he pmchased it up u..11til approximately 1995. The evidence is unclear as to Steuerer's incorne for
those years. Steuerer has not filed any income tax returns since 1996. Between 1995 and 1996
his gross income was not more than $8,000.00 from part-time work. From 1995 forward,
Steuerer did not pay his property taxes.
4.

Richards, from time to time, would help Steuerer by feeding him, providing him with

water, and allowing him to shower at her residence. At some point in time, Richards and Steuerer
had discussions regarding the subject property. The testimony of the parties is in conflict as to
when these discussions took place and as to the content of those discussions. According to
Richards, these discussions first took place sometime between 1995 and 1996. According to
Steuerer, these discussions first took place in 1997. As to the content of the discussions,
according to Richards, they concerned Steuerer' s delinquent property taxes and according to
Steuerer the discussions concerned his desire to develop his property into a bar/restaurant, to be
known as the Shoshone Club. Richards denies any discussion of the idea of a bar/restaurant and
Steuerer denies any discussion of delinquent property taxes. What is not in dispute is that these
discussions concerned Steuerer's need for money and Richards' willingness to assist Steuerer
financially. It is clear to the court that the current recollections of the parties, in their testimony,
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are not necessarily reliable, 15 years later. This case is a classic example of why friends and
handshakes do not always work.
5.

There is no dispute that, at some point in time, Richards agreed to loan money to Steuerer

and did in fact loan money to Steuerer. There is conflict in the testimony of the parties as to
when the money was loaned and how much money was loaned. According to Richards, in 1995
or 1996 she initially paid to Steuerer the sum of $2,000.00; however, she does not know if the
money was paid in cash or by check. Furd1er, Richards testified t.liat she loa...11ed an additional

$5,000.00 to Steuerer sometime in 1997, which was paid in monthly payments over a period of
ten (10) months. According to the testimony of Steuerer, he only received the sum of $2,000.00
in 1997, which was paid to him in the form of four (4) checks, each in the sum of $500.00 over
four (4) consecutive months. From the notations on the original check stubs [Exhibit 212], it
would appear that Richards originally agreed to loan $5,000.00 in February 1997.
6.

There is no reliable evidence, either through the testimony of the parties or the

documentary evidence, that Richards loaned any money to Steuerer in 1995 or 1996. The
documentary evidence [Exhibits # 212-215] reflect that Richards issued six (6) monthly
consecutive checks totaling $2,500.00 to Steuerer, which is contrary to his testimony that he only
received four (4) monthly, consecutive checks for $2,000.00. The evidence supports the
conclusion that Steuerer was paid at least $2,500.00 as follows:
Check#

Date Paid

Amount Paid

1807

2/25/1997

$400.00

1809

3/03/1997

$100.00

495

4/01/1997

$500.00

1812

5/01/1997

$500.00
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425

6/01/1997

$500.00

511

7/01/1997

$500.00

The documentary evidence [Exhibit 212] also supports the finding that Richards agreed
to loan to Steuerer the sum of $5,000.00 in February 1997; by reason of the notations she made
on her check stubs #1807, 1809, and 1812. On each of these check stubs there is a notation
written by Richards at the time the check was issued. The notation for check #1807 is
«$5000-+B::ilance 4600"; the notation for check# 1809 is "Balance for }Aarch

1st

$4,500"; and

the notation for check# 1812 is "May Balance $3,500." This is consistent when one considers
the April 1, 1997 check, issued to Steuerer for $500.00, check #495, which was written from a
different account. It is clear that, for a period of time, Richards was tracking how much of the
original $5,000.00 had been paid to Steuerer. This court has also examined Exhibit 213, the
original check register of Richards, which appears to cover the period of 4/9/96 to 10/28/98, and
during this entire period there were only two checks written from this account. They were check
#495, dated 4/1/97 for $500 payable to Steuerer, and check# 511, dated July 1, 1997 for $500,
written to the Shoshone Club. The court also finds that the first check Richard wrote [check #
1807] made reference to both Steuerer and the Shoshone Club.
7.

It appears from the testimony of Richards and Steuerer that their recollections of the

events are not necessarily reliable, as to the amounts loaned and when. The court finds that the
testimony that Richards loaned $2,000 to Steuerer in 1995 or 1996 is not reliable and that the
testimony of Steuerer that he only received four (4) consecutive checks of $500.00 each is not
reliable. The court further finds that in February 1997 Richards agreed to loan $5,000.00 to
Steuerer and that Richards would pay the money to Steuerer in monthly payments. Based on the
evidence, the court can only find that the amount paid by Richards to Steuerer over six (6)
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months totaled $2,500.00. Richards has retained records that support the six (6) payments to
Steuerer, but has not retained or provided to the court documentary evidence of any other
payments to Steuerer. The testimony of Steuerer and Richards as to the number of payments
made is not reliable and the best evidence is the documentary evidence that has been admitted.
The court finds that of the $5,000.00, Richards paid $2,500.00 to Steuerer.
8.

As noted above, the first payment by Richards to Steuerer was on February 25, 1997. A

Warranty Deed dated February 24, 1997 was prepared, whereby Steuerer conveyed to Richards a
one-half interest in the subject property. The deed was notarized and recorded on February 26,
1997. The deed was signed by both Steuerer and Richards. Steuerer testified that the purpose of
the deed was to be collateral for the $5,000 loan from Richards. Richards testified in her
deposition that the purpose of the deed "was to have some kind of collateral."
9.

Both parties were of the expectation and agreement that the amounts paid to Steuerer by

Richards would be repaid by Steuerer and, upon repayment, Richards would re-convey her
interest in the subject property to Steuerer. The parties did not agree as to a definite time for
repayment, other than to agree that Steuerer would repay the monies as soon as possible or when
he could. Richards, prior to the filing of this lawsuit, has never made a demand for repayment.
There was no agreement as to any interest to be paid and it was not a topic of discussion in the
original agreement.
10.

Prior to June 20, 2011, the last time that Steuerer personally paid any real property taxes

on the subject property was on April 2, 1997, in the amount of $201.58 [Exhibit 107]. This was
for the 1994 property taxes, which were delinquent and the payment was inclusive of the tax,
interest, and penalties owed to Lincoln County. In May 2000, Steuerer was delinquent in the
payment of his property taxes on the subject property for the prior years of 199 5 to 1999.
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Richards brought the property taxes current by her payments to Lincoln County dated May 8,
2000 and December 20, 2000 [Exhibits 108-112].
11.

On May 8, 2000, the same day that Richards paid part of the delinquent property taxes on

the subject property; Steuerer executed a Quitclaim Deed to the subject property, wherein he
conveyed his remaining interest in the subject property to Richards. The deed was notarized and
recorded on May 8, 2000. As with the Warranty Deed, the Quitclaim Deed was signed by both
Steuerer and Richards. The testimony of Steuerer and Richards is again in conflict as to t.1-ie
reason for the quitclaim deed; however, what is clear is that it was executed contemporaneously
with Richards' agreement to pay the property taxes on the subject property. Richards testified
that the purpose of the quitclaim deed was the same as the warranty deed, as collateral or
"something to assure me that he was going to pay me back."
12.

Between May 8, 2000 and December 20, 2010, Richards paid all of the property taxes,

including any interest and penalties, in the sum of $6,784.91 as follows:
Date of Payment

Amount of Payment

5/8/2000

$466.02

12/20/2000

$995.97

6/20/2001

$114.49

12/21/2001

$239.65

6/19/2002

$234.95

12/19/2002

$217.87

6/20/2003

$217.87

12/20/2003

$275.23

6/20/2004

$275.23
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13.

12/20/2004

$283.19

6/20/2005

$283.19

12/20/2005

$304.30

6/20/2006

$304.30

12/20/2006

$303.00

6/20/2007

$303.00

12/20/2007

$287.47

6/20/2008

$287.47

12/20/2008

$292.09

6/20/2009

$292.90

12/20/2009

$262.81

6/20/2010

$262.81

12/20/2010

$281.91

At all times relevant, between 1997 and 2010, Steuerer continued to occupy the subject

property and was not paying any rent to Richards; nor had Richards demanded the payment of
rent.

III.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

From the facts above the legal question is whether the monies paid by Richards to

Steuerer, between February 1997 to July 1997, and the property taxes paid by Richards, between
May 8, 2000 to December 20, 2010, were loans and whether the Warranty Deed, executed on
February 25, 1997, and the Quitclaim Deed, executed May 8, 2000, were intended as a
conveyance of title or a mortgage.
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2.

"It is settled law of this state that a deed, absolute in form, the terms of which are not

ambiguous, may constitute a mortgage." Jaussaud v. Samuels, 58 Idaho 191, 71 P.2d 426, 431
(1937). It is undisputed that the plaintiff signed a warranty deed and quitclaim deed at different
times over to the defendant.

"\Vb.ere an instrument in writing in the form of a deed of

conveyance is executed and delivered as security for a debt, such instrument becomes a
mortgage, and not a deed, notwithstanding the form of the instrument." Bergen v. Johnson, 21
Idaho 619, 123 P. 484, 484 (1912). "This cou.."'i: is aware t.liat the burden is on the plaintiff to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that a mortgage, and not a sale, was intended."

Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 216, 440 P.2d 143 (1968). The court is also
aware that parol evidence may be considered when determining whether a deed was intended to
be a mortgage. Id The criteria to consider when determining if a deed was intended to be a
mortgage includes,
(a) existence of debt to be secured; (b) satisfaction or survival of the debt; (c) previous
negotiations of parties; (d) inadequacy of price; ( e) financial condition of grai.1tor; mid (f)
intention of parties .... While all these factors are to be considered, the controlling test to
be applied is whether the grantor sustains the relation of debtor to the grantee after the
execution of the instrument. A mortgage is an incident of the debt, and without a debt
there can be no mortgage.

Id It is undisputed that the plaintiff owed money to the defendant before and after the deeds
were executed and/or recorded; therefore, the debt existed at the time of the deed transfer and
survived after the transfer. "The fact that the grantee retains in his possession without
cancellation the written evidence of a debt raises a strong presumption that a conveyance given
did not extinguish the debt, and that a mortgage was intended." Dickens v. Heston, 53 Idaho 91,

21 P.2d 905, 908 (1933).
[TJhe consideration passing between the parties, or the amount to be paid by the grantor
on exercising his right to repurchase, would be fairly proportioned to the value of the
property, if considered as a debt or loan secured by a mortgage thereon, but grossly
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inadequate if regarded as the price of the land upon an absolute sale, this will tend
strongly to show that a sale could not have been intended, but that the transaction should
rather be treated as a mortgage. It is true inadequacy of price is not by itself alone
enough to justify a finding that the deed_ was intended as a mortgage, contrary to the
presumption arising from the face of the papers, but it is entitled to great weight when
coupled with other circumstances ...

Id at 909 (quoting 41 C. J. 33 7, § 101 ).
While the court does not have evidence of the fair market value of the subject property,
other than the value for purposes of property taxes, both parties agree that at the time of the loans
the subject property was expressly intended as collateral. It is clear that, at the time of the
execution of the two deeds, Steuerer was not intending to sell and Richards was not intending to
purchase the subject property.
3.

"If the grantor was severely pressed for money at the time of the transfer, so as not to be

able to exercise a perfectly free choice as to the disposition of his property, and raised the sum
needed by conveying his property in fee with a right of repurchase, his necessitous condition,
especially in co:r~11ection v,rit.11 the inadequacy of t}1e price, will go far to show that a mortgage
was intended." Dickens, 21 P.2d at 909 (quoting 41 C. J. 288, § 24). It is clear that, at the time of
the loans and the execution of the deeds, Richards had the subjective and objective belief that
Steuerer was possibly going to lose his property, due to the delinquent property taxes, and that
she did not want his property to be foreclosed on by
4.

County

Collector.

"The intention of the parties at the time an agreement to execute a deed is consummated

is determinative of whether the title is irrevocably transferred, or the conveyance is merely as
security for the payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho
546, 290 P. 205, 207 (1930). Again, as indicated above, the parties testified, in one form or
another, that the subject property, at the time of the loan, was intended as collateral. Richards
cannot unilaterally alter the intent of the parties at the time the deeds were executed. Since the
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deeds were intended to be a mortgage, Richards' remedy would have been a judicial foreclosure,
which she has not sought.
5.

Based on the evidence presented at the trial and the law as set forth above, the court finds

that in February 1997, Richards agreed to loan to Steuerer the sum of $5,000.00 and that she paid
part of this amount to Steuerer in monthly payments. The documentary evidence shows that
Richards paid to Steuerer the sum of $2,500.00 between February 25, 1997 and July 1, 1997.
Richards has been u..riable to present a.._71y additional doc1.1.tT1entai-::v evidence of any payments to
Steuerer after July 1, 1997. The court must find that Steuerer received the sum of $2,500.00 from
Richards over the period of February 25, 1997 to July 1, 1997. The court must further find that
the execution and recording of the Quitclaim Deed on May 8, 2000 was intended as collateral for
the repayment of the property taxes paid by Richards on behalf of Steuerer and, therefore, at the
time of the agreement, the parties intended the deeds to be mortgages.
6.

The parties also contest the issue of interest. It is clear that the amount of interest to be

paid or whether interest was to be paid on the loans was not discussed by the parties. When there
is no express agreement in writing fixing a rate of interest to be paid on "money lent," the
interest is allowed at the rate of 12% per annum and the interest is not to be compounded. LC. §
28-22-104(3); Doolittle v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 805, 814, 919 P.2d
334 (1996).
7.

The interest to be paid is governed by I.C. § 28-22-104 (2) for "money lent." The parties

did not state a definite period for repayment of the monies loaned by Richards to Steuerer;
however, they each testified that the money was to be repaid as soon as possible or when
Steuerer could make repayment. Richards testified that she would have liked to have had
Steuerer at least make payments of $50.00 a month, in an effort to repay the loans; yet, she made
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no demand for any type of repayment and this appears to only have been a subjective belief that
maki11i:r
was never communicated to Steuerer. Steuerer testified that he was in a -position to bef':in
_.
- - -o
payments to Richards in 2003; yet, he made no effort to send a payment even by way of "general
delivery." Prejudgment interest begins to accrue only after the money becomes due. Swanson v.

Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 519, 5 P.3d 973 (2000). '"\Vb.ere no time is expressed in a contract for
its performance, the law implies that it shall be perfom1ed within a reasonable time as
determined by the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the
circumstances attending the performance."' 97 Idaho at 178-79, 540 P.2d at 1357-58, quoting

Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43, 382 P.2d 906, 908 (1963)." Wolcott v. Booth, 101
Idaho 89, 92, 609 P.2d 156, 159 (1980). Steuerer testified that he had the ability to repay the
$2,500.00 in the year 2003 and, based on his ability to repay at that time, it is reasonable that
interest at the rate of 12% per annum would commence to accrue as of January 1, 2003. The
annual interest on the sum of $2,500.00 is $300.00 per year/$0.8219178 per day. The total
prejudgment interest due on the $2,500.00 loan, as of September 6, 2011, is $2604.66.
8.

Steuerer would also be obligated to pay prejudgment interest, for the same reasons as set

forth above, as to the property taxes paid on his behalf by Richards, beginning in May 2000.
Although the interest would not commence to accrue until January 1, 2003, as to the property
taxes paid by Richards prior to January 1, 2003. Otherwise, interest would accrue on the property
tax payments made by Richards after January 1, 2003 from the date of said payments. The total
prejudgment interest due on the payment of the property taxes as of September 6, 2011 1s
$4,755.22. The court has calculated the interest on the property taxes as follows:
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Interest Calculated to September 6, 2011
Date of
Pavment
5-8-2000
12-20-2000
6-20-2001
12-21-2001
6-19-2002
12-19-2002
6-20-2003
12-20-2003
6-20-2004
12-20-2004
6-20-2005
12-20-2005
6-20-2006
12-20-2006
6-20-2007
12-20-2007
6-20-2008
12-20-2008
6-20-2009
12-20-2009
6-20-2010
12-20-2010

I;;:~e~tf
$466.02
$995.97
$114.49
$239.65
$234.95
$217.87
$217.87
$275.23
$275.23
$283.19
$283.19
$304.30
$304.30
$303.10
$303.10
$287.47
$287.47
$292.09
$292.09
$262.81
I $262.81
$281.91

/ Interest per
. Day
$.15
$.33
$.04
$.08
$.08
I $.01
$.07
$.09
$.09
$.09
'I: • t)O
I....,
...,.,.

1

I

$.10
$.10
$.10
$.IO
$.09
$.09
$.10
$.10
$.09
$.09
$.09

I Days Since I ~~terest

Due*
3169
3169
3169
3169
3169
3169
2999
2817
I 2634
2452
2269
2087
1904
1722
1539
1357
1174
992
809
627
444
262

j
.......
I...__
...... _.

I

I

$475.35
$1045.77
$126.76
$253.52
$253.52
$221.83
$209.93
$253.53
$237.06
$220.68
I $204.21
$208.70
$190.40
$172.20
$153.90
$122.13
$105.66
$99.20
$80.90
$56.43
$39.96
I $23.58

*All loans prior to January of 2003 began to accrue interest on January 1, 2003. All loans post January of 2003
began to accrue interest on the date of payment. The days since due are only counted to September 6, 2011.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court, having considered all of the evidence and having entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law, without giving undue influence to any one factor, and good cause appearing,
it is ORDERED, ADJUGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1.

The court finds that the deeds executed by the plaintiff conveying the subject

property to the defendant were intended by the parties to be a mortgage to secure loans and
payment of real property taxes made by the defendant to or on behalf of the plaintiff.
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The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of $9,285.11, plus prejudgment
interest in the sum of $7,359.88, for a total judgment in the sum of $16,644.99, said sum shall
bear interest at the legal rate for post judgment interest until paid in full.
3.

Upon satisfaction of this Judgment, the defendant shall re-convey title of the

subject property to the plaintiff by delivering to the plaintiff a duly executed and notarized
Quitclaim Deed. The plaintiff shall bear the cost of the recording of the Quitclaim Deed.

4.

The determination of the prevailing party, if any, ai,d claims for attorney fees or

costs, if any, will be determined post-judgment in accordance with I.R.C.P. Rule 54.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATEDth.is

i.Q

dayof~{~l
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I, undersigned, hereby certify that on t h e ~ day of s.e-qoti:mJ:)..(' _fL-; 2011, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
was mailed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following persons:
Robert E. Williams
Attorney at Law
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Attorney for Plaintiff

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
400 S. Main St.
Ste. 303
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Attorney for Defendant
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L__ DUR/1., T COURT LINCO~~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
N .E.M. RICHARDS , aka NICKY
RICHARDS,
Defendants.
--------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2010-212

JUDGMENT

On September 6, 2011 the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order in the above entitled matter following a court trial. The Court, having considered all of the
evidence and having entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, without giving undue
influence · to any one factor, and good cause appearing, ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND

DECREES, as follows:
1.

The court finds that the deeds executed by the plaintiff conveying the subject

property to the defendant were intended by the parties to be a mortgage to secure loans and
payment of real property taxes made by the defendant to or on behalf of the plaintiff.
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2.

The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of $9,285.11 plus prejudgment

interest in the sum of $7,359.88 for a total judgment in the sum of $16,644.99, which sum shall
bear interest at the legal rate for post judgment interest until paid in full.
3.

Upon satisfaction of this Judgment the defendant shall re-convey title to the

subject property to the plaintiff by delivering to the plaintiff a duly executed and notarized
Quitclaim Deed. The plaintiff shall bear the cost of the recording of the Quitclaim Deed.
4.

The determination of the prevailing party, if any, and claims for attorney fees or

costs, if any, will be determined post-judgment in accordance \V:ith I.R.C.P. Rule 54.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this _ _
'7-'-._ day of

~-t,
\

, 2011

</~ldi?
It

J

1

\1,

I

John K. Butier, District 'Ju1tf)_.,

I

2-WDGMENT

.

I

!

Page

I 398

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

'l,

I, undersigned, hereby certify that on the
day of
~_/)h11 )A--2fil 1, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing JlJDGMENT was maiied, postag~ paid, and/or hand-delivered to
the following persons:
Robert E. Williams
Attorney at Law
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Attorney for Plaintiff

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
400 S. Main St.
Ste. 303
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Attorney for Defendant

Deputy Clerk
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fl ROBERT E. \\TJLLIArr1S
IDAHO STATE BARN0.1693

WILLIA.MS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0, Box 168
Jerome; Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324·3135
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFIB WDICIAL DISTJUCT OF 1RE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Lil~COLN

DONALD E. STEURER,
Case No. CV 2010 212
Plaintiff,
vs
N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY
RICHARDS,

MEMORANDUM
RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES;
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY

Defendant

STATE OF IDAHO )

ss:
County of Jerome

)

Robert E. W:illiams, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and snys:
1.

I am an attorney duly licensed and practicing law in the Stan· ofldaho. I am a partner

in the law firm of Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP.

ram the counsd ofrecord for Plaintiff,

DONALD E. STEUERER; (hereinafter "Plaintiff') in the above entitled matter.
2.

As attorney of record for Plaintiff, I am informed as to the items of fees, costs, and

disbursements expended in the prosecution of the above captioned action than is the Plaintiff.
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II

3,

The matters set furth herein are based upon my 0"'11 personal knowledge1 information

and belief, and are also based upon the accounts, recordsi and business lee .gets kept by our finn in
the regular and ordinary course of its business.

4.

The costs and disbursements set forth herein are to my know'.;edge and belief correctly

stated, properly claimed, and in accordance with I.R.C.P. 54. To my knowledge and beHef, all such
costs and disbursements were incurred or expended reasonably, in good faith, for purposes of

preparing, trying and. arguing this action. The costs and disbursements hen:·by claimed are truly and

correctly stated, and were actually paid, and are claimed in compliance with LR.C.P. 54(d) as

follows:
A.

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT ... I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l}!Q.:

FILINO FEES:

Complaint

88.00

$88.00
SERVICE FEES:

Service of Complaint and
Summons on Defendant
Service of Deposition Notice
for N.E.M. Richards
Service of Subpoena - Duces

45.00
60.00

57.00

Teourn on Wells Fargo Bank

$162.00
DEPOSIDON Cosrs :POR
ORJGINALS AND/OR

COPlES OF THE
FOLLOWING
DEPOSITJONS;

Deposition ofN.E.M.
Richards, aka Nicky Richards

329.39

Deposition of Donald E,

177.96

Steuerer
$507.35

Total:

$757.35
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I further certify that the follovving attomey fees were incm red by Plaintiff through

August 24, 2011, which are based upon the records of your affiant's law firm; that the hours shovVn
are accurate, and the rates are reasonable in arnount1 considering the tim, and labor required 1 the
difficulty of the questions, the requisite skill required to perform the legal services properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney involved, prevailing charges for lik,3 work, time limitations

obtained in similar cases:

A

ATTORNEY'S FEES - I.R.C.P. 54(e);
R,\TE

ATTOAATEY

HOURS

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS

74.2

$200.00/hr

$14,840.00

JOHN B, LOTHSPETCH

4.6

$175.00/hr

$

B.

CHARGE

805.00

A true and correct coy of the itemization of the services re1tdered under 5.A above

is attached hereto as SCHEDULE 1.
TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES CLA.IMED:
6.

$15,645.00

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this ca:;e under Idaho Code§

I 2-120(3 ). Plaintiff prevailed in the quiet title action, in that the Court ruled that the deeds to

real property, signed by the Plaintiff, which resulted in record ovm.ership ,if the real property in
the Defendant were intended to be mortgages, as advocated by the Plaintiff. The Court also ruled
that money given by Defendant to Plaintiff in connection with the deeds were loans, also as
advocated by Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that one of the purposes of the le.ans received by him

from the Defendant was to allow him to open a bar on the real property th.:i.t was the subject of
the quiet title action. The loans were therefore made for a commercial pwpose and constitute a

commercial transaction. Wi.ere a commercial transaction constitutes the gravamen of the suit, in
that it is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the Plamti:ff seeks to recover,
an award of attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) can be made. Johanns,·n vs Utterbeck, 146
Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008).
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Plaintiffs claims asserted in this case arose directly from the loan transactions
between the parties, because the deeds involved were executed and recoded pursuant to the
loans. The loans had a commercial purpose and were the basis upon whi;h Plaintiff sought to
quiet title to the real property, Having prevailed in the case, Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded
attorney's fees pursuant to IC.§ 12-120(3).

7.

Additional fees will be claimed in the event an additional 1.earing is required,

8.

The undersigned verifies under oath that the abo--ve c.osts~ disbursements, and

attorney fees are true Wld accurate to the best of A:ffiant)s knowledge and ,l.!e properly and
correctly set forth in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED thisU day of September,

.

SUBSC!HRED and SWOKN" to before me t:b.Js

J/) ~day of September, 2011.

Residing at
Commission e

ires;

3/ ~J '-z:..o /b
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ..2Q. day of September, 2011, I sel"Ved a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names arici addresses appear
below by the method indicated:

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1861
· J

Hailey, ID 83333

'ia US Mail, Postage Paid
O'Via Facsimile - _______ O
Hand-Delivered· Cour1 Folder

I CJ Other

ROBERIE. WILLil,MS
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VVQ/ VV:;J

Will~ M ~ & LO(}Jspeicl,,1 W'
Attorne:91 at Law
P.O. Booc 166

Jerome; ID 83338--0xoB

SCHEDULE 1

I DATE

I

9/8/2010

HOURS

ATTORN.E\'

1.3

REW

9/8/2010

1.5

REW

10/05/10
10/13/2010

.3
.3

REW
REW

10/22/10

.2

REW

11/1/10
11/5/10

.1
1

REW
REW

12/6/10

2

REW

l2/l4/10
. 12/20/10

,7

.2

REW
REW

1/7/10

.3

REW

1/19/11

·-'

REW

l/22/11

.6

REW

2/1/11

J

2/4/11

.7

TEW
REW

2/15/11

.2

REW

2/17/11

.4

REW

3/14/11

3.5

REW

3/14/2011

.2

REW

..,

A.1\1.0UNT

DESCRIPTION

Conference with Donn Bordewyk and
Don Steuerer; Telephone Conference
with Patti at Land, Title and Escrow;
Research.
Preparation of Complaint
Review litigation guarantee
Telephone conference with Tim Stover;
tic vi.i.th Donn B.
Email communication with T. Stover;
Review correspondence
Email communication with Donn B.
Telephone conference with Donn B. (2x:.
Review answer
Telephone conference with Donn B.; tic
with Tim Stover. Preparation of
discovery requests; note ofissue and
request for trial settin_g

Revise discovery requests
Teleohone conference with Donn B.
Email communication with Donn B.; tic
with Donn B.
Telephone conference with Donn B.; tic
with Don S.; tic with Tim Stover
Letter to Donn B, and Dons.; telephone
conference with Don S.; review responsE
to request for admission and

correspondeP,ce
Telephone conference with Donn B.
Conference with Don S., Donn B, and
Tim Stover
Telephone conference with Tim Stover,
tic with Donn B.
Preparation of notice of deposition and
subpoena
Conference with clients; preparation for
deposition; attend deposition of Nikki
Richards
Telephone conference with Donn B.; tic
with Tim Stover

260.00

300.00
60.00
60.00

I

40.00

I
20.00
200.00

400.00

140.00
40.00

60.00
60.00
120.00

20.00
140.00
40.00
80.00
700.00

40.00
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3/15/2011

1

REW

3/19/11
3/22/11
3/23/11

.2
']

REW
REW
REW

4/7/11

.4

REW

4/14/11

1.5

REW

4/20/11

.3

REW

5/2/11

1.6

REW

.1

5/5/11

I.2

REW

5/7111

3

REW

5/1 I/11

2

REW

5/12/11
5/12/11

.3

REW
REW

1.5
1.8

5/13/11

5/16/11

5/27/11
5/30/11
6/3/11
617/11

6/8/1 l

REW
REW

/ ·5

.3

REW
REW
REW
REW

1
.2

2.3

REW

6/20/11

.2
5.6

7/1/11

3.5

REW

7/4/11
7/5/11

2

REW
REW

7/6/11

.2
1

REW
I

7/9/11
7/11/11

1.7

1.5

lg) UU4/UU:;i

._I

REW
REW
REW

200.00

Court appearance at hearing on Stover's
Motion to Withdraw
Review order _granting withdrawal
Telephone conference wi.th Tim Stover
Telephone conference with Donn B.
Telephone conference with Alison B; tic
with DonnB.
Letter to Allison B.; review deposition
and file; research elements of deed as a
mort:;1:asi;e
Email communication with Allison B.;
revise letters
, Letter to clients; review discovery
responses; preparation of calculations of

40,00

20.00
20.00
80.00

300.00

60.00
320.00

loan amount owed
I
Revise letter to Dons.
Research and prepare motion for
summary judgment, affidavit, brief,
notice of hearing
Revise brief and affidavit
Preparation of affidavit of Donn B.
Revise brief and affidavit
Conference with Don S.. Donn B.; letter
to clients; citation check; final revisions
to brief
Telephone conference with Alison B.;
letter to Don S,; reviev,,,r fax
Preparation of pretrial statement
Revise pretrial statement
Telephone conference with Alison B.
Telephone conference with client;
prepare for and attend pretrial oonferenci:
Telephone conference with Alison B,
Telephone conference with Chris S.;
review new filings; preparation for
hearing on pending motions; attend
hearing
Prepare for and attend Steuerer
deposition
Research and prepare trial brief
Telephone conference with Chris S.;
review and revise trial brief
Telephone conference with Donn B.
Review deposition of Don S.
Conference with Donn B., Don S.;
preparation or meeting
I

40.00
600.00

400.00
60.00
300.00
360.00

100.00
60,00
200.00
40.00
460.00
40.00

1,120.00

700.00
400.00
340.00
40.00
200.00
300.00
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7/12/1 J

7.5

REW

Telephone conference with Chris S.;
preparation for trial; attend trial;
preparation of subpoena; Email
communication with Donn B.

7/14/11
7/19/11

.3
.4

REW
REW

7/22/11

.2

REW

8/11/11

2.5

REW

8/13/11

3

REW

8/16/11

6.5

REW

8/17/11

.4

REW

8/22/11

2

REW

8/23/11

3.5

REW

Letter to Wells Pargo
Telephone conference with Kay at Wells
Fargo; preparation of new subpoena for
reco:rds
Telephone conference with Wells Fargo;
tic with C. Simms
Preparation of proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law
Revise proposed findings of fact and
I
conclusions of law
I
Research and revise proposed findings of I
fact and conclusions of law
Review defendant's proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law
Research and prepare rebuttal to
plaintiff's findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw
Revision of rebuttal to plaintiff's :findings
of fact and conclusions of law

74.2
6/15/11

.2

JBL

Review ml"ltinn, siffirt~vit tri
motion to continue

4.4

40.00
500.00
600.00
1,300.00

I

80.00
400.00

700.00
$14,840,00

withdraw, notice of appearance and
6/20/11

60.00
&0.00

JBL

Telephone conference with REW,
review file, brief and affidavit;

35.00 I

I

770.00

research
4.6

805,00
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
H~ilPy, Trhh() R1111

PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
)
)
Defendants.
- - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - .)

CV-2010-212
OBJECTIONS TO COSTS &
ATTORNEY FEES AND
MOTION TO DISALLOW
I.R.C.P. 54

COMES NOW Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, by and through counsel, and files
these objections to Memorandum Re: Costs and Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiff herein
and therefore states as follows;
1.

Plaintiff, on or about September 20, 2011, filed a Memorandum Re: Costs and

Attorney Fees; Affidavit of Attorney, requesting this Court to award costs and attorney
fees, claiming entitlement to same under LC. Section 12-120(3).
2.

Defendant objects to said requests in that Plaintiff is entitled to neither costs or

attorney fees for the following reasons;
a. Plaintiff is not the prevailing party.
b. Plaintiff failed to request and cite to the specific legal basis for a claim of
costs and attorney fees at his first opportunity. Fournier v. Fournier, 125

OBJECTIONS TO COSTS & ATTORNEY FEES AND MOTION TO DISALLO"Wc:ige
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Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1994); Bingham v. Montane
Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999)
c. Plaintiff has not incurred costs and attorney fees.

Plaintiff himself

testified to this fact at trial, as did witness Borde·wyck, who testified Mr.
Williams worked for him and represented the Co-Op.

O'Neil v.

Schckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 480 733 P.2d 693, 701 (1986); Bowles v. Pro
Indiviso. Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 973 P.2d 142 (1999) citing Swanson v.
Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1989)
d. No underlying basis, contract, statute, or rule supports the award of
attorney fees. Plaintiff claims I.C. 12~120(3) as a statutory basis for his
claim of fees, apparently relying on the catch-all language " ... any
commercial transaction ... " However, the plain language of the statute
defining "commercial transaction" excludes transactions for personal or
household purposes. Clearly, the gravemen of the transaction between the
parties hereto was not commercial in nature. The money provided from
Defendant to Plaintiff, was given because Defendant felt sorry for Plaintiff
and she didn't want him to lose his house. Where gravemen of the case is
not a "commercial transaction" attorney fees should be denied. Spence v.
Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995) The award of attorney fees is
not warranted every time a commercial transaction is remotely connected
with the case. Brower v. E.I. Dupont, 117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990)
e. The Court in its discretion should deny Plaintiff's request for fees due to
the equities involved in the case. Certainly, this was a close case. Plaintiff

OBJECTIONS TO COSTS & ATTORNEY FEES AND MOTION TO DISALLO\P?,age _± 409

prevailed, not as a matter of law, but upon a balancing of the equities.
Defendant should not be punished for submitting to the court her
interpretation of the facts and law, when in fact she held deeds absolute,
had given money to Plaintiff, and never been repaid.

Defendant paid

Plaintiffs taxes, because she did not want Plaintiff to lose his home. If
Plaintiff were awarded attorney fees and costs it would be the classic case
of "no good deed goes unpunished."
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this Court to deny Plaintiffs request for costs
and attorney fees and to order the parties to each bear their own costs and fees.

ORNEY AT LAW

CHRJSTOPHERP. SLMMS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

DATED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of September, 201 L a true and

correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTIONS TO COSTS & ATTORl\TEY FEES
AND MOTION TO DISALLOWwas delivered to Robert E. Williams, Attorney for
Plaintiff, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street, PO Box

CHRJSTOPHER P. SIMMS
OBJECTIONS TO COSTS & ATTORNEY FEES AND MOTION TO DISALLOWge )3410

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7 4 73
P.O. Box 1861
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
ISB No. 7473
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
VS.
)
)
N.E.M. RJCHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I- V,
)
)
_ _ _ _ _D_e_£_en_d_an_t_s~_ _ _ _ _)
DONALD E. STEUERER,

CV-2010-212

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Fee Category: L4 $101.00

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, DONALD E. STEURER, AND HIS
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ROBERT E. \VILLIAMS, PO BOX 168, JEROME,
IDAHO, 83338 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HERBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, appeals against the above-named

Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment in the
above-entitled action dated on 8th day of September, 2011, the Honorable Judge John K.
Butler, presiding.·

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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2.

The Defendant-Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and

the judgment and order described in paragraph one (1) above is an appealable judgment
and order under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l), I.AR.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which appellant intends to assert

in the appeal are as follows:
(a)

The trial court erred finding Plaintiff met his burden that the Warranty
Deed executed by Plaintiff to· Defendant, granting a Yi interest in the
property in question, was a mortgage and not a sale of an interest in
real property with a right of repurchase.

(b)

The trial court erred finding Plaintiff met his burden that the Quitclaim
Deed executed by Plaintiff to Defendant, granting a complete fee
simple interest in the property in question to Defendant, was a
mortgage and not an outright sale with a right of repurchase.

4.

No order has been entered seaiing aii or any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests preparation of a

reporter's transcript of all proceedings in the compressed transcript format pursuant to

I.AR. Rule 26.
6.

Appellant requests preparation of the clerk's record to include each and every

document filed with the Clerk of the District Court, except and excluding notices of
hearing and stipulations relating thereto
7.

I certify that:
(a) A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Lincoln County
Candice Childers
233 West Main
Jerome, Idaho 83338

(b) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid, contemporaneously with the
filing hereof, the estimated fees for preparation of the designated reporter's
transcript as required by Rule 24.
(c)

The Clerk of the District Court has been paid, contemporaneously with the
filing hereof, the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record and all
appellate fees.

(d) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20, I.AR.

Dated

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Page !3413

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

11th

day of October, 2011, a copy of

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL was served upon Robert E. Williams, Attorney
for Plaintiff/Respondent, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main
Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135 and the Court
Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Lincoln County, Candice Childers, 233 West Main,
Jerome, Idaho 83338.

Christopher P. Simms

NOTICE OF APPEAL·
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
ISB No. 7473
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
)
)
- - - - - - - - ' =Defendants.
: . . = = = = - ' - - - - - - - ·)

CV-2010-212

A.MENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, DONALD E. STEURER, AND HIS
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ROBERT E. WlLLIAMS, PO BOX 168, JEROME,
IDAHO, 83338 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HERBY GIVEN THAT:
l.

The above named Defendant, N.E.M. Richards, appeals against the above-named

Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment in the
above-entitled action dated on

8th

day of September, 2011, the Honorable Judge John K.

Butler, presiding.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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2.

The Defendant-Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and

the judgment and order described in paragraph one (1) above is an appealable judgment
and order under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a}(l), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which appellant intends to assert

in the appeal are as follows:
(a)

The trial court erred finding Plaintiff met his burden that the Warranty
Deed executed by Plaintiff to Defendant, granting a Y:z interest in the
property in question, was a mortgage and not a sale of an interest in
real property with a right of repurchase.

(b)

The trial court erred finding Plaintiff met his burden that the Quitclaim
Deed executed by Plaintiff to Defendant, granting a complete fee
simple interest in the property in question to Defendant, was a
mortgage and not an outright sale with a right of repurchase.

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's limited transcript is requested. The appellant requests preparation of

a reporter's transcript of the Court Trial Hearing which trial hearing took place on July
13,2011.
6.

Appellant requests preparntion of the clerk's record to include each and every

document filed with the Clerk of the District Court, except and excluding notices of
hearing and stipulations relating thereto.
7.

I certify that:
(a) A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Lincoln County
Candice Childers
233 West Main

(b) The Court reporter has been paid directly the requested sum for preparation
of the reporter's transcript at the request of the Clerk of the District Court
and after personal communication with the C~mrt Reporter.
(c)

The Clerk of the District Court has been paid, contemporaneously with the
filing of the Notice of Appeal, the estimated fees for preparation of the
clerk's record and all appellate fees.

(d) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20, I.AR.

A:~ /ZANTNPELLANT
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS

/tJZ7-r(
Dated

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of October, 2011, a copy of
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED NOTICE O_F APPEAL. was served upon Robert E.
Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP,
153 East Main Street, PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via Facsimile to 208.324.3135
and the Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Lincoln County, Candice Childers, 233
West Main, Jerome, Idaho 83338.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
CV-2010-0000212
Donald E Steuerer vs. N .E.M. Richards
Hearing type: Motion for Attorney fees and Costs
Hearing date: 11/1/2011
Time: 9:50 am
Judge: John K Butler
Court reporter: Candace Childers
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Petruzzelli

950 Court introduces case
Mr. Williams present on behalf of the Plaintiff.
Mr. Simms present on behalf of the Defendant
951 :Mr. Williams begins argument.
954 :Mr. Simms argument.
956 Further comments from Mr. Williams
956 Courts comments as to entitlement to attorney's fees.
1001 Court denies plaintiffs request for Attorney's fees. Mr. Williams will prepare the
order.
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ROBERT E. WILLIAMS
lDAHO STATE BAR NO. 1693

\VILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

DONALD E. STEUERER,

Case No. CV-2010-212

Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MEMORANDUM
RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

VS

N.E.M. RICHARDS, aka NICKY RICHARDS,
and JOHN DOES I-V,
Defendants.
A hearing regarding the Memorandum RE: Costs and Attorney's Fees filed by the
Plaintiffin this matter came on for hearing before the Honorable John K. Butler at 9:45 a:m. in
the District Courtroom of the Lincoln County Courthouse. Robert E. Williams appeared on
behalf of the Plaintiff. Christopher P. Simms appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Court,
having reviewed the Memorandum RE: Costs and Attorney's Fees, and the Objection to Costs
and Attorney's Fees and Motion to Disallow filed by the Defendant, and having heard the
arguments of counsel, has determined that:
1.

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter and is entitled to claim costs as a matter of

right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(c).

ORDER oN MEMORANDUM RE: cosTs AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 1
\\SERVER\sHAREIDATA\STEUERER, DONALD1RICHARDS\0RDER ON MEMO RE COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES.DOCX
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2.

Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code §12-120(3) for

the reason that the quiet title action plead by Plaintiff does not qualify as a commercial
transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
a. Plaintiff is awarded its costs as a matter ofright in the amount of $757.35;
b. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code §12-120(3).

SO ORDERED this //{day of

JV(}Jev4<: 2011.

ORDER oN MEMORANDUM RE: cosTs AND ATTORNEYS FEES -2
\\SERVER\sHARE\DA TA \STEUERER, DONALD\RJCHARDS\ORDER ON MEMO RE COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES .DOCX
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II

CEKTU1LATE UJ:l SERVICE

lh

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of November, 2011, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addresses appear
below by the method indicated:

Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, ID 83333

.ffU.S. Mail, postage prepaid
D Hand Delivery - Court Folder
D Facsimile Transmission
D Federal Express

Robert E. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338

ffU.S. Mail, postage prepaid
D Hand Delivery - Court Folder
D Facsimile Transmission
D Federal Express

ORDER ON MEMORANDUM RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 3
\\SERVER\sHARE\DATA \STEUERER, DONALD\RJCHARDS\0RDER ON MEMO RE COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES.DOCX
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FILED
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Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law ISB #7473
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333
PH 208 788 2800
FAX 208 788 2300
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
DONALD E. STEUERER,

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
).
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
N.E.M. RICHARDS, a.k.a. NICKY
)
RICHARDS, and JOHN DOES I - V,
)
)
___D=-.,:.efi==e=n=d=an=t=-s--=-A"""p"-*p'-=e=ll=a=nt=s;;_.______)

ET,
COMES NTOW.. CO
- _ TUNS - FOR
- ---

Supreme Court Docket No.
39274-2011
Lincoln County DocketNo.
CV-2010-212
STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS

PPFT
T A" iT r'l11·1·
C'trvni,,,,,.
P
~ ,_,.,_,;...;.lJ', ~ l
'-'
v V_t-'H'-'J.

A
""~

i,

c::;,.,.,m"'
UUHH .::,l

.,~r1

UHU

advises the Court of the STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS in the above styled matter
pursuant to the Court's Order of January 30, 2012, and states the following;
1.

The above named parties were scheduled for mediation with the Honorable Mark

Ingram, Magistrate Judge, Fifth Judicial District at 1:30 pm on March 20, 2012, in the
Lincoln County Courthouse.
2.

The Plaintiff-Respondent and Defendants-Appellants, as well as their respective

counsel appeared ready for the mediation hearing on March 20, 2012. However, the
Honorable Mark Ingram was not present due to an ongoing trial in a different venue.
3.

The mediation hearing was rescheduled for 9:00 a.rn. on March 29, 2012, in the

Lincoln County Comthouse.
STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS
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4.

On March 29, 2012, all parties were present for the mediation hearing. The

Honorable Mark Ingram, Magistrate Judge, appeared and conducted the mediation
hearing. Progress was made toward resolution, but the case was not settled.

5.

Judge Ingram, concluded the mediation session, but adjourned the mediation

hearing for further consideration by the parties, regarding the offers of settlement made,

.

.

to be called back into session within the next thirty days, by request of either party or the
Court.
Respectfully Submitted:

'//
1
,
112~/ // / /

·'
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTOENBY FOR DEFEND ~T-APPELLANT

./ /

i~

Ii 1/
I
1·1,/
/f
I ;, · I
1

1

•

.,,//)

/v·· r·\/"

·

Gitristopher P. Simms

·'l

"'.:::i

-:, .-..

.

_)v'_/

-..

L

Dated

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 30th day of March, 2012, a copy of
STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS was served upon Robert E. Williams, Attorney for

Faa 27.3131
/1);/~

Plaintiff/Respondent, of Williams, Meservy, & Lothspeich, LLP, 153 East Main Street,

PO Box 168, Jerome Idaho, 83338, via

.
.

to

icz,=./_ _,,___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Christopher P. Simms

STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS
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FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

Donald E. Steuerer,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

N.E.M. Richards, a.k.a Nicky Richards,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Certificate of Exhibit' s
Supreme Court Docket No. 39274-2011
Lincoln County District Court No. 2010-212

I, Ruth Petruzzelli, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, do hereby certify that the following is a list of exhibits
that have been lodged with the Supreme Court.
EXHIBIT NO.

DESCRIPTION

DATE FILED

Deposition of N.E.M. Richards
212

Check carbons

July 13,2011

213

Check register

July 13,2011

214

Check# 425

July 13,2011

215

Check register

July 13,2011

101

July 13,2011

103

Warranty deed from Plaintiff dated February
24,1997
Quitclaim Deed from Plaintiff and defendant to
defendant dated May 8,2000
Check stub from defendant's check no. 1812

July 13,2011

104

Check stub for Defendant's check no. 1807

July 13,2011

102

Certificate of Exhibit's

July 13,2011
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105

) Check stub for Defendant's Check no. 1809

July 13,2011

I

106

107
108
109
110
111
112

113

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

124

Certificate of Exhibit's

Defendant's handwritten note, dates February
25,1997, March 3,1997, April 1, 1997 in the left
hand column
Lincoln County Tax Collector Delinquency
Document 1983/1984
1997 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector dated December 20,2000
1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from Lincoln County Tax
Collector dated May 8,2000
1998 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector dated December 20,2000
1999 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector dated December 20,2000
2000 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector dated December 20,2000 and June
20,2011
2001 Tax Bill/Receipt from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector dated December 21,2001 and June
19,2002
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector for the year 2002
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector for the year 2003
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector for the year 2004
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector for the year 2005
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector for the year 2006
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector for the year 2007
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector for the year 2008
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector for the year 2009
Tax transaction details from the Lincoln County Tax
Collector for the year 2010
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1997
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1998

July 13,2011

July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011

I July 13,2011
July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011
July 13,2011

July 13,2011
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125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

July 13,2011

History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 1999
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2000
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2001
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2002
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2003
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2004
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2005
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2006
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2007
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2008
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2009
History report from the Office of the Lincoln County
Assessor for Lots 4 and 5, Block E, City of
Shoshone, Idaho, for the year 2010
Affidavit of Donn W. Bordevryk

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011

July 13,2011
I

138
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Litigation Guarantee Order number: L-39662
Policy Number: 2200504 Dated September 17,2010
and Guarantee Date-Down Endorsement dated June
10,2011 on Lots 4 and 5 in Block E of Shoshone
Townsite

July 13,2011
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Seal of Said
Court on the

\

6

Day o~\MV

_

2012.

Suzanne McConnell
CLERK OF THE DI

Certificate of Exhibit's
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

Donald E. Steuerer,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
N.E.M., a.k.a Nicky Richards
Defendant-Appellant.

______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Certificate of Clerk
Supreme Court Docket No. 39274-2011
Lincoln County District Court No. 2010-212

1, Ruth Petruzzelli, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofidaho,
in and for the County ofldaho do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full and correct
Record of, the pleadings and documents under C Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules~.
1 do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or admitted in the
above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the
Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record retained in the possession of the undersigned), as
required by C Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits if there
are exhibits and no Reporter's Transcript or not listed in the Reporter's Transcript.)
IN WITNESS WYEOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court
(&V\...Q
~ , 2012.

this 15__day o

Suzanne McConnell
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

Donald E. Steuerer,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
N.E.M., a.k.a Nicky Richards
Defendant-Appellant.

)
) Certificate of Service
)
) Supreme Court Docket No. 39274-2011
) Lincoln County Case No. 2010-212
)
)
)
)

--------------)

I, Ruth Petruzzelli, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Lincoln, do hereby certify that I have personally served or
mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any
Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows:
Robert E. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338

Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, Idaho 83333

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court
this
day of
, 20 _ .
Suzanne McConnell
Clerk of the District Court

B~~QK
Ruth Petruzzelli, Deputy

Certificate of Service
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